जब हामी पृथ्वीनारायण शाहको बारेमा सोच्दछौं, दिमागमा आउने छवि लगभग सधैं एक अथक सैन्य विजेताको हुन्छ। उहाँ त्यो राजा हुनुहुन्छ जसले आफ्नो तरवारको धारले दर्जनौं साना राज्यहरूलाई नेपाल राष्ट्रमा एकीकृत गर्नुभयो। यो तस्वीर सत्य भए पनि अपूर्ण छ। यसले योद्धाको पछाडिको वास्तुकारलाई सम्झन्छ।
पृथ्वीनारायण शाहको एकीकरण अभियानको वास्तविक प्रतिभा केवल उनको सैन्य रणनीतिमा मात्र थिएन तर उनको परिष्कृत, दूरदर्शी र प्रायः निर्दयी आर्थिक राज्यकलामा थियो। उनले जितको युद्ध जति उग्र रूपमा लडे, आफ्ना शत्रुहरूको अर्थतन्त्रलाई घाँटी थिचेर आफ्नो नयाँ राज्यको लागि संरक्षणवादी जग बसाले। यो नदेखिने आर्थिक शक्तिहरूको कथा हो जसले साँच्चै राष्ट्रलाई आकार दियो।
यस लेखमा…
५ आर्थिक रणनीतिहरू
१. आत्मसमर्पणका लागि प्रेरित गर्ने
काठमाडौं उपत्यकाका समृद्ध मल्ल राज्यहरू विरुद्ध पृथ्वीनारायण शाहको प्राथमिक रणनीति प्रत्यक्ष आक्रमण थिएन तर योजनाबद्ध आर्थिक घाँटी थिच्नु थियो। १७४४ मा रणनीतिक हिमाली किल्ला नुवाकोट कब्जा गरेपछि, उनले उपत्यकालाई तिब्बतसँग जोड्ने मुख्य व्यापार मार्गको नियन्त्रण कब्जा गरे – मल्ल अर्थतन्त्रको जीवनरक्त।
यो एकल चालसँगै, उनले दण्डनीय आर्थिक नाकाबन्दी स्थापना गरे। मल्ल राजाहरूलाई एक पटक एकल भन्सार शुल्क तिर्ने सामानहरूले अब उनलाई दोस्रो, छुट्टै शुल्क तिर्नु पर्थ्यो। यसले व्यवस्थित रूपमा उपत्यकालाई आकर्षक ट्रान्स-हिमालय व्यापारबाट काट्यो जुन यसको धनको प्राथमिक स्रोत थियो। टाढाको रणनीतिकार हुनुको सट्टा, उनी यो नयाँ आर्थिक हतियारको हातमा प्रयोग हुने सूक्ष्म प्रबन्धक थिए। तिब्बतबाट सुन खरिद गर्ने जिम्मेवारीमा रहेका आफ्ना एजेन्टलाई लेखेको पत्रमा उनले आफ्नो चतुर, व्यावहारिक दिमाग प्रकट गरे:
“सुन न गाली १६ रुपैयाँ तोला दिन्छ भने किन्नु। यसरी किन्न घटिया सुन न लिनु । तिब्बतीहरू सुनमा पितलको धुलो मिसाउने हुनाले सो कुराको विचार गरी सुन किन्नु ।… सोह्र रुपैयाँ तोला दिँयेनन् भने सोह्रमा एक सुक्का थपेर पनि किन्नू । थोरै सुन पाइने भए १७ रुपैयाँ तोला देखि न बढ्नु तथा १०–१२ हजार तोला सुन पाइये औ गालेर बेच्छन् भने १८ रुपैयाँ तोला दिएर पनि किन्नु।”
राजधानीमा आफ्नो अन्तिम आक्रमण हुनुभन्दा धेरै अघि, पृथ्वीनारायण शाहले बाहिरबाट आर्थिक संकटको सिर्जना गरे, जसले गर्दा निर्णायक युद्धहरू आउँदा मल्ल राज्यहरू आर्थिक रूपमा कमजोर र आन्तरिक रूपमा कमजोर भएको सुनिश्चित भयो।
२. हिमालयका असम्भव विश्वव्यापी व्यापारीहरू
