I am a Nepali citizen currently working at Nepal Oil Corporation. I did my Master's in Engineering Geology and I have interests on literature, history, philosophy.
It is possible to summarize the main story of Life of Pi (2001) as “A boy, a tiger, a boat in the middle of the Pacific” (also shown on the cover and in the movie). However, it would be injustice to reduce the novel to just this visual. The novel in its core is philosophical as well as traumatic, with Martel’s genius metafictional storytelling that frequently blurs the line between fact and fiction.
Blurring of fact and fiction in Life of Pi
The overlap between fact and fiction begins with the prologue written in the form of an Author’s Note (written in italics). Here we meet the Author who is struggling in his career and is writing a novel on Portugal (which Martel eventually did) in Pondicherry, India. He meets Francis Adirubasamy, who tells about Piscine “Pi” Patel and claims that Pi’s story will make him believe in God.
Pi’s two stories
Next, we hear from Pi about his growing up in India with interludes from the Author (written in italics). We hear about Pi’s interest in zoology and theology, his simultaneous adoption of Hindu, Catholic, and Islamic faiths and religious practices, and the most harrowing of all, his 227-day ordeal in the Pacific after the sinking of the Japanese cargo ship, the Tsimsum. He tells the story of how he was stranded in a lifeboat with a zebra, a hyena, an orangutan, and the tiger, Richard Parker.
Towards the end of his story, Pi says, “…could you tell my jumbled story in exactly one hundred chapters, not one more, not one less?” Leaving out the prologue, the Author does exactly that, sometimes cleverly using one-liners in some chapters and even two words in Chapter 97: “The story.”
The last five chapters are his conversation with the officers of the Japanese Ministry of Transport. Here, the officers make Pi tell another story without the animals because it is too incredible for the authorities. Pi then tells another story with the savage cook, the helpless sailor, his kindly mother, and himself (timid at first and gradually finding evil within him). The officers compare the cook with the hyena from the first story, the sailor with the zebra, the mother with the orangutan, and Pi with the tiger.
What I felt
The novel left me with many questions as it ended. I doubted if it fulfilled the promise that it would make one believe in God. I don’t know if it even changed my understanding of God. While Pi’s struggle in the Pacific feels traumatic and extraordinarily human, it did not change me. I felt that although Pi’s experience helped him shape his understanding of God, it also felt detached and dissociated.
Talking about detachment and dissociation, we can understand Pi’s two stories with trauma theory which Gabor Maté has described in detail in “The Myth of Normal.” Maté notes that “the mind can do some amazing things” to protect a person from pain, such as “leaving the body” or splitting the mind. By projecting himself as the tiger, Pi could allow his “animal” survival instincts to take over, while his “human” self remained a “harmless vegetarian boy, bookish and religious.” This allows him to survive his own “savagery” without his spirit breaking entirely. Thus, the tiger becomes a protective mask.
Conclusion
The two stories of Pi differ in details, but the synopsis remains the same: the ship sinks, Pi loses everything, and he suffers. When he asks the Japanese officers which story is better, they choose the imaginative and fantastic story with animals instead of the “dry, yeastless” story of human savagery. Pi finds peace, and so the story “goes with God.” In summary, life of Pi is about which story he chooses to believe no matter how irrational it is.
Before we begin this article, let’s watch the video below.
Courtesy: 7 News, Australia
The video shows Kim Jong Un being elected as the leader of his Workers’ Party with 100% approval. It’s legitimate voting according to Kim and his sycophants. But we know it’s not democratic. We know what happens to the North Koreans who defy Kim.
On the opposite spectrum is Switzerland, where voter turnout is less than 50%. The low turnout is because of the frequency and complexity of elections. They vote for popular initiatives – petitions filed by the public; for referendums for changing the constitution and laws; and for the election of representatives at different levels.
We also have countries Uruguay and Belgium with voter turnout of over 85% and that are highly democratic.
But then there are countries like Tunisia and Haiti, whose voter turnout in the last elections (2023 and 2015, respectively) sits at 11.4% and 17.8%. These countries have been classified as having poor democratic representation.
These examples paint a complex picture. Countries with both high and low voter turnout are authoritarian. Similarly, democratic countries also have both high and low voter turnouts.
In this article, we explore one aspect: how authoritarian regimes use elections for their legitimacy and why voting alone is not democracy.
In this post, we discuss…
“Performing” Democracy
Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their elected representatives.
A democracy, according to Robert Dahl, Philppe C. Schmitter, and Terry Lynn Karl, should have the following nine procedures:
Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.
Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.
Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government.
Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined.
Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law.
Citizens have the right to form associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups.
Popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutional powers without being subjected to overriding (albeit informal) opposition from unelected officials.
The polity must be self-governing; it must be able to act independently of constraints imposed by some other overarching political system.
Most people, however, believe that democracy refers to having regular fair elections. This fallacy, known as “procedural fallacy” or “electoralism”, rests on the erroneous faith that the mere act of holding elections will channel political conflict into peaceful contestation and confer legitimacy upon the victors, regardless of the structural conditions under which those elections occur.
Contemporary autocrats have mastered the art of “performing” democracy. They do not abolish institutions; they hollow them out. They do not ban opposition; they render it impotent. They do not cancel elections; they engineer them. They have turned democracy into illusion.
Elections, therefore, do not always equate to democracy.
Competitive Authoritarianism and Rigged Voting
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way introduced the concept of “Competitive Authoritarianism” to describe regimes that possess the formal architecture of democracy—legislatures, judiciaries, and multiple parties—but where the playing field is so heavily skewed it cannot be considered democratic.
The incumbent often has an advantage over others in competitive authoritarianism because of the following three generations of rigging.
First-Generation (Crude Rigging)
Prevalent during the Cold War and early transition periods, this kind of involves physical ballot stuffing, violent voter suppression, and the overt falsification of tally sheets. This method is high-visibility and high-risk.
The regime of Ferdinand Marcos (1965–1986) in the Philippines provides a quintessential example of Cold War proceduralism. After declaring martial law in 1972 to “save the republic” from communist insurgency, Marcos did not abolish the constitution; he replaced it with the 1973 Constitution, creating a parliamentary framework that concentrated power in his hands.
The 1978 elections for the Batasang Pambansa (Interim National Assembly) were a masterclass in performative democracy. Marcos allowed the opposition coalition, Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN), led by the imprisoned Benigno Aquino Jr., to run in Metro Manila. However, the regime denied LABAN access to media, banned public rallies, and engaged in massive vote-buying. On election day, the result was a clean sweep for Marcos’s Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) party (21-0 in Manila). The fraud was so blatant that it triggered a “Noise Barrage” protest, yet the U.S. State Department, prioritizing the security of Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base, accepted the “official” results as a step toward “normalization”.
Marcos repeated this in the 1981 presidential election, which he “won” with 88% of the vote against a token opponent, Alejo Santos, after the legitimate opposition boycotted. Vice President George H.W. Bush’s famous toast to Marcos—“We love your adherence to democratic principles and to the democratic processes”—encapsulated the era’s procedural fallacy: the existence of the process was sufficient for validation, regardless of the principle. It was only when the “Snap Election” of 1986 exposed the regime’s crumbling control and the military defected that the U.S. withdrew support, proving that validation was contingent on the autocrat’s ability to maintain stability, not democracy.
Second-Generation (Institutional Bias)
The second-generation rigging, prevalent in the 1990s and 2000s, includes gerrymandering, the packing of electoral commissions with partisans, and the misuse of state media.
The end of the Cold War fundamentally altered the incentives for autocrats. Overt dictatorships lost international funding and legitimacy. To survive, autocrats had to adopt the full architecture of democracy. This era gave birth to Competitive Authoritarianism, where the struggle was between Western conditionality (linkage and leverage) and the incumbent’s ability to manipulate the level playing field.
Alberto Fujimori’s regime in Peru (1990–2000) serves as a critical case study of how an elected leader can use democratic mandates to destroy democracy. Faced with a hostile Congress and the Shining Path insurgency, Fujimori executed an autogolpe (self-coup) in April 1992, dissolving the legislature and judiciary with military backing.
What followed was a sophisticated use of the procedural fallacy to regain international standing. Under intense pressure from the Organization of American States (OAS), Fujimori did not embrace permanent dictatorship. Instead, he:
Convened a Democratic Constituent Congress (CCD) to draft a new constitution.
Held a referendum to ratify it.
Organized general elections in 1995.
Fujimori won the 1995 election in a landslide (64%) against Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. International observers validated the election as procedurally “acceptable”, effectively washing away the sin of the 1992 coup. This validation ignored the underlying reality: the National Intelligence Service (SIN), led by Vladimiro Montesinos, was systematically bribing judges, media owners, and opposition figures to ensure Fujimori’s dominance. The “clean” election of 1995 masked the “dirty” institutional capture, allowing the regime to survive until the Vladivideos scandal exposed the rot in 2000. This case highlighted the danger of international observers focusing on election-day mechanics while ignoring the inter-election destruction of checks and balances.
Third-Generation (Autocratic Legalism)
Prevalent post-2010, the third-generation rigging involves “lawfare” (disqualifying candidates on technicalities), the capture of the judiciary, digital surveillance, internet shutdowns, and the deployment of “zombie observers” to dilute criticism.
The trajectory of Bangladesh under Sheikh Hasina (2009–2024) offers a stark illustration of how the procedural fallacy can eventually lead to regime collapse. Hasina employed progressively more brazen techniques to secure power:
2014: The “Uncontested Election” (BNP boycott leading to 153 uncontested seats).
2018: The “Midnight Election” (allegations of ballot stuffing the night before).
