The exponential proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI), complex machine learning architecture, and pervasive cloud computing are accelerating the global digital economy. At the heart of this digital metamorphosis are data centres. These resource-intensive facilities have evolved rapidly from passive repositories into aggressive computational engines for sustaining the modern global economy. From a market valued at approximately USD 386 billion in 2025, the industry is projected to exceed USD 1.1 trillion by 2035. Nearly 100 gigawatts (GW) of new capacity is expected to come online between 2026 and 2030 alone, doubling global capacity.

The speed of this expansion is, however, bringing up a systemic global resource crisis. The unprecedented increase in demands for electricity, water, and land to train and operate advanced generative models has already strained national power grids, compromised corporate environmental sustainability commitments, and incited socio-political backlash in established digital hubs, including those in the (US).

Consequently, global technology conglomerates and major hyperscale operators, viz. Microsoft, Meta, Amazon, and Google, are actively scouting for alternative locations that can offer abundant renewable energy, a favourable climate for natural cooling, fewer jurisdictions, and cost-effective industrial operational environments. In this context, Nepal has emerged as a potential candidate for a “green data hub”. The eleventh point of the Policies and Programmes for the FY 2026/2027 (2083/84) also reflects the aspiration of developing green computing and high-capacity data centres.

Nepal’s prospect is challenged by a volatile political environment, fluctuating hydropower, and intense geopolitical rivalries between India, China, and the US. Therefore, the persisting question is: “Is Nepal ready?” This article examines the global prospect of AI data centres and the applicability of their extension to Nepal.

1. Macroeconomics of the Data Centre Market

1.1 Market Size and Growth Trajectory

The global data centre market stood at approximately USD 386 billion in 2025 and is on a steep upward trajectory. The market is expected to exceed USD 1.1 trillion by 2034–2035, representing a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of approximately 11–12%. The data centre solutions segment, encompassing hardware and software, is even more dynamic, projected to grow from USD 449 billion in 2024 to USD 1.1 trillion by 2030 at a CAGR of nearly 20%.

Physical capacity growth is equally dramatic. Global data centre capacity grew fivefold between 2005 and 2025 to reach 114 GW. The sector is projected to increase by a further 97 GW between 2025 and 2030 — effectively doubling again in five years — potentially reaching 200 GW by 2030. This rapid growth is expected to require up to USD 3 trillion in investment by 2030.

1.2 Demand Drivers

AI and Machine Learning

AI represented around 25% of all data centre workloads in 2025. By 2030, this is expected to reach 50%. According to McKinsey, generative AI alone could account for roughly 40% of data centre demand in 2030. The major hyperscalers have announced combined long-term commitments exceeding USD 500 billion in this sector.

Cloud Computing & Digital Transformation

Cloud computing remains the foundational driver of data centre growth. The number of large hyperscale data centres reached 1,136 by end-2024, roughly double the total five years earlier. Record leasing activity in early 2025 was fuelled by hyperscalers and cloud service providers. The shift to distributed cloud architectures and hybrid cloud models continues to expand the market.

Edge Computing

Edge computing, i.e., placing compute closer to data sources, is driving a new category of smaller, distributed facilities. The edge data centre market is projected to grow from USD 15.4 billion in 2024 to USD 39.8 billion by 2030 at a CAGR of 17.1%, fuelled by 5G deployments and Internet of Things (IoT) adoption.

1.3 Energy: The Major Constraint

Energy Consumption Trends

Unlike traditional cloud computing paradigms, which rely primarily on central processing units (CPUs) handling sequential, transactional workloads, AI model training and real-time inference require massive, interconnected clusters of graphics processing units (GPUs) and specialized tensor processing units (TPUs) operating in highly synchronous parallel configurations. This architectural change has drastically increased the power consumption of server racks. traditional enterprise data centre racks consumed between 5 to 10 kilowatts (kW) of continuous power. In stark contrast, modern AI-optimized racks regularly exceed 40 kW and are rapidly pushing toward 100 kW per rack.

New engineering paradigms have emerged to address the issues. The market has witnessed a rapid development and deployment of liquid immersion cooling technologies, phase-change materials, and advanced thermal management systems to resolve the extreme thermal exhaust generated by these high-density computational workloads. Leading tech companies are utilizing AI to optimize their hardware efficiencies. For instance, Google reported that between May 2024 and May 2025, it successfully reduced the median energy consumption per Gemini prompt by a factor of 33, and the associated carbon footprint by a factor of 44. These impressive gains were driven by more efficient model architectures, accurate quantized training algorithms, and optimized idling protocols.