पृथ्वीनारायण शाहको उदय हुनुभन्दा पहिले, यस क्षेत्रको चहलपहल व्यापारलाई उल्लेखनीय रूपमा विविध व्यापारी समूहद्वारा नियन्त्रित गरिएको थियो। तिनीहरूमध्ये प्रमुख काठमाडौँका नेवार व्यापारीहरू थिए, जसले तिब्बतसँग गहिरो व्यावसायिक सम्बन्ध स्थापित गरेका थिए, र राम्रोसँग जोडिएका कश्मीरी मुस्लिम व्यापारीहरू थिए, जसका व्यापारिक घरहरू भारतदेखि ल्हासासम्म फैलिएका थिए।
सबैभन्दा अचम्मको कुरा के छ भने, अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय व्यापारीहरूको एक प्रमुख समूह गोसाईं तपस्वीहरू थिए। यी पूजनीय पवित्र पुरुषहरूले आफ्नो धार्मिक हैसियत र आवागमनको स्वतन्त्रतालाई सीमा पार गर्न प्रयोग गरे, उच्च मूल्य, कम मात्राको सामानको शक्तिशाली व्यापारीको रूपमा काम गरे। नाकाबन्दीले उनीहरूको व्यवसायलाई कमजोर बनायो, र यी प्रभावशाली व्यापारीहरू – गोसाईं, कश्मीरी र नेवारहरू – पृथ्वी नारायण शाहको विरुद्धमा लागे। आफ्नो हताशतामा, तिनीहरू उनका उग्र विरोधी बने, ब्रिटिश इस्ट इन्डिया कम्पनीलाई उनको विरुद्ध सैन्य अभियान सुरु गर्न पनि उक्साए।
३. विदेशी शक्तिहरूलाई खाडीमा राख्ने कट्टरपन्थी दृष्टिकोण
आफ्नो विजय पूरा गरेपछि, पृथ्वी नारायण शाहले संरक्षणवादको कट्टरपन्थी आर्थिक नीति लागू गरे। उनको अटल लक्ष्य व्यापारबाट हुने सबै नाफा नेपाल भित्र र नेपालीहरूको हातमा रहोस् भन्ने थियो। उनको योजना विदेशी व्यापारीहरूलाई देशको भित्री भागमा प्रवेश गर्न निषेध गर्ने थियो। बरु, उनले पर्सा जस्ता सीमामा तोकिएका व्यापारिक चौकीहरूको कल्पना गरे, जहाँ सबै अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय व्यापार सञ्चालन हुनेछ।
यो नीति युरोपेली उपनिवेशवादको गहिरो र पूर्वज्ञानी डरबाट प्रेरित थियो। उनले देखे कि कसरी एशियाभरि राजनीतिक र सैन्य अधीनताको लागि वाणिज्यलाई बहानाको रूपमा प्रयोग गरिँदैछ। ब्रिटिश इस्ट इन्डिया कम्पनीको बारेमा उनको दृष्टिकोण एक शक्तिशाली चेतावनीमा कैद गरिएको थियो:
“दक्षिणका समुद्रको बादशाहसँग घा ता राख्नु तर त्यो महाचोर छ”
उनले बुझे कि विदेशी व्यापारीहरूलाई स्वतन्त्र लगाम दिनु भनेको शक्तिशाली संस्थालाई पाइला राख्न निमन्त्रणा हो। यो केवल सिद्धान्त मात्र थिएन; यो फलामको मुट्ठीले लागू गरिएको नीति थियो। आफ्नो विजय पछि, उनले विदेशी व्यापारीहरूलाई मात्र प्रतिबन्ध लगाएनन् – उनले तिनीहरूलाई निष्कासित गरे। जसरी उनले क्यापुचिन मिसनरीहरूलाई हटाए, त्यसरी नै उनले शक्तिशाली गोसाई व्यापारीहरूलाई पनि निष्कासित गरे, आफ्नो प्रभावको नेटवर्क भएको कुनै पनि बाह्य समूहलाई हटाउने आफ्नो पूर्ण दृढ संकल्प प्रदर्शन गरे।
४. एक राष्ट्र, एक सिक्का एक समयमा बनाउने
