Nepal in the Grasp of NGOs and INGOs: Why We should be Vigilant

I am still trying to process the events of Bhadra 23 and 24 (September 8 and 9) that occurred in Nepal. The youth protest turning into massacre on the first day and the riots the next day have shaken me to the core. The appointment of the new interim prime minister brought some calm, but I think another storm is yet to arrive.

The politics after the end of the riots and clear involvement of NGOs and INGOs have made me feel like a ramite, a spectator, holding on at the edge of history. I see the moves being made: the protests, the promises, the backroom deals. And I feel powerless, even as I care deeply. I am also finding more people who are worried about Nepal’s future. What has happened in my country in the last two weeks shows how a well-meaning peaceful protest can turn violent and how sovereignty can slip quietly from the people’s grasp.

What We Know About the Protests

1. Underlying cause of the protests
   • Politics benefitting a select few built tensions and frustrations. Lack of employment and better education due to political incompetence and interference drove out-migration among the youth.
   • Unhealthy and unpredictable coalitions among the political parties showed that they could do anything to hold on to power irrespective of the said ideologies.
   • Dominance of political parties in every institution of the country made them corrupt.
   • Political elites were immune to allegations of corruption, money laundering, and human trafficking.
   • The government was becoming increasingly arrogant and the riots in Tinkune on Chaitra 15, 2081 made it feel invincible.
2. What triggered the protests
   • The government banned 26 social media platforms (Facebook, WhatsApp, Instagram, YouTube, X, etc.) for failing to register under new digital service rules. This was justified under regulation of misinformation and foreign platforms. (Reuters)
   • For many young Nepalis (students, digital natives), social media is both livelihood and expression. The ban felt like censorship, but it also shone a spotlight on deeper discontents: corruption, lack of jobs, nepotism. (Reuters)
3. What followed: build up, escalation and outcomes
   • Social media ban was not that strict. A simple DNS change or overlay could bypass it. The Prime Minister himself was posting on Facebook, allowing youths to call out the hypocrisy.
   • On TikTok, which was not banned as it complied with government regulations, “nepobaby” trend got viral. The display of wealth by political elites and their children increased the rage of youths.
   • A call for protests by Gen Z (currently 13 to 28 years old) on September 8 came up on Reddit and was boosted by posts made by Balen Shah, RSP, and Rabi Lamichhane.
   • The “Gen Z” protests, which began peacefully demanding transparency and accountability turned deadly as the protesters went into the parliament building. Early estimates noted at least 19 killed in clashes near parliament. (Reuters) Later, news came that more than fifty were killed and almost one thousand were injured that day.
   • The next day, protests escalated to an unprecedented level all over the country and forced Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli to resign.
   • Riots afterwards incinerated the parliament building, the executive palace (Singha Durbar), Supreme and district courts, Department of Roads, CIAA, and many other public and private properties.
   • Nepal Army, who allowed burning of public properties took charge of the state for some time and called protesters for talks.
   • Interim Prime Minister Sushila Karki (former Chief Justice) was chosen by a poll of about 7000 people on Discord. (Reuters)
   • The President appointed the new Prime Minister without mentioning any constitutional provision.
   • As negotiations started, the President, the to-be prime minister, the Chief of Army, and the representatives of the protesters held backroom discussions. The transparency originally demanded seemed to recede. Deals were made. Some protesters said they did not want to become politicians; yet they became part of making high-stakes decisions. (Reuters)
   • The interim government says elections will be held in March 2026. (Reuters)
4. Constitutional and legal tension
   • Nepal’s Constitution (2015) has never imagined the absence of parliament and political parties. The situation now was that parliament had become dysfunctional, and no party could be trusted. The Constitution also has specific articles about how the government is formed (e.g., under Article 76) and about eligibility for high offices. There are provisions that limit who can serve, how ministers are appointed, and uphold rights like transparency, good governance, free speech. (Constitution of Nepal 2072 (2015))
   • The appointment of an interim Prime Minister who was not chosen under the usual partisan/House of Representatives route (Article 76). Also, the Constitution prohibits an ex-Chief Justice to hold an executive position (Article 132(2)). Appointment of former Chief Justice Sushila Karki as the Prime Minister raises questions about constitutional legitimacy. Although this has been defended by invoking the Doctrine of Necessity and the fact that the political parties were undermining the Constitution, writ petitions have already been put forth demanding interpretation by Constitutional bench. The registration has however been delayed by the lack of proper office for the Supreme Court.