However, these per-unit efficiency gains are being overwhelmed by the sheer volume of global compute demand. This dynamic is a textbook illustration of the Jevons Paradox: an economic principle wherein an increase in the efficiency with which a resource is used tends to lower the operational cost, which in turn exponentially stimulates an increase in the total rate of consumption of that resource. As AI becomes cheaper and faster to run on a per-query basis, its integration into every facet of the global economy deepens, driving aggregate power demands to unprecedented levels.

Data centres already consume approximately 2% of global electricity (410 TWh in 2024), with U.S. consumption alone reaching about 190 TWh. The IEA projects that the global consumption could double to 945 TWh globally by 2030.

Fossil Fuel Consumption

The AI boom is inadvertently prolonging the lifecycle of fossil fuels. The IEA notes that though renewable energy is expanding at an annual average rate of 22% and supplying about 27% of current consumption, coal (~30%) and natural gas (~26%) still dominate. Nuclear power accounts for 15%. The IEA forecasts that natural gas and coal will still be required to satisfy over 40% of the additional electricity demand through 2030.

1.4 Regional Landscape

The distribution of the data centre economy reflects a huge disparity. In 2025, North America occupied the largest market share (40%) whereas the Middle East and Africa have less than a 2% share.

1.5 Investment and FDI

Data centres have become one of the most attractive asset classes for global investment. Greenfield investment in the sector rose by approximately USD 125 billion in 2025, while international project finance increased by USD 30 billion. This surge helped push global FDI up 14% in 2025 to an estimated USD 1.6 trillion.

However, this investment is highly concentrated in France, the US, and the Republic of Korea. Emerging markets seeking to attract this capital face stiff competition and must offer compelling value propositions around power, connectivity, regulatory clarity, and total cost of operation.

2. Socio-Political Backlash and Market Reallocation

The voracious resource appetite of these facilities has sparked severe socio-political backlash in established markets. In the United States, an estimated $156 billion worth of data centre projects were officially blocked, severely delayed, or cancelled in 2025 alone due to a confluence of grid capacity constraints and environmental litigation.

Communities are increasingly mobilizing against the daily emissions of massive diesel backup generators. Furthermore, agricultural and municipal water conflicts are escalating. A single Meta facility in Georgia, for instance, utilizes approximately 500,000 gallons of water daily for its evaporative cooling arrays, directly competing with local farming requirements during drought conditions.

In response to such frictions and the broader threat of utility grid oversupply, hyperscalers are exhibiting strategic hesitation. Investment analysts from TD Cowen reported in early 2026 that Microsoft had terminated select leases with at least two private data centre operators across multiple US markets, cancelling hundreds of megawatts of capacity due to severe power delivery delays. The firm likened this to Meta’s previous withdrawal from data centre leases during the scaling down of its metaverse initiatives. Furthermore, Microsoft has paused Statements of Qualifications (SOQs) for multiple domestic sites, leading to market speculation regarding temporary AI compute overcapacity, or alternatively, a strategic reallocation of capital expenditures toward international markets with fewer regulatory frictions.

3. Geopolitics and Weaponization of Cloud Computing

Data centres are critical national security infrastructure. Weaponization of cloud computing and strategic competition between the US and China have defined the geopolitics in recent years. The US has imposed restrictions on the sale and transfer of advanced semiconductors (most notably Nvidia‘s cutting-edge architectures) to Chinese entities. The rationale is to strategically throttle China’s advances in AI-driven military logistics, autonomous weapons systems, and domestic surveillance apparatuses.

Despite restrictions, the Chinese state entities, research institutions, and tech giants are renting raw computing power from hyperscale data centres located in third-party countries. For example, in late 2025, investigations revealed that INF Tech, a Shanghai-based start-up, had been remotely accessing approximately 2,300 restricted, leading-edge Blackwell chips housed in an Indonesian data centre to train complex AI systems for scientific applications. Similarly, Chinese tech giants Alibaba and ByteDance have leveraged Nvidia clusters housed in Southeast Asian facilities to train their latest large language models. In another significant manoeuvre, China’s Tencent executed a $1.2 billion agreement with a Japanese cloud provider to secure remote access to 15,000 advanced B200 chips.