शताब्दीऔंदेखि, काठमाडौँ उपत्यकाका मल्ल राजाहरूले बनाएका चाँदीका सिक्काहरू हिमालयको विश्वसनीय, प्रमुख मुद्रा थिए, जुन आकर्षक तिब्बत व्यापारको लागि आवश्यक थियो। तर समयसँगै, शासकहरूले सस्तो धातुहरूले तिनीहरूलाई कमजोर बनाउन थालेपछि तिनीहरूको गुणस्तर घट्दै गयो, जसले गर्दा शताब्दीऔं पुरानो विश्वास क्षय भयो।
रणनीतिक खुलापनलाई पहिचान गर्दै, पृथ्वीनारायण शाहले मल्लहरूको आर्थिक सार्वभौमिकतामा प्रत्यक्ष आक्रमण गरे। १७४९ मा पहाडी क्षेत्रहरूमा आफ्नै उच्च गुणस्तरका चाँदीका सिक्काहरू टकसार गर्ने उनी पहिलो राजा बने। यो आर्थिक विध्वंसको एक उत्कृष्ट अभ्यास थियो। तिब्बतमा स्वीकृति सुनिश्चित गर्न, उनले मल्ल सिक्काहरूको सामान्य शैली र तौलको नक्कल गरे। यो नयाँ, शुद्ध मुद्रा केवल विनिमयको माध्यम मात्र थिएन; यो मल्लहरूको प्रतिष्ठालाई चकनाचुर पार्न गरिएको एक विघटनकारी नवप्रवर्तन थियो।
५. तिब्बतले बेलायतीहरूको होइन, नेपालको पक्षमा रहेको आश्चर्यजनक कारण
पृथ्वीनारायण शाहको नाकाबन्दीले नेपाल हुँदै परम्परागत व्यापार मार्ग बन्द गरेपछि, ब्रिटिश इस्ट इन्डिया कम्पनीले एउटा खुलापन देख्यो। तिब्बतसँग प्रत्यक्ष व्यावसायिक सम्बन्ध स्थापित गर्न उत्सुक गभर्नर, वारेन हेस्टिंग्सले १७७४ मा पञ्चेन लामासँग वार्ता गर्न जर्ज बोगल नामक दूत पठाए।
नतिजा विपरीत आयो। बेलायतीहरूबाट सतर्क र चीनको कट्टर ब्रिटिश विरोधी नीतिहरूबाट प्रभावित तिब्बतीहरू आफ्नो मनसायप्रति गहिरो शंका गर्थे। गोरखा विजयबाट उत्पन्न अवरोधका बाबजुद पनि, उनीहरूले अन्ततः नेपाल हुँदै आफ्नो शताब्दी पुरानो, यदि अस्थायी रूपमा टुटेको भए पनि, व्यापार सम्बन्धमा अडिग रहन रुचाए। उनीहरूले ज्ञात नेपालीहरूलाई अज्ञात र सम्भावित खतरनाक ब्रिटिशहरू भन्दा राम्रो साझेदारको रूपमा देखे। बोगलको मिसन असफलता थियो, जुन पुरानो नेपाल-तिब्बत आर्थिक सम्बन्धको स्थायी शक्तिको प्रमाण थियो जुन ब्रिटिश साम्राज्यले पनि सजिलै तोड्न सक्दैनथ्यो।
वाणिज्य साम्राज्य
पृथ्वी नारायण शाहको विरासत केवल सैन्य विजेताको भन्दा धेरै जटिल छ। उनी एक दूरदर्शी आर्थिक वास्तुकार थिए जसले बुझेका थिए कि राष्ट्रहरू युद्धभूमिमा मात्र नभई बजार र टक्सारहरूमा पनि निर्माण हुन्छन्। उपत्यकाको व्यावसायिक घाँटी थिच्ने र यसको मुद्राको विध्वंसदेखि, शक्तिशाली विदेशी व्यापारीहरूको बहिष्कार र ब्रिटिश साम्राज्यलाई नै पराजित गर्नेसम्म, एकीकरणको लागि उनको खाका आर्थिक युद्धको जित जत्तिकै सैन्य शक्तिको विजय थियो।
उनको कथाले हामीलाई सोच्नको लागि गहिरो प्रश्न छोड्छ: यदि यो उग्र संरक्षणवादी दृष्टिकोण शताब्दीयौंसम्म कायम राखिएको भए नेपाल र क्षेत्रको आर्थिक मार्ग कसरी फरक हुन सक्थ्यो?