2024: The “Dummy Candidate” Election. To avoid another uncontested poll, the Awami League ran “independent” candidates who were actually party members to create the illusion of competition.
The international reaction to the January 2024 election was polarized. The U.S. and UK declared the elections “not free or fair”. Conversely, India, China, and Russia validated the results, prioritizing strategic partnership. Hasina relied on this geopolitical shield and the veneer of the election to claim legitimacy. However, this “procedural” victory severed the regime’s connection to the populace. Lacking genuine consent, the regime crumbled in August 2024 in the face of student protests, proving that while elections can satisfy foreign allies, they cannot permanently contain domestic rage without substantive legitimacy.
The Controversy of International Legitimacy
The persistence of electoralism is sustained by specific international mechanisms that allow autocrats to shop for legitimacy.
The “Zombie Observer” Phenomenon
Autocrats have neutralized the threat of international election observation by cultivating their own monitoring groups. Regimes in Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe, invite observers from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and various “GONGOs” (Government-Organized NGOs). These missions invariably issue reports declaring the elections “transparent, free, and democratic,” often contradicting the findings of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or EU. This creates an “epistemic fog,” allowing the autocrat to claim that criticism is merely Western bias and pointing to “international validation” from friendly blocs.
However, the West has also repeatedly established and accepted authoritarian regimes as long as they support their interests. For example, the US and UK intelligence orchestrated the Operation Ajax to overthrow Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, after he attempted to nationalize the British-controlled oil industry. In his place, they restored absolute power to the monarch, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The Shah ruled autocratically with a brutal secret police force (SAVAK) but was heavily armed and supported by the West until he was overthrown in the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Similarly, the West supported the military rule of General Pervez Musharraf (1999–2008) for Pakistan was the frontline state in the “War on Terror”. With this support, General Musharraf conducted a referendum to consolidate his rule in 2002.
The Foreign Aid Trap
Research by Cheeseman and Desrosiers highlights how Western aid can inadvertently strengthen electoral autocracies. By continuing “everyday engagement” and funding “capacity building” for captured institutions (like judiciaries or electoral commissions), donors validate the structures of repression.
The “Aid Curse”: In regimes like Rwanda and Uganda, high levels of aid reduce the government’s dependence on tax revenue, making them less accountable to their citizens.
Bureaucratic Inertia: Donor agencies are incentivized to move money and demonstrate “technical” success (e.g., “we trained 500 judges”), often ignoring the political reality that those judges are not independent.
Inconsistency: The discrepancy in how the West treats elections in strategic partners (Pakistan, Egypt) versus adversaries (Venezuela, Belarus) undermines the moral authority of democratic promotion.
Geopolitical Diversification
The rise of a multipolar world has been a boon for electoral autocrats. China and Russia offer a “no strings attached” alternative to Western validation. For regimes in Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Zimbabwe, the support of Beijing (via the Belt and Road Initiative) and Moscow provides an economic and diplomatic lifeline that renders Western conditionality ineffective. Autocrats can now “look East” for validation if the West demands too much democracy
Elections v/s Rule of Law
If elections are the engine of democracy, the Rule of Law is the chassis. Without a strong legal framework, the engine tears the vehicle apart. The World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index 2025 provides alarming evidence of a global “Rule of Law Recession” that is accelerating, undermining the very foundations of democratic governance.
The Global Rule of Law Recession
In 2025, the global rule of law continued to deteriorate, with 68% of countries, including Nepal, experiencing a decline in their scores. This represents a significant worsening from the previous year, where 57% of countries declined.
Top Performers: The Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden) and New Zealand continue to set the global standard. These nations demonstrate that high rule of law is inextricably linked to high levels of social trust, low corruption, and generally high voluntary voter turnout.
Bottom Performers: Venezuela, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Haiti, and Nicaragua rank lowest. In these nations, the law has ceased to be a constraint on power and has become an instrument of state control.
The Collapse of Checks and Balances
The most concerning trend identified in the WJP 2025 report is the targeted erosion of constraints on government powers. The pillars that are meant to hold the executive branch accountable are crumbling.
Legislative Weakness: Legislative checks on executive power declined in 61% of countries. Parliaments are increasingly bypassed by executive decrees or are dominated by super-majorities that act as rubber stamps for the leader’s will.
Judicial Capture: The judiciary is the “last line of defense” against executive overreach, yet it is currently losing ground. Judicial independence declined in 61% of countries. When courts are captured, as seen in the 2024 judicial reforms in Mexico which introduced the popular election of judges, the capacity for legal redress vanishes.
Trust Deficit
When a citizen cannot resolve a land dispute fairly or enforce a business contract because the courts are corrupt or inefficient, their trust in the “system” evaporates. This breeds cynicism and paves the way for populist strongmen who promise “justice” through extra-legal means. The data shows a clear correlation: countries with low civil justice scores (e.g., Venezuela, Cambodia) also have the highest levels of democratic dysfunction.
Corruption v/s Democracy
Corruption is not merely a financial crime; it is a solvent that dissolves democracy. The 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) report by Transparency International paints a grim picture of the relationship between graft and governance, revealing a world where anti-corruption efforts have stagnated.
Global Stagnation and Regional Trends
The global average CPI score remains stuck at 43/100, unchanged for over a decade. More than two-thirds of countries score below 50, indicating serious corruption problems.
Eastern Europe and Central Asia: This region is trapped in a “vicious cycle” where weak democratic institutions allow corruption to flourish, and the proceeds of that corruption are used to further weaken institutions.
Western Europe’s Slide: Even top-performing regions are backsliding. The UK (Rank 20) and other Western European nations have seen scores drop due to issues of “undue influence,” lobbying scandals, and the fraying of ethical standards in public office. This highlights that no democracy is immune to the corrosive effects of money in politics.
The Corruption-Turnout Nexus
The relationship between corruption and voter turnout is complex and context-dependent.
The Mobilization Effect: In functioning democracies, high perceptions of corruption can increase turnout as angry citizens mobilize to punish incumbents through voting. This was evident in the 2024 elections in South Africa and Senegal, where frustration with entrenched corruption contributed to significant political shifts and the loss of majorities for ruling parties.
The Apathy Effect: In contexts of systemic, endemic corruption, the effect is often the opposite. In Nigeria (CPI Score ~25), low turnout often reflects the widespread belief that the system is so rigged that voting changes nothing. When the electorate believes that all candidates are corrupt, the rational response is disengagement.
The Populist Bridge: High corruption perceptions often predict the rise of populist leaders. When “mainstream” parties are viewed as corrupt elites, voters turn to “anti-system” candidates who often dismantle democratic checks under the guise of “draining the swamp.” This narrative has been potent in the US, Brazil, parts of Europe, and in Nepal.
Wealth v/s Democracy
Seymour Martin Lipset’s seminal 1959 modernization theory posited that economic development creates the social conditions—literacy, a robust middle class, and civil society—necessary for democracy. The data from 2024-2025 challenges the universality of this thesis, suggesting a more fractured relationship between wealth and liberty.
The Anomaly of Wealthy Autocracies
The existence of high-income autocracies contradicts the linear Lipset trajectory. Countries like Singapore, Qatar, and the UAE possess high GDP per capita but maintain restrictive political systems.
The “Singapore Model”: Singapore ranks 3rd in the CPI (very clean) and has high governance effectiveness (Rank 9 in Governance Index), yet it restricts political pluralism. This represents the “technocratic authoritarian” ideal—a social contract where citizens trade political liberty for economic prosperity and administrative competence.
The Rentier State: The Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE) use oil rents to buy social peace, effectively severing the link between taxation and representation. The WJP Index shows these nations with relatively high rule of law scores regarding order and security, but abysmal ratings on fundamental rights. This demonstrates that wealth generated through resource extraction does not produce the same democratic pressures as wealth generated through industrialization or innovation.
Wealth Inequality: The Great Distorter
The distribution of wealth appears to be more predictive of democratic health than the aggregate wealth. High GDP per capita in the United States ($75,492 PPP) coexists with significant inequality and decline in democracy.
Inequality and Voice: Research on civic engagement indicates that economic inequality skews political influence. In unequal societies, the wealthy have disproportionate access to policymakers through lobbying and campaign finance, while the poor are marginalized. This leads to policies that further entrench inequality, creating a cycle of exclusion.
Poverty and Vulnerability: In lower-income democracies, poverty makes the electorate vulnerable to clientelism. Vote buying was recorded in at least 17 national elections in 2024, a direct consequence of economic vulnerability where a vote is sold for immediate subsistence needs rather than cast for long-term policy goals.
Conclusion
As we have seen from history, authoritarians have often arisen from elections and embraced them. Through clandestine operations and rigged international observers, they establish themselves as purveyors of democracy while dismantling democratic institutions. The global decline in rule of law and increasing corruption pose threat to the “rule of the people”.
Voting is necessary for democracy, but it should not be exclusive. As @NotsoLalit says in the embedded tweet, when grievances are reduced to elections, democracy becomes a formality and free pass for politicians to make promises without delivering anything. Also, a sustainable democracy is not limited to the tenure of elected representatives. It has to be a continuous process.
Ensuring meaningful participation of people at all levels is the key to strengthening democratic institutions. Moreover, without a restoration of the rule of law, the ballot box risks becoming nothing more than a coffin for liberty. The task ahead is not just to get out the vote, but to ensure that the vote still matters.