This regulatory loophole is forcing US policymakers to fundamentally reassess their strategy. To maintain the efficacy of hardware embargoes, the US will inevitably have to implement and enforce complex export restrictions on cloud computing services themselves. This means Washington will dictate not just who can purchase chips but also who can remotely log into servers globally, effectively weaponizing access to digital infrastructure.

Geotechnology disputes, thus, are new realities in international relations and diplomacy. Cross-border data flows, which were the unquestioned bedrock of the early internet, now face strict national oversight under the evolving doctrine of “digital sovereignty”. Governments fear that allowing sensitive citizen or government data to be processed on foreign soil exposes them to extraterritorial surveillance, economic espionage, or sudden geopolitical leverage.

This dynamic is fuelling intense competition for influence across the Global South. Both China and India view themselves as the natural leaders of this bloc. While India has facilitated strategic diplomatic manoeuvres, such as enabling the African Union’s entry into the G20, and aims to attract USD 200 billion in data centre investments to position itself as a trusted, development-focused AI partner for the developing world. The signing of the MOU between Nepal’s Kathmandu University and India’s BHASINI on June 6, 2026, for the development of artificial intelligence, digital public infrastructure, and natural language processing (NLP) in the presence of the foreign ministers of both countries is a significant geopolitical move.

China still has a massive financial superiority over India. Its outward direct investment (ODI) in 2023 amounted to nearly $180 billion, dwarfing India’s $110 billion. Beijing utilizes this capital to integrate nations into its technological sphere; for instance, Pakistan operates within the China Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) and hosts special economic zones designed explicitly to attract relocated Chinese technological firms under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In this fiercely contested environment, any nation offering to host neutral data infrastructure becomes an immediate focal point for superpower proxy competition.

4. Nepal’s Position

4.1 Current State of Data Centre and IT Services

Nepal’s data centre industry is nascent but growing. The first government-owned facility, the Government Integrated Data Centre (GIDC), was set up in 2009. The country’s first commercial data centre was established by Access World Tech Pvt. Ltd. in 2013. Most facilities are clustered around Kathmandu.

As of 2025–2026, Nepal has its first data centre company, Ncell. It’s Nakkhu Data Centre has been recently certified Tier 3. The first Tier 3 certified and purpose-built data centre, however, is Data World (a subsidiary of WorldLink Communications). It has 14 strategically located facilities across the country. A new development milestone arrived in May 2026 when Bichuten announced plans to build Tier 4 Hyperscale Data Centres in Chobhar, Kathmandu and Birgunj. These two will have a combined capacity of 5 MW, with all power sourced from Nepalese hydroelectric sources.

The IT service sector is growing as well. Given Nepal’s challenging topography and landlocked status, it is exceedingly difficult for physical Nepalese manufactured goods to compete with the industrial-scale output of neighbouring India and China. However, the “weightless” and borderless nature of IT service exports presents a distinct comparative advantage.
Current trends indicate significant latent potential. By 2022, Nepal exported IT services worth an estimated Rs 67 billion, and the sector is now generating over $1 billion annually. These IT service exports contribute approximately 1.4% to the country’s GDP and bolster foreign currency reserves by 5.5%.

4.2 Political Vision

The government has established highly ambitious targets to exponentially accelerate this growth. Policymakers aim to increase IT service export earnings from the current $1 billion to an astounding $30 billion by 2030, alongside the creation of 500,000 specialized domestic jobs to absorb a young national workforce projected to reach 22 million by the end of the decade.

To facilitate this transition, the government has drafted the Digital Nepal Framework (DNF) 2.0 in 2025. Expanding upon the original 2019 DNF 1.0, which sought to digitize eight key sectors through 80 distinct initiatives, the draft DNF 2.0 identifies data hosting and cloud infrastructure readiness as critical dependencies for national socioeconomic transformation. The framework explicitly prioritizes the establishment of energy-efficient, green data centres that align with international benchmarks like LEED and Uptime Institute standards. The framework also encompasses broad digitalization efforts, including a National Biometric ID system (with 17 million citizens already registered), eHaat Bazaar platforms for precision agriculture, and the widespread implementation of Digital Signatures. The Policies and Programmes for FY 2083-84 (2026-27) also reflect these aspirations.