Constitution Study #14:Clash of the Constitutional Mandate and Popular Uprising
A Nation at a Constitutional Crossroads
In a move that has shaken Nepal’s political foundations, the Gen Z-led anti-corruption movement on September 8-9 swept the KP Sharma Oli government from power. In the ensuing political vacuum, President Ramchandra Paudel executed an unprecedented solution: the September 12 appointment of former chief justice Sushila Karki as interim Prime Minister. This decision, followed by the dissolution of the House of Representatives, was hailed by some as a necessary response to the popular will but has plunged the nation into its most profound constitutional crisis yet.
This is more than a mere political debate; it is a fundamental stress test of Nepal’s young constitution. The appointment has ignited a fierce legal battle, pitting the raw power of popular sovereignty against the established bulwarks of judicial precedent and the separation of powers. As ten petitions challenging the government’s legitimacy land at the Supreme Court, Nepal is forced to confront a question that will define its democratic future: Are the rules that govern the state absolute, or can they be rewritten by the force of a people’s movement?
In this post…
1. The Blueprint for Power: How Nepal’s Executive is Supposed to Work
The current crisis is unintelligible without a firm grasp of Nepal’s constitutional blueprint for executive power, specifically the procedures laid out in Part-7 of the Constitution. Article 74 establishes a “multi-party competitive federal democratic republican parliamentary form of governance.” This framework is not merely a suggestion; it is the binding charter for political legitimacy.
At its core, Article 76 provides a clear, step-by-step process for appointing a Prime Minister. The President is to appoint the leader of the parliamentary party that commands a majority in the House of Representatives. Recognizing the complexities of coalition politics, the article also provides a sequence of fallback options in clauses (2), (3), and (5) for scenarios where no single party holds a majority. This constitutional playbook is the only established path to forming a government, which the recent political rupture cast aside.
2. The Political Rupture: A Protest, a President, and an Unprecedented Appointment
The crisis unfolded with breathtaking speed. Following the ousting of the KP Sharma Oli government by a massive Gen Z-led anti-corruption movement on September 8-9, the nation’s political order was upended. On September 12, President Ramchandra Paudel, acting on the recommendation of movement representatives, appointed former chief justice Sushila Karki to lead an interim government. On Prime Minister Karki’s recommendation, the President then dissolved the House of Representatives and gave the new government a six-month mandate to conduct parliamentary elections, scheduled for March 5. This rapid sequence of events, occurring over just a few days, bypassed the established constitutional process and triggered an immediate judicial backlash in the form of ten petitions filed in the Supreme Court.
These petitions challenge two distinct but deeply intertwined actions: the formation of Karki’s government and her subsequent recommendation to dissolve the House. The challenge to Karki’s appointment is therefore foundational; if her premiership is deemed unconstitutional, then her recommendation to dissolve the House—the second major point of contention—is invalid from the start.
3. The Core of the Controversy: Can a Former Chief Justice Become Prime Minister?
The petitioners’ case against Sushila Karki’s premiership hinges on a direct, literal reading of a single constitutional clause designed to safeguard judicial independence. They argue that her appointment as Prime Minister is an unambiguous breach of Article 132 (2), which is intended to prevent the politicization of the judiciary. The article states:
“No person who has once held the office of Chief Justice or a Justice of the Supreme Court shall be eligible for appointment to any government office, except as otherwise provided for in this Constitution.”
However, a sophisticated counter-argument has emerged, positing that this clause does not apply to the prime ministership. Ram Lohani, Associate Professor, Tribhuvan University first argues that the Prime Minister’s post is not an office that the President “assigns” someone to work in. Whereas the President has discretion in other appointments, Article 76 obligates the President to appoint any person who meets the constitutional criteria, such as commanding a majority. The Prime Minister is therefore not “put to work” by the President but rather assumes an office by constitutional right.
This leads to the second, crucial distinction: the difference between a “government office” and a “political post“. Lohani argues that Article 132’s prohibition applies only to the former. He notes that other constitutional articles, such as 238(8) and 240(8), explicitly permit former members of constitutional commissions to hold “political posts” while barring them from other “government service.” This distinction, he argues, implies that political roles like Prime Minister fall outside the scope of the prohibition placed on former justices. This clash between a literal interpretation and a nuanced, structural one lies at the heart of the legal controversy.