In the ever-illusory modern democracy, party politics plays a significant role in organizing people, speaking for the well-being and development of the country, and raising voices against tyranny. However, parties often delve into demagoguery. And while the intraparty unity keeps cadres together (at times, to the level of sycophancy), interparty rivalries can sow divisions among the citizens even in issues related to humanity or national interests. Schisms have deepened so much that even families are fragmenting. Individuals have been atomized so much that the parties—the purveyors of democracy—have become authoritarian.
In this post…
How Political Parties Create Divisions
Because there are individuals and groups that think differently about how politics should be conducted, many ideologies have developed over time. A political party sets its goals and the means of achieving goals according to the ideology it adopts. Ideology also allows parties to adopt the form of governance, such as autocracy, democracy, or theocracy, and the economic system, like capitalism, socialism, communism, and so on. These economic systems have also come to be defined as political ideologies on their own.
In most countries, political ideologies adopted by parties can be divided into left-wing and right-wing. The terminologies originated during the French Revolution in 1789. The supporters of traditional values and hierarchy sat to the right of the king in the National Assembly, whereas the revolutionaries demanding radical changes sat to his left. Eventually, right-wing politics adopted conservative philosophy, advocating limited government, free market capitalism, and strict immigration policies. Similarly, the left wing took up liberal philosophy, demanding equality, government market intervention, and more open immigration policies.
However, despite the relevance of the left-right framework as an analytical tool for understanding political competition, it simplifies a more complex reality. In some contexts, parties combine elements from both traditions; others may shift positions over time in response to social change.
Political parties may also be defined by the strategies they use to forward their ideologies and actions. They may be populists, where a single charismatic leader guides or directs followers, or issue-based, seeking to solve various issues even in the absence of a charming leader. Most parties flock around one or a few leaders and also carry issues that need to be solved.
In Nepal, a new kind of division has emerged in the recent decade. There are the older parties that stick to positions of power and are seen as corrupt. In the opposite spectrum are the newer parties that are cleaner, less experienced alternatives. This assortment is a result of generational conflict stemming from the indifference of the older generations to the voice of the younger citizens.
Even though the ideologies, philosophies, and strategies are often blurry, political parties present themselves as strictly adhering to a certain ideology, philosophy, or strategy. These are etched in the intraparty laws, policy papers, various publications, and eventually, in the minds of the followers. Parties may not explicitly say they are divisive, but the ideas become so indelible that they cannot accept the other spectrum. Party politics most often radicalize followers so much that they become their defenders even at the cost of their lives.
Depth of the Schisms
As if the vertical divisions of left- and right-wing politics were insufficient, political parties have now promoted horizontal divisions between generations. Radicalization of party followers and cadres has driven deep wedges between individuals, families, society, and even nations.
Politicization has reached such a serious state that no individual can be trusted. Opposing ideas are bashed immediately—online masks aggravating the issue even more. Fathers and sons, mothers and daughters, and brothers and sisters have petty fights in support of their political parties and ideologies. Moreover, political paradigms have turned into identities of societies and nations, sowing a deep sense of betrayal against those who oppose the views.
Consequences
The divisive party politics affects individuals, families, societies, and nations at different levels, ranging from discussions that can be solved easily to complexities resulting in wars involving different nations.
1. Solvable differences
Ideological differences can create intense debates. However, some of them can be solved by identifying common grounds and interests. Spectrums of ideas exist within the extreme ends of left and right. While extremities tend to dehumanize issues, the ideas in the middle are more humane and achievable. Solving differences between ideologies also leads to improved relations between the political actors.
2. Passionate rows and rivalries
Humans tend to cooperate to fulfill their interest, but more often, they love to maintain rivalry with those who have opposing views. Party politics enjoys maintaining rivalries because they (1) divide and rule, (2) have their ego inflated when they are proven correct, and (3) win elections when the opposing ideologies fail.
3. Ad hominem attacks
Disputes don’t always get solved, though. And parties don’t always involve ideologies. Ad hominem attacks, or personal slanders, are becoming increasingly common in political speeches. Because of the rising popularity of a leader and lack of impunity, rivalries become personal. As such, ideologies become obsolete, and cults develop around the leader. Loyal henchmen, in coordination of cabals, surround their cult leader.
4. Dishonesty/Moral corruption
Cults separate political leadership from the actual political realities. Obsequious henchmen inflate the ego. The leader and his party start believing that they are invincible. Corruption prevails. Rule of law is thrown out of the window. Dishonesty and immoral behaviours become the norm. Citizens become more divided.
5. Mob violence
Divisions sown by political parties, coupled with corruption, give rise to violence in societies. As impunity prevails, crimes get normalized. Cadres and supporters of political parties turn increasingly violent against rivals. Mob justice becomes the norm.
6. National disruption
Crowd psychology is different from that of the individuals in isolation. The increased intensity of mob violence can result in disruptions at national levels. If the parties who are in power suppress the dissent, they turn more authoritative. If they are displaced, the new forces are called revolutionaries. But if a revolution brings destruction and little to no hope, is it really a revolution?
7. Foreign Interference and Proxy Conflicts
Extreme polarization from party politics makes a nation vulnerable to foreign interference. When domestic parties prioritize defeating their rivals over national interest, they often seek external alliances to gain an upper hand. Consequently, the nation becomes a chessboard for larger geopolitical powers. By openly aligning with foreign regimes or accepting outside backing, domestic political parties act as proxies. This not only compromises the country’s sovereignty but can also drag citizens into prolonged, devastating proxy conflicts that serve foreign interests rather than local needs.
8. International Wars
Partisan politics does not remain confined within national borders. When political ideologies become rigid and moralized—portraying opponents not merely as rivals but as existential threats—such polarization can extend into foreign policy. States governed by highly ideological parties may begin to interpret international relations through the same lens of division that shapes domestic politics.
The twentieth century offers a significant illustration. The prolonged confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War was rooted not only in geopolitical competition but also in ideological antagonism between liberal capitalism and communism. Although it did not escalate into direct large-scale war between the two superpowers, it generated proxy conflicts across Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Domestic political rhetoric in both countries reinforced the perception that compromise was weakness and coexistence was morally suspect.
Countering the Political Divide
Supporting a political ideology and debating against rivals can feel satisfying, but as we saw, dissent can spiral down to a dangerous territory. We should thus be careful not to allow party politics to disrupt the well-being of individuals, societies, and nations. Following are the suggestions to promote healthy discussions and debates.
1. Empathy
Ideological debates without empathy can easily turn into ad hominem attacks. If you understand why a person follows certain ideas about politics, you can agree with them on common matters. Even if you don’t, you can gracefully acknowledge their shortcomings. Such debates and discussions also help identify common ground.
2. Educating yourself about various ideologies
Political thoughts and actions don’t originate and arise in a vacuum. They are rooted in the conditions of society and their aspirations. When you learn about political ideologies, you know their origin, the goals they want to achieve, and the means to support them. As a result, you build empathy. You may also develop a new ideology from the analysis of shortcomings of the existing ideologies and expectations of your society.
3. Dissociation from party politics
Sometimes taking sides can be difficult. In such cases, if you dissociate from the ways parties think and operate, you can see the bigger picture. Thinking beyond the established rhetoric helps you identify the issues at hand, the stance taken by the parties, and their strengths and shortcomings. Such an analysis ultimately helps strengthen the rule of law and democracy.
4. Unity in humanitarian or national issues
If you are debating for or against a party or ideology, even in cases against dignified living, human rights, and national issues, take a break to think about how party politics has divided the people. Take measures to bridge gaps with the opposition and solve problems empathetically. If your party or ideology is not allowing you to take selfless actions, you will be doomed.
Conclusion
Political parties are indispensable to democratic governance. They organize representation, structure public debate, and provide mechanisms for accountability. Yet when loyalty to party eclipses commitment to constitutional principles, human dignity, and the rule of law, democratic competition can deteriorate into polarization and exclusion. Ideologies, which are meant to guide collective aspirations, may instead harden into identities that promote divisions and resist dialogue and compromise.
Unchecked party politics narrows the space for reasoned deliberation. It encourages citizens to perceive opponents as adversaries rather than fellow participants in a shared political community. Over time, such attitudes weaken social trust and strain the institutional foundations of democracy itself.
Countering this trajectory requires conscious civic effort. Empathy, intellectual openness, and a willingness to engage ideas critically rather than defensively can help preserve pluralism. Democratic societies thrive not in the absence of disagreement, but in their ability to manage disagreement constructively.
If citizens remain attentive to shared constitutional values and humanitarian principles beyond party lines, political competition need not become social fragmentation. The challenge is not to eliminate party politics, but to prevent it from eroding the very democratic culture it is meant to sustain.
How does a country merge with another? Does a referendum held within 72 hours have legal validity? How do foreigners play in domestic issues? Indian journalist and editor Sunanda K. Dutta-Ray, who was close to the Chogyal of Sikkim (Sukhim/Denzong), explores these issues in detail in Smash & Grab: Annexation of Sikkim.
In this post, you’ll read about…
A Brief History of Sikkim
Independent Existence and British Shadows
Sikkim had an independent existence even before the Treaty of Sugauli between Nepal and the British East India Company in 1815. In 1642, Phuntsog Namgyal had become the first Chogyal of Sikkim. The term Chogyal is derived from Tibetan, which means ‘the gyalpo (king) who defends the chho (Dharma). After the Treaty of Tumlong in 1861, Sikkim, which was a British protectorate, became a protectorate of India when India became independent.
Plights as the Protectorate of India
Ever since India became independent from the British, the feeling that a republic should not have a monarchical protectorate had developed in the Indian administration. Nehru did not consider it a big deal. But in 1951, China established complete control over Tibet. After the Tibetan uprising in 1959 and the war with China in 1962, India became suspicious. Due to the religious-cultural ties between Lhasa and Gangtok, fearing that China might also take over Sikkim, India came to the side of annexing Sikkim.