Market projections reflect optimism regarding these policy shifts. The Nepal Data Center Market is forecast to grow from an estimated $171.86 million in infrastructure value in 2024 to $530.52 million by 2035, representing a CAGR of 10.00%. The broader data centre services market is expected to reach $407.15 million by 2035 at a 10.44% CAGR. Domestic players are already scaling up. For instance, WorldLink Communications has attracted significant FDI from the British International Investment (BII) and the Dolma Impact Fund to expand its enterprise solutions and subsidiary Data World Limited.

4.3 The Case FOR Nepal as a Data Centre Hub

Abundant Clean & Affordable Hydroelectric Power

Nepal’s most compelling competitive advantage is its extraordinary hydropower endowment. The country has an estimated hydropower potential of approximately 83,000 MW, of which around 43,000 MW is considered technically and economically feasible. As of April 2026, 4,340 MW has been harnessed, meaning the vast majority of this resource remains untapped.

Nepal has already become the first country in South Asia to sell surplus electricity on the Indian Energy Exchange market. By the 2025–2026 fiscal year, Nepal is projected to have a maximum surplus of 2,456 MW available for export. Crucially, almost all of the country’s electricity comes from hydropower, a renewable source that is increasingly prioritised by data centre operators seeking to meet net-zero commitments.

Energy costs represent the single largest operating expense for data centres, typically comprising 30–40% of total costs. Clean, affordable power directly addresses the dominant constraint facing the global industry today.

Natural Cooling Advantage

Nepal’s Himalayan geography offers significant natural cooling. Data centres generate enormous heat and require sophisticated (and energy-intensive) cooling systems. Nepal’s cool mountain climate, particularly at higher altitudes, could reduce power consumption for cooling, improving Power Usage Effectiveness (PUE) ratios. Some existing Nepalese facilities already report PUE figures below 1.4, competitive with global benchmarks. Combined with abundant cold river water for water-side cooling, Nepal’s natural environment could substantially lower the total cost of data centre operation.

Strategic Location Between Two Giant Economies

Nepal is landlocked between India and China, two of the world’s largest and fastest-growing data economies. India’s data centre market is projected to reach over 4 GW capacity by 2030, expanding at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 23%. Asia-Pacific as a whole is the fastest-growing data centre region globally, with a projected 12–23% CAGR. Nepal’s geographic position could, if adequately connected, offer low-latency reach to both markets and serve as a neutral hub for regional data processing and storage.

By positioning itself as a sovereign, green data conduit, Nepal can cleverly leverage its strategic geography to attract competing streams of infrastructure financing. The United States, viewing secure digital infrastructure as a core component of its broader Indo-Pacific Strategy, is already heavily involved in modernizing the nation’s energy sector. The $500 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Nepal Compact is explicitly designed to increase the availability of electricity by financing critical high-voltage cross-border transmission lines, such as the Nijgadh–Motihari 400 kV link.

Green Brand Positioning

The global data centre industry is under mounting pressure to decarbonize. Hyperscalers are competing to secure renewable energy at scale, and renewable energy credentials are increasingly a prerequisite for major contracts. Nepal, where virtually 100% of electricity comes from hydropower, is in a unique position to offer one of the world’s greenest data centre environments. This green positioning could be a decisive differentiator when competing for environmentally conscious US operators subject to investor ESG (Environment, Social, and Governance) scrutiny.

Emerging Policy Momentum and Low Land Costs

The almost two-thirds majority government provides a political window to establish clear policy frameworks and incentive structures for foreign data centre investment. Land costs in Nepal remain a fraction of those in established markets. In primary U.S. markets, average monthly asking rates now exceed USD 200 per kW, which Nepal could substantially undercut. The combination of low land prices, cheap power, and natural cooling could offer a compelling total cost of ownership for certain workloads.

FDI Diversification and Economic Development

Nepal is heavily reliant on remittances (accounting for roughly 25–27% of GDP) and tourism. Data centre investment would bring in substantial FDI, creating skilled employment, building technical capacity, and generating long-term recurring revenue from power sales and services. Each direct data centre job is estimated to create 7.4 ancillary jobs in the broader economy. Investment in data centres would also accelerate Nepal’s own digital transformation, expanding access to cloud services, e-commerce, and digital public services.