4. A Dissolved House: Constitutional Move or a Breach of Precedent?
The second constitutional challenge targets the dissolution of the House of Representatives, an act petitioners claim is both unconstitutionaland a direct repudiation of the Supreme Court’s own landmark rulings. The argument carries significant weight, as:
“The court had reinstated the House of Representatives twice after it was dissolved by the then Oli-led government in 2020 and 2021. It had ruled that the constitution envisions a full five-year term for the lower house.”
Petitioners contend that in endorsing the dissolution, President Paudel violated his primary duty under Article 61: “to abide by and protect the Constitution.”
In response, supporters of the move, including some constitutional experts, frame the dissolution not as a legal breach but as a “political solution to a political problem.” They argue that the extraordinary circumstances, born from a popular uprising against a failing political class, demand a departure from rigid legalism. This perspective is articulated forcefully by senior advocate Dinesh Tripathi:
“In the changed context, decisions should be made accordingly by the court. This is the change brought about by a political movement.”
This viewpoint asks the court to prioritize the perceived spirit of political change over its own carefully constructed precedent, presenting a direct challenge to the court’s role as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional text.
Conclusion: Law, Spirit, and the Path Forward
Nepal now stands at a precipice, forced to reconcile the rigid text of its Constitution with the undeniable force of a popular movement demanding a political reset. The creation of an extra-parliamentary government and the dissolution of the House represent a profound departure from the constitutional order, justified by its architects as a necessary response to an existential crisis of governance.
The Supreme Court’s impending decision will be its most consequential to date. The verdict will not only determine the legality of Karki’s government but, more importantly, will define the very nature of Nepal’s constitutional democracy. At stake is a fundamental question:
Is this a singular, emergency-driven deviation from the rules, or does it set a precedent for a new, extra-constitutional pathway to power that could be abused in the future?
The court’s ruling will determine whether Nepal’s democratic institutions are resilient enough to withstand political storms or fragile enough to break under the weight of popular pressure.
On October 8, an article on Nepal’s revolution appeared in The New York Times. (Click here if you don’t have access.) Written by Hannah Beech, the article is an ugly mix of journalism and storytelling that leaves huge plot holes in the characters described. (Also, I choose to comment on the report published in a foreign newspaper to show my fellow to be careful of the narratives they are trying to set.) Among the basic questions that journalism should answer, who, what, where, and when appear, but there are huge gaps in why and how. In this essay, I will point out and try to analyse where these questions are missing.
The article presents the story of Tanuja Pandey, Misan Rai, Mahesh Budhathoki, Sudan Gurung, Rakshya Bam and Dipendra Basnet as representatives of the protests. Presentation of these stories, however full of plot holes, inconsistencies, and mystery that journalism fails to cover.
Plot holes, Inconsistencies, and Mysteries
1. Generalization of Gen Z
In the fifth paragraph when Beech writes:
Across the world, Nepal’s youth have been celebrated as spearheads of a Gen Z revolution, the first to so rapidly turn online outrage at “nepo kids,” as privileged children of the elite are called, into an overthrow of the political system. The trajectory of Nepal’s Gen Z — economically frustrated, technologically expert, educationally overqualified — is part of a wellspring of youthful dissent that has flowed in recent years from Indonesia and Bangladesh to the Philippines and Sri Lanka.
Calling Nepal’s Gen Z technologically expert and educationally overqualified is a picture that applies only to the urbanites and the privileged. I too had made this mistake earlier. There are thousands of youths between 13 and 28 in rural areas who are struggling to get even a primary education. And there are more, even among the well-educated, who don’t know how to use a computer and for whom the internet is nothing but Facebook and TikTok.
2. How the new government formed
The article has two paragraphs on how the new government was formed. In the first paragraph, it says that “Gen Z keyboard warriors” supported Sushila Karki as the interim prime minister.
After the government collapsed last month, thousands of Gen Z keyboard warriors supported the appointment of Sushila Karki, a corruption-busting former chief justice, as leader of a caretaker administration, making her Nepal’s first female prime minister. Elections in this Himalayan nation, one of Asia’s poorest, are scheduled for March. The three big political parties, which for years traded power and alliances with an exuberant disregard for ideology, have been cowed for now.
A paragraph that appears later tells that the Chief of Army, General Ashok Raj Sigdel mentioned Sushila Karki’s name as the prime minister even before her name came up on Discord.
At army headquarters, General Sigdel had mentioned Ms. Karki’s name to members of the Gen Z movement before she became an online favorite. It was strange, they said, like he knew what was happening on Discord before it actually happened.