However, since it had a democratic image and had helped Bangladesh gain independence, it was not possible for India to launch a direct military attack. Similarly, India controlled the communications, foreign affairs, and resources necessary for the development of Sikkim. The British colonial period also continued to interfere internally through political officials and chief executives.
Shifting Demographics, Politics, and Indian Interests
After the British protection, Nepali-speaking traders entered Sikkim, which was created by the Bhutia-Lepchas, in large numbers. By the 1970s, the Bhutia-Lepchas were only 25 per cent, i.e., a minority in their own country. However, since the power was with them, the majority Nepali-speaking people were afraid that something would happen. There were Kazis of all castes, but their power was waning as the Chhogyals had limited authority. During the power struggle, they began to seek democratic rights.
Lendup Dorji was one such Kazi. He did not have a good relationship with the Chogyal Palden Thondup Namgyal, who was based in Kalingpong. The rift between them widened after the Chogyal married Hope Cook and the Kazi married Elisa Marie. The Chogyal, who was trying to make Sikkim independent, lost popularity due to the Indians and their propaganda. A dictatorial rakshyah became his public image. On the other hand, leaders like the Kazi, Nar Bahadur Khatiwada, and Ramchandra Paudyal, who were trying to establish democracy, became widely praised.
With the involvement of Indian political officials, diplomats, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the intelligence agency RAW, the Chogyal was constantly weakened, and after the 1973 movement, the Kazi was gradually made powerful. Ashok Raina’s ‘Inside RAW’ says that this movement was run by RAW. However, the real power lies with the Indian Chief Executive. B.S. Das starts working above Chogyal. After him, B.B. Lal becomes the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and even assumes the powers of the Chief Justice.
The Referendum for Annexation of Sikkim
On April 14, 1975, he proposes the merger of Sikkim with India after the referendum. But Dutta-Ray makes a big question mark about the plebiscite being announced on the 10th, the voting on the 14th, and the results coming out overnight from remote places. Most people did not understand what the voting was for. Most of them thought it had been done to remove Chogyal as the head of the nation. Even journalists were not given proper access during the polls. Nar Bahadur Khatiwada later sent a memorandum to Morarji Desai, the Prime Minister after Indira Gandhi, saying that they were deceived. Former Prime Minister of Nepal Bishweshwor Prasad Koirala said that there was no referendum in Sikkim.
My Feelings on the book Smash & Grab: Annexation of Sikkim
Reading about how the simple-minded Chogyal and leaders of Sikkim were manipulated by clever Indians, I felt love for Sikkim and anger towards Indians. The Chogyal also seems to be at fault for not understanding the geopolitical pressures. Moreover, he could not reconcile with Lhendup Dorji on common national interests. Dorji, too, was so blinded by the prospect of gaining power over the Chogyal that he did not understand that he was only a pawn in the grand chessboard of geopolitics.
Datta-Ray weaves movie-like stories of characters, some of which are extremely moving, especially at the beginning. The ending, however, is abrupt. Since the book was first published in 1984, nine years after the annexation, the aftermath of the annexation could have been included, but it is not there. Moreover, the book has a high level of vocabulary, which slowed my reading.
One problem I have realised in reading the history of Sikkim is that there are several points of view. Smash & Grab: Annexation of Sikkim is biased towards Chogyal in the book. Angles from the “revolutionaries” in Sikkim, Indian bureaucrats, diplomats, and RAW agents portray different pictures. I will be back with those perspectives as soon as possible.
जब हामी पृथ्वीनारायण शाहको बारेमा सोच्दछौं, दिमागमा आउने छवि लगभग सधैं एक अथक सैन्य विजेताको हुन्छ। उहाँ त्यो राजा हुनुहुन्छ जसले आफ्नो तरवारको धारले दर्जनौं साना राज्यहरूलाई नेपाल राष्ट्रमा एकीकृत गर्नुभयो। यो तस्वीर सत्य भए पनि अपूर्ण छ। यसले योद्धाको पछाडिको वास्तुकारलाई सम्झन्छ।
पृथ्वीनारायण शाहको एकीकरण अभियानको वास्तविक प्रतिभा केवल उनको सैन्य रणनीतिमा मात्र थिएन तर उनको परिष्कृत, दूरदर्शी र प्रायः निर्दयी आर्थिक राज्यकलामा थियो। उनले जितको युद्ध जति उग्र रूपमा लडे, आफ्ना शत्रुहरूको अर्थतन्त्रलाई घाँटी थिचेर आफ्नो नयाँ राज्यको लागि संरक्षणवादी जग बसाले। यो नदेखिने आर्थिक शक्तिहरूको कथा हो जसले साँच्चै राष्ट्रलाई आकार दियो।
यस लेखमा…
५ आर्थिक रणनीतिहरू
१. आत्मसमर्पणका लागि प्रेरित गर्ने
काठमाडौं उपत्यकाका समृद्ध मल्ल राज्यहरू विरुद्ध पृथ्वीनारायण शाहको प्राथमिक रणनीति प्रत्यक्ष आक्रमण थिएन तर योजनाबद्ध आर्थिक घाँटी थिच्नु थियो। १७४४ मा रणनीतिक हिमाली किल्ला नुवाकोट कब्जा गरेपछि, उनले उपत्यकालाई तिब्बतसँग जोड्ने मुख्य व्यापार मार्गको नियन्त्रण कब्जा गरे – मल्ल अर्थतन्त्रको जीवनरक्त।
यो एकल चालसँगै, उनले दण्डनीय आर्थिक नाकाबन्दी स्थापना गरे। मल्ल राजाहरूलाई एक पटक एकल भन्सार शुल्क तिर्ने सामानहरूले अब उनलाई दोस्रो, छुट्टै शुल्क तिर्नु पर्थ्यो। यसले व्यवस्थित रूपमा उपत्यकालाई आकर्षक ट्रान्स-हिमालय व्यापारबाट काट्यो जुन यसको धनको प्राथमिक स्रोत थियो। टाढाको रणनीतिकार हुनुको सट्टा, उनी यो नयाँ आर्थिक हतियारको हातमा प्रयोग हुने सूक्ष्म प्रबन्धक थिए। तिब्बतबाट सुन खरिद गर्ने जिम्मेवारीमा रहेका आफ्ना एजेन्टलाई लेखेको पत्रमा उनले आफ्नो चतुर, व्यावहारिक दिमाग प्रकट गरे:
“सुन न गाली १६ रुपैयाँ तोला दिन्छ भने किन्नु। यसरी किन्न घटिया सुन न लिनु । तिब्बतीहरू सुनमा पितलको धुलो मिसाउने हुनाले सो कुराको विचार गरी सुन किन्नु ।… सोह्र रुपैयाँ तोला दिँयेनन् भने सोह्रमा एक सुक्का थपेर पनि किन्नू । थोरै सुन पाइने भए १७ रुपैयाँ तोला देखि न बढ्नु तथा १०–१२ हजार तोला सुन पाइये औ गालेर बेच्छन् भने १८ रुपैयाँ तोला दिएर पनि किन्नु।”
राजधानीमा आफ्नो अन्तिम आक्रमण हुनुभन्दा धेरै अघि, पृथ्वीनारायण शाहले बाहिरबाट आर्थिक संकटको सिर्जना गरे, जसले गर्दा निर्णायक युद्धहरू आउँदा मल्ल राज्यहरू आर्थिक रूपमा कमजोर र आन्तरिक रूपमा कमजोर भएको सुनिश्चित भयो।
२. हिमालयका असम्भव विश्वव्यापी व्यापारीहरू
पृथ्वीनारायण शाहको उदय हुनुभन्दा पहिले, यस क्षेत्रको चहलपहल व्यापारलाई उल्लेखनीय रूपमा विविध व्यापारी समूहद्वारा नियन्त्रित गरिएको थियो। तिनीहरूमध्ये प्रमुख काठमाडौँका नेवार व्यापारीहरू थिए, जसले तिब्बतसँग गहिरो व्यावसायिक सम्बन्ध स्थापित गरेका थिए, र राम्रोसँग जोडिएका कश्मीरी मुस्लिम व्यापारीहरू थिए, जसका व्यापारिक घरहरू भारतदेखि ल्हासासम्म फैलिएका थिए।
सबैभन्दा अचम्मको कुरा के छ भने, अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय व्यापारीहरूको एक प्रमुख समूह गोसाईं तपस्वीहरू थिए। यी पूजनीय पवित्र पुरुषहरूले आफ्नो धार्मिक हैसियत र आवागमनको स्वतन्त्रतालाई सीमा पार गर्न प्रयोग गरे, उच्च मूल्य, कम मात्राको सामानको शक्तिशाली व्यापारीको रूपमा काम गरे। नाकाबन्दीले उनीहरूको व्यवसायलाई कमजोर बनायो, र यी प्रभावशाली व्यापारीहरू – गोसाईं, कश्मीरी र नेवारहरू – पृथ्वी नारायण शाहको विरुद्धमा लागे। आफ्नो हताशतामा, तिनीहरू उनका उग्र विरोधी बने, ब्रिटिश इस्ट इन्डिया कम्पनीलाई उनको विरुद्ध सैन्य अभियान सुरु गर्न पनि उक्साए।