4.4 The Case AGAINST

Seismic Vulnerability

Nepal sits on one of the world’s most seismically active zones. The 2015 Gorkha earthquake (7.8 Mw) caused catastrophic infrastructure damage and is a stark reminder of the country’s exposure. In September 2024, flooding and landslides affected 20 hydropower plants and reduced electricity production by at least 1.1 GW. For data centre operators, particularly hyperscalers housing mission-critical workloads, seismic risk is a serious deterrent.

Connectivity Bottlenecks

Nepal is landlocked and entirely dependent on its neighbours for international internet connectivity. The country’s internet bandwidth flows through India and China, both of which have been known to restrict cross-border data flows for geopolitical reasons. This creates a single point of failure for any data centre claiming to offer reliable global connectivity. Latency to key U.S. or European markets is high compared to established hubs in Singapore, the UAE, or even India.

For U.S.-based companies considering Nepal for data hosting, the connectivity question is near-disqualifying for latency-sensitive workloads. It may be less of an issue for cold storage, backup, archival, or batch AI training workloads, but these are lower-value use cases that generate less revenue.

Absence of Regulatory Framework

As of June 2026, Nepal has no comprehensive legal or regulatory framework governing data centres and their environmental impact, foreign data hosting, or data sovereignty. Local residents adjacent to existing, smaller-scale data centres in the Kathmandu Valley (such as the Ncell facility in Nakkhu) already report severe noise and vibration pollution, a continuous, low-frequency humming from cooling arrays that causes nearby houses to vibrate and disrupts sleep patterns. When grid failures occur, these facilities activate massive diesel generators, which residents report emit toxic black smoke daily.

For U.S. companies subject to U.S. data governance requirements (including potential export control regulations, data localisation rules under contracts with U.S. federal agencies, and GDPR-equivalent obligations for European user data), the absence of a clear Nepalese data centre regulatory framework is a significant obstacle. There is no equivalent of Singapore’s Model Data Centre framework, Ireland’s data centre planning guidance, or India’s new Digital Personal Data Protection Act to provide investment certainty.

Infrastructure and Skills Gap

Nepal’s existing data centre infrastructure is small-scale and domestically focused. The country has no experience connecting hydropower directly to a hyperscale data centre. Transmission infrastructure, substations, and grid stability are not yet calibrated for the power demands of large facilities. The skilled technical workforce required to operate and maintain hyperscale data centres, viz., electrical engineers, cooling specialists, network engineers, data centre technicians, etc., is scarce.

Building this workforce requires significant investment in training and potentially substantial salary premiums to attract talent.

Seasonal Power Variability

Nepal’s hydropower output is significantly seasonal. During the monsoon season (June–September), rivers run high and power is abundant, sometimes exceeding domestic and export demand. Although the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) projects that the nation will technically stop electricity imports during the dry season by 2026 and possess a maximum surplus of 2456 MW, independent analysts warn that the underlying supply remains highly fragile. During winter dry seasons, however, river flows drop sharply, and Nepal has historically imported electricity from India.

This seasonal mismatch, which is one of the factors challenging Nepal’s EV revolution, is a material risk for data centre operators who require 99.9%+ uptime, year-round, without fluctuation. This scenario also negates the “green compute” value proposition that initially attracts them. The prime minister’s assertion in parliament that increasing household consumption will result in power cuts is a clear deterrent for large-scale data centre operation. Addressing this requires significant investment in storage-type hydropower plants, battery storage, or guaranteed backup arrangements, none of which are currently in place at scale.

Geopolitical and Policy Instability

Nepal’s political history is marked by frequent government changes — the country has had over a dozen governments in the past two decades. Political protests and riots are also common. As such, policy continuity for long-horizon infrastructure investments (data centres have 15- to 25-year asset lives) is a legitimate concern. The government’s vision is compelling, but it depends on sustained political will across multiple electoral cycles.

Additionally, Nepal’s position between India and China creates complex geopolitical dynamics. India has imposed restrictions on the export of power from projects with Chinese involvement.

On the other hand, the dynamics in US-China relations could give rise to intense geopolitical rivalry. If US operators establish advanced computing facilities in Nepal, these servers become highly prized strategic assets for China. Because Nepal is physically linked to China via the 4 Gbps Rasuwagadhi optical fibre route, Beijing could easily lease computational bandwidth from US facilities based in Kathmandu. Moreover, any data centre that attracts Chinese investment or uses Chinese hardware could face complications with U.S. customers who are subject to U.S. national security review processes (such as CFIUS reviews or restrictions under the CHIPS Act framework).