Journalism, however, ends here. There is no exploration of how the General Sigdel put the name forward. Questions remain: Did he do it on his own? Was there other external influence?
If General Sigdel said the name himself, we are under a military control. If there was external influence, its even worse.
Moreover, the Discord poll was for selecting a representative to put forth unified demands of various Gen Z groups, not to choose a prime minister (even I had thought so before I looked back).
3. Unnecessary storytelling over journalism
The characters mentioned above appear dispersed throughout the article. The fact that they are flawed makes them human. However, the storytelling choice makes them unserious and cringey. Although I have been criticising the “Gen Z leaders”, I felt sympathetic towards them for being featured in a “story” of sensational journalism.
Insensitive Portrayal of Misan Rai
Misan Rai, a 18-year old protester had gone to the protest for the first time on Bhadra 23 (September 8). Her story, although truthful, makes her look insensitive and comical.
Tear gas exploded around her. Her friend’s mother ordered them to withdraw. The trio escaped down an alley, trailed by clouds of tear gas. The sounds of gunfire came soon after, but it was hard to tell the rev of a motorcycle from the volleys of bullets. Ms. Rai hadn’t eaten all day, apart from a couple of wafers gulped down before her exam. In the alley was a grapefruit tree, and she plucked the bittersweet fruit.
“I feel terrible I was eating when people were dying,” she said.
Inconsistency in Rakshya Bam’s Story
Rakshya Bam has been confidently telling that “saving the constitution” and going to elections in Falgun (March) is the best option and confidently puts its forward in her interviews with Rupesh Shrestha and Himalkhabar. The New York Times has shown a different side.
“We are all wondering, what to do if everything goes back to the same way, even after we lost our blood and fallen comrades?” said Rakshya Bam, 26, a protest organizer, who missed a bullet by a fateful flick of her head. “What if all this was a waste?”
The story of her missing a bullet appears later in the story again.
Ms. Bam, a protest organizer, felt a bullet rush past her head, the warmth imprinted even now in her mind, like a shadow that cannot be outrun.
Her interviews have never talked about the incident. She mentions making a human chain and witnessing a injured person, but she has never said about a bullet missing her. It’s an extremely significant event to miss. Also, eyewitness accounts have told that she and her team never went beyond the Everest Hotel. What’s the truth then?
Mysteries around Mahesh Budhathoki
The story of Mahesh Budhathoki is full of mysterious, sensational events. On September 8, he is said to have ridden among a fleet of motorcycles, whose riders wore black:
By late morning, men on motorcycles arrived, two or even three on each bike. Many wore black. Some waved the Nepali flag with its two red-and-white triangles. Some were Gen Z, but others were not. Ms. Pandey and some other organizers didn’t like the intrusion. They had released an earnest set of protest prohibitions, including no flags or party symbols. They didn’t want old politics to infiltrate a nonpartisan movement.
Mahesh Budhathoki, 22, rode among a fleet of motorcycles, the bikes revving with sharp salvos of noise. These bikes, as well as the entrance of other men — older, tougher, tattooed — changed the protest’s atmosphere, attendees said. The crowd got angrier, the slogans more extreme.
The protesters rushed the gates of Parliament. Men materialized with pickaxes. They attacked a fence. Ms. Rai watched the “goondas,” as she called them, “like bad guys in Bollywood” films. She wrapped her arms around a fence pillar to defend it from the destruction.
Again, storytelling tops journalism here. There is no objective investigation on those bikers and men with pickaxes. Only after a hint was left by Diwakar Sah in his video on October 11, the identity of those bikers became more well-known (See this TikTok video). Were they involved in violence? They have denied it on their Facebook page. There are other videos like this where the biker gang is aggressive, though. I think it’s a matter of deeper investigation.
Beech’s description of the events on September 9 gets even more mysterious with the mention of unfamiliar men handing Molotov’s cocktail.
In another part of town, Mr. [Mahesh] Budhathoki and his friends awaited instructions. Unfamiliar men handed them bottles filled with fuel, cloth stuffed in the top. The mob attacked a police station, anger swelling at the force blamed for killing the protesters the day before. From inside the station, a police officer grabbed a rifle and opened fire.
His death is shocking.