३. विदेशी शक्तिहरूलाई खाडीमा राख्ने कट्टरपन्थी दृष्टिकोण
आफ्नो विजय पूरा गरेपछि, पृथ्वी नारायण शाहले संरक्षणवादको कट्टरपन्थी आर्थिक नीति लागू गरे। उनको अटल लक्ष्य व्यापारबाट हुने सबै नाफा नेपाल भित्र र नेपालीहरूको हातमा रहोस् भन्ने थियो। उनको योजना विदेशी व्यापारीहरूलाई देशको भित्री भागमा प्रवेश गर्न निषेध गर्ने थियो। बरु, उनले पर्सा जस्ता सीमामा तोकिएका व्यापारिक चौकीहरूको कल्पना गरे, जहाँ सबै अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय व्यापार सञ्चालन हुनेछ।
यो नीति युरोपेली उपनिवेशवादको गहिरो र पूर्वज्ञानी डरबाट प्रेरित थियो। उनले देखे कि कसरी एशियाभरि राजनीतिक र सैन्य अधीनताको लागि वाणिज्यलाई बहानाको रूपमा प्रयोग गरिँदैछ। ब्रिटिश इस्ट इन्डिया कम्पनीको बारेमा उनको दृष्टिकोण एक शक्तिशाली चेतावनीमा कैद गरिएको थियो:
“दक्षिणका समुद्रको बादशाहसँग घा ता राख्नु तर त्यो महाचोर छ”
उनले बुझे कि विदेशी व्यापारीहरूलाई स्वतन्त्र लगाम दिनु भनेको शक्तिशाली संस्थालाई पाइला राख्न निमन्त्रणा हो। यो केवल सिद्धान्त मात्र थिएन; यो फलामको मुट्ठीले लागू गरिएको नीति थियो। आफ्नो विजय पछि, उनले विदेशी व्यापारीहरूलाई मात्र प्रतिबन्ध लगाएनन् – उनले तिनीहरूलाई निष्कासित गरे। जसरी उनले क्यापुचिन मिसनरीहरूलाई हटाए, त्यसरी नै उनले शक्तिशाली गोसाई व्यापारीहरूलाई पनि निष्कासित गरे, आफ्नो प्रभावको नेटवर्क भएको कुनै पनि बाह्य समूहलाई हटाउने आफ्नो पूर्ण दृढ संकल्प प्रदर्शन गरे।
४. एक राष्ट्र, एक सिक्का एक समयमा बनाउने
शताब्दीऔंदेखि, काठमाडौँ उपत्यकाका मल्ल राजाहरूले बनाएका चाँदीका सिक्काहरू हिमालयको विश्वसनीय, प्रमुख मुद्रा थिए, जुन आकर्षक तिब्बत व्यापारको लागि आवश्यक थियो। तर समयसँगै, शासकहरूले सस्तो धातुहरूले तिनीहरूलाई कमजोर बनाउन थालेपछि तिनीहरूको गुणस्तर घट्दै गयो, जसले गर्दा शताब्दीऔं पुरानो विश्वास क्षय भयो।
रणनीतिक खुलापनलाई पहिचान गर्दै, पृथ्वीनारायण शाहले मल्लहरूको आर्थिक सार्वभौमिकतामा प्रत्यक्ष आक्रमण गरे। १७४९ मा पहाडी क्षेत्रहरूमा आफ्नै उच्च गुणस्तरका चाँदीका सिक्काहरू टकसार गर्ने उनी पहिलो राजा बने। यो आर्थिक विध्वंसको एक उत्कृष्ट अभ्यास थियो। तिब्बतमा स्वीकृति सुनिश्चित गर्न, उनले मल्ल सिक्काहरूको सामान्य शैली र तौलको नक्कल गरे। यो नयाँ, शुद्ध मुद्रा केवल विनिमयको माध्यम मात्र थिएन; यो मल्लहरूको प्रतिष्ठालाई चकनाचुर पार्न गरिएको एक विघटनकारी नवप्रवर्तन थियो।
५. तिब्बतले बेलायतीहरूको होइन, नेपालको पक्षमा रहेको आश्चर्यजनक कारण
पृथ्वीनारायण शाहको नाकाबन्दीले नेपाल हुँदै परम्परागत व्यापार मार्ग बन्द गरेपछि, ब्रिटिश इस्ट इन्डिया कम्पनीले एउटा खुलापन देख्यो। तिब्बतसँग प्रत्यक्ष व्यावसायिक सम्बन्ध स्थापित गर्न उत्सुक गभर्नर, वारेन हेस्टिंग्सले १७७४ मा पञ्चेन लामासँग वार्ता गर्न जर्ज बोगल नामक दूत पठाए।
नतिजा विपरीत आयो। बेलायतीहरूबाट सतर्क र चीनको कट्टर ब्रिटिश विरोधी नीतिहरूबाट प्रभावित तिब्बतीहरू आफ्नो मनसायप्रति गहिरो शंका गर्थे। गोरखा विजयबाट उत्पन्न अवरोधका बाबजुद पनि, उनीहरूले अन्ततः नेपाल हुँदै आफ्नो शताब्दी पुरानो, यदि अस्थायी रूपमा टुटेको भए पनि, व्यापार सम्बन्धमा अडिग रहन रुचाए। उनीहरूले ज्ञात नेपालीहरूलाई अज्ञात र सम्भावित खतरनाक ब्रिटिशहरू भन्दा राम्रो साझेदारको रूपमा देखे। बोगलको मिसन असफलता थियो, जुन पुरानो नेपाल-तिब्बत आर्थिक सम्बन्धको स्थायी शक्तिको प्रमाण थियो जुन ब्रिटिश साम्राज्यले पनि सजिलै तोड्न सक्दैनथ्यो।
वाणिज्य साम्राज्य
पृथ्वी नारायण शाहको विरासत केवल सैन्य विजेताको भन्दा धेरै जटिल छ। उनी एक दूरदर्शी आर्थिक वास्तुकार थिए जसले बुझेका थिए कि राष्ट्रहरू युद्धभूमिमा मात्र नभई बजार र टक्सारहरूमा पनि निर्माण हुन्छन्। उपत्यकाको व्यावसायिक घाँटी थिच्ने र यसको मुद्राको विध्वंसदेखि, शक्तिशाली विदेशी व्यापारीहरूको बहिष्कार र ब्रिटिश साम्राज्यलाई नै पराजित गर्नेसम्म, एकीकरणको लागि उनको खाका आर्थिक युद्धको जित जत्तिकै सैन्य शक्तिको विजय थियो।
उनको कथाले हामीलाई सोच्नको लागि गहिरो प्रश्न छोड्छ: यदि यो उग्र संरक्षणवादी दृष्टिकोण शताब्दीयौंसम्म कायम राखिएको भए नेपाल र क्षेत्रको आर्थिक मार्ग कसरी फरक हुन सक्थ्यो?
When we think of King Prithvi Narayan Shah, the image that comes to mind is almost always one of a relentless military conqueror. He unified dozens of petty principalities into the nation of Nepal with the edge of his sword. This picture, while true, is incomplete. It misses the architect behind the warrior.
The true genius of Prithvi Narayan Shah’s unification campaign was not just in his military tactics but in his sophisticated, visionary, and often ruthless economic statecraft. He waged a war of commerce as fiercely as he waged a war of conquest, strangling his enemies’ economies and laying a protectionist foundation for his new kingdom. This is the story of the unseen economic forces that truly shaped a nation.
In this post, you’ll read about…
The 5 Economic Strategies
1. How to Strangle an Economy into Submission
Prithvi Narayan Shah’s primary strategy against the prosperous Malla kingdoms of the Kathmandu Valley was not a frontal assault but a calculated economic strangulation. After capturing the strategic hill fort of Nuwakot in 1744, he seized control of the main trade route linking the valley to Tibet, the lifeblood of the Malla economy.
With this single move, he established a punishing economic blockade. Goods that once paid a single customs duty to the Malla kings now had to pay a second, separate duty to him. This systematically cut off the valley from the lucrative trans-Himalayan commerce that was its primary source of wealth. Far from being a distant strategist, he was a hands-on micromanager of this new economic weapon. In a letter to his agent in charge of purchasing gold from Tibet, he revealed his shrewd, pragmatic mind:
“If they give pure gold for 16 rupees per tola, buy it… If they don’t give it for 16, add a quarter-rupee… If much gold is available, don’t go above 17… but if 10-12 thousand tolas can be had and sold at a profit, then buy it even for 18 rupees per tola.”
Long before his final assault on the capital, Prithvi Narayan Shah engineered an economic crisis from the outside, ensuring the Malla kingdoms were financially weakened and internally fragile when the decisive battles came.
2. The Unlikely Global Traders of the Himalayas
Before Prithvi Narayan Shah’s rise, the region’s bustling trade was controlled by a remarkably diverse group of merchants. Prominent among them were the Newar traders of Kathmandu, who had established deep commercial ties with Tibet, and the well-connected Kashmiri Muslim merchants, whose trading houses spanned from India to Lhasa.
Most surprisingly, a key group of international traders were the Gosain ascetics. These revered holy men used their religious status and freedom of movement to travel across borders, acting as powerful merchants of high-value, low-volume goods. The blockade crippled their business, and these influential traders, namely, the Gosains, Kashmiris, and Newars turned against Prithvi Narayan Shah. In their desperation, they became his fierce opponents, even instigating the British East India Company to launch a military expedition against him.
3. A Radical Vision to Keep Foreign Powers at Bay
After completing his conquest, Prithvi Narayan Shah implemented a radical economic policy of protectionism. His unwavering goal was to ensure all profits from trade remained within Nepal and in the hands of Nepalis. His plan was to prohibit foreign traders from entering the country’s interior. Instead, he envisioned designated trading posts at the border, such as Parsa, where all international business would be conducted.