This places Kathmandu in an impossible diplomatic position. Refusing the US could risk American sanctions, the immediate withdrawal of hyperscale FDI, and the freezing of MCC infrastructure funds. Conversely, accommodating US demands and severing Chinese data access would enrage Beijing, likely triggering economic coercion, border trade blockades, or a halt to Chinese infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative. This proxy conflict is already visible. During the recent visit of US Assistant Secretary of State Samir Paul Kapur to Kathmandu in April 2026, Chinese diplomat Cao Jing held near-parallel meetings, explicitly warning Nepal against the ramifications of the MCC Compact and urging the rejection of US satellite networks like Starlink.

Compounding this geopolitical friction is Nepal’s own chaotic approach to data sovereignty. The newly implemented Data Centre and Cloud Service Directives, 2025, mandate strict data localization, requiring all foreign operators to enlist with the local Department of Information Technology and mandating that domestic financial payment systems host their data strictly with these enlisted entities. Additionally, the Nepalese government has expressed intent to restrict the transmission of “sensitive data” outside its borders to enforce social media censorship and ensure local tax compliance. These heavy-handed, government-mandated backdoors and stringent localization prerequisites are highly unappealing to Western hyperscalers, who demand jurisdictional autonomy to protect global user privacy and shield their proprietary models from state interference.

No Proof of Concept Yet

Perhaps the most fundamental challenge is the absence of a demonstrated track record. There is no operational hyperscale or even mid-scale foreign-owned data centre in Nepal. There is no evidence that the economic case of cheap hydropower + natural cooling offsetting seismic construction premiums + connectivity costs actually works in practice. Without a pilot facility that validates the business model, risk-averse institutional capital will remain on the sidelines. This creates a classic chicken-and-egg problem: no investment without evidence, no evidence without investment.

4.5 Comparative Scorecard

4.6 Strategic Recommendations for Nepal

1. Establish a legal and regulatory framework. Draft and pass a Data Centre Act that addresses building standards for seismic zones; environmental impact requirements; data sovereignty and cross-border transfer rules; and a licensing regime for foreign operators. Draw on Singapore, Ireland, and India as models.

2. Build a proof-of-concept facility. Partner with a development finance institution (such as the IFC or ADB) and a credible technology operator to construct and operate a single mid-scale (5–10 MW) internationally certified data centre powered directly by a dedicated hydropower source. Document the full economics.

3. Invest in hydropower generation, transmission and grid stability. The connection between hydropower generation and data centre campuses requires dedicated and reliable transmission infrastructure and backup systems to address seasonal variability. This is a prerequisite, not an afterthought.

4. Resolve connectivity dependency. Work with India and Bangladesh, and potentially directly with submarine cable landing stations via Bangladesh, to diversify and secure international bandwidth. Explore partnerships with regional internet exchange points.

5. Develop the workforce pipeline. Partner with Tribhuvan University and technical institutes to create data centre operations and engineering curricula. Establish apprenticeship agreements with international operators.

6. Target appropriate workload types first. Rather than competing head-on with Singapore or the UAE for latency-sensitive workloads, focus initially on cold storage, AI training (batch, not real-time inference), backup and archival, and sustainability-driven offloading from carbon-heavy facilities.

7. Create a stable investment environment. Offer political stability and security against riots; long-term tax certainty (10+ year agreements); land lease guarantees; and repatriation of profits provisions that survive changes in government. Consider a special economic zone model for data centre campuses.

5. Conclusion

Nepal’s proposition as a data centre hub is genuinely compelling in theory. The combination of vast untapped clean energy, natural cooling, and low land costs addresses the most acute constraint facing the global industry today: power. The political will is present. The timing as the world scrambles for green computing capacity is, in principle, favourable.

However, the structural challenges are substantial and largely unaddressed. Seismic risk, connectivity dependence, regulatory vacuum, workforce gaps, and seasonal power variability are deal-breakers for hyperscalers operating at the frontier of global digital infrastructure, where uptime and data sovereignty are non-negotiable.

Nepal’s most realistic near-term path is to build credible proof with one well-documented, internationally certified, hydropower-connected facility and let the economics speak. If the math works, the investment will follow. If it does not, Nepal will have learned a critical lesson before committing national resources at scale.

The opportunity is real. The hard work of converting ambition into investable reality has barely begun.