Role of NGOs and INGOs in Nepal’s Protests and the Future

• Organizers, volunteers, and leaders: There were several organizers on the first day of protests. Some of them were associated with NGOs. Hami Nepal, an NGO that showed up as volunteers had also started the discord server, Youth Against Corruption, where polls for the Prime Minister occurred. Sudan Gurung of Hami Nepal was the prominent face as a representative of Gen Z, although he is over 35 years old. Many others associated with NGOs have also showed up as leaders. Deals have been made in the presence of NGO and INGO activists and many of them even have become ministers.
• Political control: In 2006, even though the peace process was flawed, there was a feeling that we had agency on political matters. Political parties and leaders, despite their corruption, could be voted out. Now, even that channel seems broken. NGOs and INGOs are outside constitutional provisions and there are no proper laws to hold them accountable. NGOs and INGOs are also formally prohibited to do politics. Moreover, we cannot fully trace where their funding, ideas, or political influence come from.
• Upholding Donor Agendas: Lord Action said, “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” NGOs and INGOs operating in Nepal now have absolute power. With almost nothing to check their influence, they can work in favour of their donors without much scrutiny. We have already seen how some of them want to sign agreements that are above the Constitution. They retracted the proposed agreements after a backlash, but such demands may come up regularly if we are not careful.

Why we should be more vigilant

I have seen several youths who say, “Why should we scrutinize everything this interim government is doing? Why don’t we close eyes on decisions it is taking? It has a mandate for conducting elections in six months. Let it do what it has to do.”

I disagree. Here’s why:

• In 2006, the restored parliament passed resolutions for abolishing monarchy and secularism without prior demands of the people. We may have to face a graver situation if we turn away from the government’s decisions.
• After the revolution of 2006, the illusion of control existed. We had parties, elections, visible political stakes. Even if deals behind closed doors were made, ordinary people felt they were participants in the process. In 2025, the illusion has slipped. When the “new faces” emerge, when INGOs mediate, when donors are involved, when constitutional norms are bypassed, we are watching someone else shape it.
• The worst result is normalization: if the Doctrine of Necessity becomes a recurring tool; if interim governments formed with NGO/donor backing become accepted as the norm; if constitutional requirements and citizen demands fade from discourse, then the foundation of democracy erodes.

What I Think Must Be Done

For me, seeing this, I believe:

1. Transparency must be demanded, not only from political parties, but also from NGOs/INGOs. We should track who funds them, what strings are attached, what influence they exercise.
2. Legal enforcement of constitutional norms must be strengthened. The Doctrine of Necessity must not become a shortcut to bypass rule of law.
3. Citizen awareness needs to grow, especially among educated people. We must keep in mind that that donor-backed leaders are not necessarily less corrupt, and that foreign funding comes with influence.
4. Institutional reforms must ensure that the only path to leadership is through constitutional legitimacy, that oversight mechanisms are real, that Parliament, judiciary, and local governance have teeth.

Conclusion

I feel we have lost whatever little agency we had. Watching Gen Z protesters demand accountability, seeing some of them move into rooms where deals are struck, noticing constitutional rules being stretched — it all tells me that Nepal is not fully collapsed, but it is certainly in a period of decline. The difference from 2006 is that we don’t even have the illusion of control anymore. I worry that in the eagerness for change, we may forget that how change happens matters as much as what change happens.

If this essay is shared, I hope it sparks more people to feel clear about our situation. And maybe, just maybe, that clarity can help us push back, reclaim our voice, and ensure that Nepal’s sovereignty is not just a word, but something we feel, something we steer.