This policy was driven by a deep and prescient fear of European colonialism. He saw how commerce was being used as a pretext for political and military subjugation across Asia. His view of the British East India Company was captured in a powerful warning:
Maintain relations with the emperor of the southern seas, but he is a great thief.
He understood that allowing foreign traders free rein was an invitation for a powerful entity to gain a foothold. This wasn’t just theory; it was policy enforced with an iron fist. After his victory, he didn’t just restrict foreign traders—he expelled them. Just as he had removed the Capuchin missionaries, he cast out the powerful Gosain traders, demonstrating his absolute resolve to eliminate any external group with its own network of influence.
4. Forging a Nation, One Coin at a Time
For centuries, the silver coins minted by the Malla kings of the Kathmandu Valley were the trusted, dominant currency of the Himalayas, essential for the lucrative Tibet trade. But over time, their quality had degraded as rulers began debasing them with cheaper metals, eroding that centuries-old trust.
Recognizing a strategic opening, Prithvi Narayan Shah launched a direct assault on the Mallas’ economic sovereignty. Starting in 1749, he became the first king in the hill regions to mint his own high-quality silver coins. This was a masterstroke of economic subversion. To ensure acceptance in Tibet, he mimicked the general style and weight of the Malla coins. This new, pure currency was not just a medium of exchange; it was a disruptive innovation designed to shatter the Mallas’ prestige.
5. The Surprising Reason Tibet Sided with Nepal, Not the British
After Prithvi Narayan Shah’s blockade sealed off the traditional trade route through Nepal, the British East India Company saw an opening. The governor, Warren Hastings, eager to establish a direct commercial link with Tibet, dispatched an envoy named George Bogle in 1774 to negotiate with the Panchen Lama.
The outcome was counter-intuitive. The Tibetans, wary of the British and influenced by China’s staunchly anti-British policies, were deeply suspicious of their intentions. Despite the disruption caused by the Gorkha conquest, they ultimately preferred to stick with their centuries-old, if temporarily broken, trade relationship through Nepal. They saw the known Nepalis as a better partner than the unknown and potentially dangerous British. Bogle’s mission was a failure, a testament to the enduring strength of the age-old Nepal-Tibet economic connection that not even the British Empire could easily break.
Conclusion: An Empire of Commerce
Prithvi Narayan Shah’s legacy is far more complex than that of a mere military conqueror. He was a visionary economic architect who understood that nations are built not only on battlefields but also in marketplaces and mints. From the commercial strangulation of the valley and the subversion of its currency to the exclusion of powerful foreign traders and the outmanoeuvring of the British Empire itself, his blueprint for unification was as much a triumph of economic warfare as it was of military might.
His story leaves us with a profound question to ponder: How might the economic trajectory of Nepal and the region have been different if this fiercely protectionist vision had been maintained for centuries?
Constitution Study #17: A step-by-step description of the constitutional provisions (Article 76) for forming a government in Nepal
The period following a general election in Nepal is often chaotic. News cycles fill with talk of negotiations, power-sharing deals, and political “horse-trading”, leaving many citizens confused about what comes next. The uncertainty around which party or coalition wins or forms a government is a bigger battleground than the polls themselves.
Yet, amidst this perceived chaos, the Constitution of Nepal provides a surprisingly clear, step-by-step roadmap for forming a government. This framework, detailed in Article 76, is designed to navigate the complexities of a multi-party system. This article breaks down that complex constitutional process into five simple, understandable steps, framing it as a constitutional drama of escalating stakes.
Forming a government in Nepal:
Step 1: The Straightforward Path – A Clear Majority
The first and most straightforward method for forming a government is outlined in Article 76, Clause (1) of the Constitution. If a single political party wins a clear majority of seats in the House of Representatives, the President appoints the parliamentary leader of that party as the Prime Minister. This is the simplest and most stable path to forming a government.
This scenario represents the ideal for stable governance, as it provides a clear mandate and avoids the need for complex negotiations. However, in Nepal’s political landscape, a single-party majority has become a rarity. This is largely due to a political culture where parties are often feudalistic in nature and centred around their topmost leaders rather than cohesive ideologies, frequently resulting in fractured electoral mandates. The instability that challenges Nepal’s governance often stems from the fact that this first, ideal step is seldom achieved.
Step 2: When No One Wins Outright – The Art of the Coalition
When no single party secures a majority, the process moves to Article 76, Clause (2). Under this provision, the President appoints a member of the House of Representatives who can prove they have majority support through an alliance of two or more parties. This is the formation of a coalition government.
This is the most common path to power, reflecting a political culture where parties, often centred on individual leaders rather than ideology, engage in intense political broking. This necessity for compromise contributes directly to the “frequent changes in government” that challenge Nepal’s stability, as alliances are often transactional and built on fragile power-sharing agreements rather than durable policy consensus. Managing the competing demands of coalition partners often leads to policy gridlock and fragile alliances.
Election coalitions can break down, and new government coalitions can form, as evidenced in the aftermath of the 2022 elections. The then CPN Maoist (Centre) ran the elections along with Nepali Congress, but when the time for forming the government came, it broke the alliance and joined the other parties: CPN (UML), Rastriya Swatantra Party, Rastriya Prajatantra Party, People’s Socialist Party, Janamat Party, and Nagrik Unmukti Party, and three independents, with Pushpa Kamal Dahal heading the government.
Step 3: If Coalitions Crumble – The Largest Party’s Chance
If a coalition government cannot be formed within thirty days, the Constitution provides a third option under Article 76, Clause (3). The President will then appoint the parliamentary leader of the single largest party in the House of Representatives as Prime Minister. However, this appointment is conditional. As per Clause (4), this Prime Minister must win a “vote of confidence” from the House within thirty days to remain in power.
This provision acts as a critical safeguard to prevent complete political deadlock when coalition talks fail. It ensures that a government can be formed, even if it lacks an upfront majority. However, this type of minority government is inherently fragile. This precariousness forces the largest party to govern not by mandate, but by perpetual negotiation, often making it vulnerable to the shifting allegiances of smaller parties.
In 2023, after the CPN (UML) withdrew its support for Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the Nepali Congress had the opportunity to lead according to this provision. However, the Congress did not take a risk and joined with the CPN (UML). KP Sharma Oli was once again appointed Prime Minister according to Article 76(2).
Step 4: The Last Attempt – Any Member’s Claim
Where Step 3 empowers the leader of the single largest party, Step Four dramatically widens the field. If the minority Prime Minister from Step Three fails to win the vote of confidence, the process moves to a crucial and often contentious final attempt under Article 76, Clause (5). The President will then appoint any member of the House who can present grounds (e.g., letters of support from a sufficient number of members) demonstrating they are able to win a vote of confidence. This Prime Minister must also secure that vote of confidence within thirty days, as stipulated in Clause (6).
This clause is the constitution’s most radical attempt to break parliamentary gridlock. By allowing any member to stake a claim, it theoretically bypasses the rigid, hierarchical party structures that often cause deadlock. It opens the door for consensus candidates to emerge from outside the established leadership, but has also become a focal point of constitutional debate, as it can trigger intense political maneuvering and legal challenges regarding what constitutes valid “grounds” for a claim.
Step 5: Dissolution and a New Election
If all previous attempts fail, including the Prime Minister appointed in Step 4 being unable to secure a vote of confidence, the process reaches its definitive conclusion under Article 76, Clause (7). In this event, the President, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, will dissolve the House of Representatives and call for new general elections to be held within six months.
This is the constitution’s last resort: a political circuit breaker designed to prevent a complete system overload by returning power to its ultimate source—the people. This step embodies the principle of popular sovereignty enshrined in the constitution’s preamble, ensuring that when the elected representatives fail, the ultimate authority returns to the people. However, it comes at a significant cost, ushering in a period of political instability and the considerable expense of another national election.
Conclusion: A Framework for Stability or a Recipe for Intrigue?
The Constitution of Nepal lays out a detailed, multi-layered process for government formation. It is designed to exhaust every possible avenue for creating a functional government from the elected parliament before returning to the voters for a new mandate. This five-step cascade is a direct response to the nation’s complex political realities. This cycle of formation and dissolution at the federal level has cascading effects, often delaying the implementation of laws and policies crucial for empowering Nepal’s provincial and local governments and deepening its fragile federalism.
This leaves us with a critical question for the future of Nepal’s democracy: does this intricate, multi-stage process serve as a robust framework for stability in a fragmented polity, or does this complexity create perverse incentives for the political manoeuvring and constitutional brinkmanship it is designed to prevent?
I had set a target of reading 25 books in 2025 because I had finished 22 in 2024. But what a tumultuous year this has been! There were a lot of things I had to attend to in the first half of the year, and in the second half, the politics of the nation got more intriguing. Even then, I managed to read 16 books. Goodreads says 14 because its database did not have two books. And despite some effort, I could not get them listed. I could not reach my target, but given the little time I had for reading and a change in reading style, I think I did well.
In this post, you’ll read about…
The changes I made in the way I read
This year, I mostly read two or three books simultaneously. Since I spend around three hours in commutation every day, I often read a physical book in the morning and an e-book in the evening. There were also days when I read nothing. This practice slowed my rate of completion, but it also gave me time to contemplate what I was reading and, as a result, analyse the books from different angles.
Completed Books
Most of the books I read this year were political, even though they spanned both fiction and non-fiction. I read a collection of stories and a collection of essays, but I read no book on poetry. I have really lagged in that beautiful genre.
Dune: Messiah and Children of Dune (Books 2 and 3 of the Dune series) by Frank Herbert are often classified as Sci-Fi, but they have rich political philosophy. There are even direct references to thinkers like Machiavelli and Aquinas. The books challenged the idea of hero-worship and helped me become more critical of leaders. However, I still don’t understand the book well. I think some knowledge of philosophy will help me analyse it better.
Another book, Lord of the Flies (William Golding) also had political undertones. I had read the book before in 2016, but the battles between the groups of Ralph and Jack devastated me. I learnt to analyse the book from different perspectives and wrote a series of reviews and character studies which I have shared here.
The next book, Rajiv Upadhya’s Cabals and Cartels is an intriguing book on the political economy of Nepal. It helped me understand the attitudes of politicians regarding development aid and how it has led to Nepal’s underdevelopment.
In March-April, I read Raja, Rashtriya ra Rajniti written by B.P. Koirala following the protest at Tinkune. I understood how far Nepali Congress is today from B.P. Koirala’s ideas. It’s hypocritical that Koirala has been elevated to Mahamanav (the Great Man) by Congressis while they themselves don’t take heed of his words.
After that, I read Why Nations Fail. Its thesis of weak vs strong institutions was easy to understand but was also simplistic. The authors did not account for factors like geography, external trade, foreign influences, liberalisation, and so on that affect the economic activities of a nation.
The next book I read was Krazz Pokharel’s In Search of Elixir. As a fantasy, it had good ideas, but the execution was poor.
Then I read The Myth of Normal by Gabor Mate after recommendations in the group Bookaholics on Facebook. I had been overwhelmed by old memories all of a sudden, and I wanted to understand why. I got some of my answers, but like Why Nations Fail, I thought it was oversimplistic in its treatment of trauma as the primary factor for our behaviour.
Just after finishing The Myth of Normal, I went into The Science of Thought by Khaptad Baba. It was short and gave practical methods of improving the way and quality of thinking.
After that, I read Jason Kunwar’s Ramite. The book was dark and traumatic, and reading it became more difficult because of the youth movement, massacre, and arson. I found myself a ramite (bystander), who can see the events unfold but can’t stop them.
The aftermath of the protests told me I should dive deeper into recent history. I started reading several books simultaneously. I finished Massacre at the Palace by Jonathan Gregson in October and Maile Dekheko Darbar by Bibek Kumar Shah and Darbar ko Dukhanta by Sundar Pratap Rana in December. They gave me insights into the history of the Palace, the characters of the kings and the royal family as well as the political games after the Royal Massacre.
I also finished Gregory Douglas’ Regicide, a book that challenged the official narrative of the JFK assassination using different intelligence reports obtained from a CIA operative. It showed how the mafia and the intelligence worked together against the president, who used them to gain power but turned around once he had everything.
Between the last three books, I completed Prithvi Narayan Shah by Maheshraj Panta. Through a collection of 11 articles, the book gave answers to some questions I had about the leader of Nepal’s unification but raised more questions. I have decided to look into the books Panta has referenced.
Physical vs E-books
I love both formats, but I find finishing e-books faster because I have my phone with me almost every time. 11 of my finished books were in the digital format.
Unfinished Books
There are some books that will carry on into 2026. I may also have to restart a few.
I started Smash and Grab: Annexation of Sikkim by Sunanda K. Datta-Ray before Massacre at the Palace in early October, but because of its tough vocabulary, my lack of knowledge of the history of Sikkim, and the time of day I have devoted to it, I have only completed 10 of its 18 chapters.
Another book that will go to 2026 is Yann Martel’s Life of Pi. This beautiful philosophical book on finding God has awed me so much that I don’t want it to end.
I had started reading For the Love of Physics by Walter Levin, Singapore: From Third World to First by Lee Kwan Yew, and 1984 by George Orwell but left them in the middle, maybe because other books attracted me more. I may have to restart them.
The answer lies in understanding the process of amendment, the formation of the Parliament, and the political mistakes made by a “new” party in the previous election.
In this post, you’ll read about…
1. How is the Constitution amended?
The amendment of the Constitution of Nepal is governed primarily by Article 274, which establishes a rigid but adaptable framework.
1.1 The Unamendables
Clause (1) of Article 274 makes it clear that:
No amendment shall be made to this Constitution in manner to be prejudicial to sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence of Nepal and sovereignty vested in the people.
This clause, too, is immune to any amendment (Article 274(2)).
1.2 Procedure for amendment
A Bill to amend or repeal any other article may be introduced in either House of the Federal Parliament (the House of Representatives or the National Assembly). Once a Bill is introduced, it must be publicly published within thirty days to ensure the general public is informed of the proposed changes.
If a proposed amendment involves altering provincial borders or affects the exclusive powers of provinces listed in Schedule-6, a more complex “federal” check is triggered:
Provincial Consent: The Speaker or Chairperson of the House where the Bill originated must send it to all Provincial Assemblies for consent within thirty days.
Timeframe and Voting: Each Provincial Assembly must approve or reject the Bill by a majority of its total members within three months.
Veto Power: If a majority of the Provincial Assemblies (at least four out of seven) notify the Federal Parliament that they reject the Bill, the amendment Bill becomes inoperative.
Federal Progression: If the three-month period expires without a response from an Assembly, the Federal Parliament may proceed with the Bill regardless.
Any other bill must be passed by at least a two-thirds majority of the total number of the “then members” of both Houses of the Federal Parliament (Article 274(8)). This high threshold prevents frequent or unstable changes driven by narrow political majorities.
1.3 Presidential authentication
After the Bill is adopted by both Houses, it is submitted to the President for final approval. The President must authenticate the Bill within fifteen days of receipt, at which point the Constitution is officially amended. The President has no discretionary power or veto over constitutional amendments that have fulfilled these procedures.
2. How does the Federal Parliament form?
Nepal has a bicameral system of legislature (Article 83), according to which there are two houses, the lower House of Representatives (HoR) and the upper National Assembly (NA).
2.1 Composition of the House of Representatives
The HoR consists of a total of 275 members, of which 165 (60%) members are elected through the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system. The 110 (40%) members are elected through the proportional electoral system, where voters vote for political parties.
2.2 Composition of the National Assembly
The National Assembly (Rastriya Sabha) of Nepal is the permanent House of the Federal Parliament. It is formed through a combination of indirect elections and presidential nominations, consisting of a total of 59 members.
i. Elected 56 members
From each of Nepal’s seven provinces, eight members are elected to the National Assembly. These members are chosen by an Electoral College composed of:
Members of the Provincial Assembly.
Chairpersons and Vice-Chairpersons of Rural Municipalities,
Mayors and Deputy Mayors of Municipalities.
The weightage of votes varies between Provincial Assembly members and local-level officials, as determined by federal law. To ensure inclusivity, the eight members from each province must include:
At least three women,
One Dalit,
One person with a disability or from a minority community.
ii. Nominated 3 members
The remaining three members are nominated by the President on the recommendation of the Government of Nepal. This group must include at least one woman.
3. Why is gaining a 2/3rds majority difficult?
If we look at the past two elections since the promulgation of the Constitution, the chance of a party gaining a simple majority (138 seats) is slim. This is due to high competition, shifting alliances, and the effect of the proportional system. The number of votes parties gain after crossing a threshold of 3% of the total valid votes cast to the parties using Sainte-Laguë method for reducing the overrepresentation of large parties determines the final outcome.
In the 2017 federal elections, CPN-UML gained 80 (~48%) seats in the FPTP system but gained only 41 (37%) seats in the proportional system. This was a result of the “Left Alliance” set up by the UML, Maoist Centre, and Naya Shakti.
In 2022, the equations were even more interesting. The Left Alliance had broken up, and the Nepali Congress (NC) won 57 (34.5%) seats in the FPTP elections. But it secured only 32 seats in the proportional. CPN-UML was the winner in the proportional system with 34 (31%) seats despite winning 44 (26%) seats in the FPTP.
4. A Scenario: Will there be an amendment if RSP gains a 2/3rds majority?
History has shown that winning even a simple majority in one House is difficult, and a supermajority in both Houses seems like a pipe dream. But let’s imagine a scenario.
Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP) was the fourth largest in the 2022 federal elections. While it mostly got its seats by catering to younger urbanites, it has also gained a loyal mass of supporters from the villages. Many believe that its Chairperson Rabi Lamichhane has been a victim of political conspiracy in cases related to fraud and money laundering while he worked as a TV presenter. The cases are still ongoing, but let’s suppose he and his party win a 2/3rds majority. And later, respecting the youth movement, the HoR passes the Constitution Amendment Bill.
Now the bill goes to the National Assembly. As of December 2025, the NA has 26 members from NCP, 16 from NC, and 11 from UML. The equation might change after the National Assembly elections, which have to be done in January 2026. Since the coalition of UML and NC was ousted in the movement, they are revengeful of the September movement. The UML 11th General Convention held recently is evidence that it rejects Gen-Z rebellion. That’s why there is a high chance they won’t let the amendment pass.
The biggest problem, however, is that RSP and new parties have no representation in the National Assembly. The local elections were held in May 2022 before the general elections for federal and provincial assemblies in November of the same year. RSP formed in June, following the success of independent candidates at the local level. It registered only for the federal elections and not for the provincial assemblies. The party has also been vocal against the provincial setup, but the stance/blunder means that it has no role in the provinces as well as the NA.
Although the Constitution has been amended twice, it was because of a wide consensus within all the major parties then. This time, there is very little possibility for such consensus. The only hope is that somehow the major parties agree to amend the Constitution, but realistically, it seems impossible.
5. Conclusion
The Constitution of Nepal is flexible to allow amendments to meet the changes that come with time. However, it is also rigid because the ease of updates may allow selfish interests to creep in, as with the Interim Constitution 2063, which got amended 12 times in 9 years.
The last eighteen months have witnessed a seismic shift in the political landscape of South Asia, as powerful, youth-led revolutions in Bangladesh (June-August, 2024)and Nepal (September, 2025) overthrew respective governments. Born from shared frustrations with corruption and economic despair, these movements represent a generational demand for a new social contract. However, the initial euphoria of political change can obscure profound dangers. This analysis argues that the the post-revolutionary collapse witnessed in Bangladesh, which allowed growth of extremism and communal violence, is a cautionary tale for Nepal. Because institutional fragility and digital manipulation are vital features of both movements, the lessons from Dhaka must be urgently heeded in Kathmandu.
In this post…
1. A Tale of Two Revolutions: The Shared DNA of Discontent
To understand the divergent paths of Nepal and Bangladesh, it is strategically vital to first recognize the parallel triggers that led to their respective uprisings. Though ignited by different sparks, a government job quota in Bangladesh and a social media ban in Nepal, the underlying grievances were nearly identical. In both nations, a combustible mix of economic stagnation, systemic corruption, and deep-seated frustration with an aging, self-serving political class created fertile ground for mass mobilization. This shared DNA of discontent explains not just why the revolutions happened, but why Nepal must now study the tragic turn its neighbor’s revolution took.
1.1. Bangladesh’s “July Revolution” (2024)
The movement that would become Bangladesh’s “July Revolution” began with a seemingly specific grievance. In June 2024, the Supreme Court reinstated a 30% quota in government jobs for the descendants of freedom fighters, a move students saw as a direct threat to merit-based opportunity. This student-led protest rapidly grew into a nationwide mass uprising as it tapped into a deep well of public dissatisfaction with Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian government, rampant corruption, and a prolonged economic downturn.
The government’s brutal response served only to escalate the conflict. A fact-finding report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) later confirmed a “systematic and widespread use of unlawful force.” Crucially, this was not just the work of state security forces. The government deployed its own political cadres. The Chhatra League (the ruling Awami League’s student wing) acted in concert with police, attacking protestors with “blunt weapons, machetes and firearms.” This violent crackdown, which resulted in as many as 1,400 protest-related deaths and thousands of injuries, transformed a student movement into a revolution that brought the government down.
1.2. Nepal’s “Gen-Z Uprising” (2025)
In Nepal, the catalyst was the government’s fateful decision to ban 26 social media platforms. The official justification was a regulatory dispute; major platforms like Meta had failed to comply with national registration laws, while others like TikTok had. For a generation whose social, economic, and emotional lives are built on digital platforms, this was not a mere regulatory issue but a profound assault on their livelihood and freedom. The ban, however, was only the spark that lit a long-smoldering fire.
The deeper causes of Nepal’s “Gen-Z Uprising” mirrored those in Bangladesh. Youth unemployment had reached a critical level of over 20%, forcing over 2,000 young Nepalis to leave the country every day for job opportunitiies. The nation’s political system was dominated by a trio of aging leaders, K.P. Sharma Oli, Sher Bahadur Deuba, and Pushpa Kamal Dahal, engaged in a musical chair of corruption and stagnation. Public anger reached a boiling point with the viral “#NepoKids” trend, which contrasted the lavish lifestyles of the political elite’s children with the daily struggles of ordinary citizens. The speed at which the Oli government subsequently disintegrated was astonishing, exposing a hollowed-out state revealing that its authority was merely a facade.
While both revolutions were born from a shared wellspring of democratic hope, the immediate aftermaths revealed a terrifying divergence, with Bangladesh descending into a sectarian violence that Nepal must now studiously avoid.
2. The Aftermath in Bangladesh: When Political Upheaval Uncorks Communal Hatred
The power vacuum that immediately follows a successful revolution is a period of extreme vulnerability. State institutions are weak, the rule of law is tenuous, and the raw anger that fueled the uprising can be easily manipulated. In Bangladesh, this vulnerability was ruthlessly exploited by extremist elements who redirected legitimate political anger toward sectarian violence. The movement’s initial focus on democratic reform was hijacked, and the nation’s Hindu minority became the new target.
2.1. A Minority Under Siege
In the weeks following Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, a wave of violent attacks was unleashed against Bangladesh’s Hindu community. The motives were a toxic blend of political retribution, rising anti-India sentiment, and pre-existing local tensions over land and blasphemy allegations. Hindus were widely perceived as allies of the ousted Prime Minister, making them convenient scapegoats.
The experience of Chakravarty, a pharmacist, provides a harrowing account. He recalls hearing a mob chanting slogans before they attacked his shop. “I quickly put the shutter down,” he said, “I was trapped inside for about two and a half hours.” Later that night, Chakravarty returned home to find his house completely destroyed. The attack, however, was more than just physical destruction; it was the tearing of a social fabric. Chakravarty emphasized that such violence was “unprecedented” in his region. “People here work together – even celebrate together in religious festivals,” he noted. “This has never happened before.”
This was not an isolated incident. The sharp increase in religious radicalism was tragically exemplified by the lynching of Dipu Chandra Das this week. These targeted assaults underscore a grim reality: when state authority collapses, minority communities are often the first to suffer.
2.2. The Mutation of a Movement: From Political Protest to Mob Rule
The attacks on the Hindu community represented a dangerous perversion of the “July Revolution’s” original goals. An uprising that began as a pro-democracy movement devolved into targeted communal violence where, as a PGurus report noted, “mob rule and religious extremism are increasingly replacing the rule of law.”
This devolution from protest to persecution was systematic. The OHCHR report confirmed attacks on religious minorities, and data from Bangladesh’s National Security Intelligence (NSI) agency detailed 37 distinct violent attacks targeting these communities between August 5 and 15 alone. A movement born from a demand for accountability from an abusive state, which deployed its own party cadres as street muscle, devolved into a new form of mob rule.
The tragic events in Bangladesh serve as a stark and unequivocal warning for Nepal’s own precarious post-revolutionary path.
3. A Clarion Call for Nepal: Navigating the Post-Revolution Minefield
This analysis now turns to its core argument. While Nepal’s “Gen-Z Uprising” was not rooted in religious conflict, the country now exhibits many of the same vulnerabilities that allowed extremism to flourish in Bangladesh. The current political instability, the profound erosion of state authority with constant threats from the ousted Prime Minister, and the very digital tools that powered the revolution create a minefield of latent dangers. These vulnerabilities could be exploited by extremist elements, whether domestic or foreign, to inflame ethnic or religious divisions and derail the nation’s democratic aspirations.
3.1. Identifying Latent Dangers
Nepal’s primary risk factors form a triad of institutional weakness and digital volatility that demands immediate attention.
A Brittle Power Vacuum: The sudden collapse of the Oli government and the installation of a fragile interim administration under former Chief Justice Sushila Karki have created a period of profound political uncertainty. This leadership vacuum, while born of a popular mandate, leaves the nation without the established structures needed to enforce order and mediate conflict.
Erosion of State Institutions: The astonishingly rapid disintegration of the police and government apparatus during the protests revealed a critical lack of institutional resilience. The police effectively vanished from the streets, demonstrating that the state’s authority was a facade. This makes the country dangerously susceptible to organized mobs, as there is no credible force to maintain law and order.
The Disinformation Accelerant: A forensic analysis by the threat intelligence firm Cyabra revealed that a coordinated network of inauthentic social media profiles acted as a “violence accelerator.” This network, comprising up to 34% of the conversation on X (formerly Twitter), systematically amplified the most aggressive narratives. This is evidence of hybrid warfare tactics being deployed against a domestic population, where digital manipulation serves as a force multiplier for street-level violence.
3.2. Avoiding the Bangladesh Playbook
The most critical lesson from Bangladesh is how political grievances and geopolitical tensions were weaponized against a local minority population. Rising anti-India sentiment was skillfully channeled into attacks on Bangladeshi Hindus. Nepal is vulnerable to similar manipulations.
Given Nepal’s strategic position as a buffer state between India and China, it is already a theater of geopolitical competition. In Bangladesh, anti-India sentiment was the narrative used to target Hindus. In Nepal, with its complex ethnic and regional dynamics, this same digital playbook could be deployed with devastating speed to turn geopolitical tensions into targeted ethnic or regional violence.
Nepal’s new leadership faces a dual challenge: it must simultaneously focus on rebuilding state institutions while building immediate societal resilience against the threat of extremism.
4. Conclusion: Securing a Fragile Peace
The youth revolutions in Nepal and Bangladesh were born from legitimate democratic aspirations. Yet, the tragic aftermath in Bangladesh reveals the grave danger that awaits when a power vacuum is filled not by democratic institution-building, but by extremism and mob violence. The specific mechanisms seen in Dhaka, where a government blurred the lines between state and party violence, and where geopolitical narratives were weaponized to incite sectarian hatred, now represent a clear and present danger for Kathmandu.
The analysis presented here distills into a final, powerful takeaway for Nepal’s new leaders and its vibrant civil society. The urgent priority must be to secure the fragile peace by fostering national unity, methodically rebuilding the rule of law, and aggressively combating the sophisticated digital manipulation that threatens to tear the social fabric apart. Nepal’s hard-won political revolution must not be allowed to curdle into sectarian conflict. The profound responsibility now falls to Nepal’s youth to learn from the tragic lessons of its neighbor and dedicate itself to building a truly inclusive, stable, and resilient democracy.
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