Mr. Budhathoki was a soccer fan who had been set to move to Romania for work before he joined the protest. His mother had been diagnosed with cancer, and the family needed money. A bullet hit him in the throat. He died slung over a scooter on the way to the hospital.
A more shocking event happens afterwards when his friends lose their mind and kill three policemen.
One of Mr. Budhathoki’s friends said he felt like the tendon girding his sanity had snapped. The crowd hurled the Molotov cocktails at the police station. They stalked the officers inside. One terrified policeman stripped off his uniform and tried to flee. The mob found his clothes and discarded pistol, then beat the man in his underpants until he stopped moving, two participants said. Video footage verified by The New York Times shows a crowd surrounding the motionless body. Another policeman ran into a neighboring building, climbing high. The crowd chased him and pushed him off a balcony, the friends said.
A traffic policeman, who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, did not escape the mob either. The police said three officers died near the police station.
“We were all killers,” said a 19-year-old protester named Habib.
He said he was proud of having avenged his friend’s death. In his hands, he held the casing of the bullet that he said killed Mr. Budhathoki. He found it on the ground, still hot. Days later, the shell smelled of smoke. He tightened his fist around it.
“We are Gen Z, but we’re just doing the dirty work of the old men,” he said.
Habib’s statements: “We were all killers” and “We’re just doing the dirty work of the old men” chilled me when I read them. When I went back at them, I realized that they are also overgeneralizations, for there were also people who were urging protesters to keep calm and avoid being like the old men.
Questions still remain: Who gave them Molotovs? Did the policemen who were killed by the mob shoot bullets? What will happen to Habib and the mob in the future?
Another inconsistent story of Sudan Gurung
Sudan Gurung, a volunteer of Hami Nepal has established a communication channel, Youth Against Corruption on Discord. This is where polls mentioned above occurred, and Sushila Karki was the clear winner. The following story is thus inconsistent with what is known to the public.
Mr. [Sudan] Gurung said that the people wanted to nominate him as prime minister. But he demurred, he said. He wanted Ms. Karki. Mr. Gurung waited for eight or nine hours in the palace for Mr. Paudel to approve her name. Mr. Gurung wore slippers and occasionally padded around barefoot.
“I didn’t care,” Mr. Gurung said. “We just toppled the government. It’s our palace now.”
When his story comes up again, he is said to have “floated vying for prime minister himself.”
Two days later, Mr. Gurung organized a late-night protest. His target: Ms. Karki, who had not consulted with him when she named three new cabinet members, he said. He demanded her resignation. He later floated vying for prime minister himself.
While I remember him and a group consisting of family of martyrs protesting the newly appointed prime minister, I don’t remember him talking about the post for himself. He did so with an Aljazeera interview though.
The Weirdest Story of Tanuja Pandey
Hannah Beech introduces Tanuja Pandey as “a Himalayan Greta Thunberg”.
Ms. [Tanuja] Pandey, a lawyer, had started off protesting as a high school student, like a Himalayan Greta Thunberg, campaigning to save Nepal’s environment. She was used to small, peaceful acts of dissent, usually with more police officers than protesters.
The problem with this description is that Greta has been controversial because of her privileged upbringing and advocacy of issues that are against Conservatives. Moreover, Nepal’s low contribution to carbon emission compared to the developed nations makes us victims. Was she involved in demanding climate justice with them? I doubt. Had she been doing so, she would have made news, at least in Nepal.
The story then pictures the protest from Tanuja’s eyes:
This march, though, felt different, she said. The online call by Ms. Pandey’s group of activists and lawyers urging fellow Gen Z-ers to rally against corruption and the social media ban had spread fast. Hami Nepal, a civic organization that helped with earthquake and flood relief, added its influential voice. Other youth groups popped up online calling for protesters to join, including one that had rebranded itself from a Hindu nationalist “God of Army” to a clique that supported Nepal’s deposed monarch to — on the day of the protest — Gen Z Nepal (similar to the moniker of the original protesters).
Hearing that students had been shot made Ms. Pandey feel ill. She couldn’t understand why so many older people had joined, kicking up trouble, revving their motorcycles, throwing stones. She was mystified by the lack of police until, suddenly, they were firing tear gas and then bullets.
However, Hannah leaves out the questions her journalism should have answered: Why was the number of police reduced? Did the pro-monarchs/pro-Hindus do anything wrong during the protest? Why did Hami Nepal become influential?
This paragraph again brings up conflicting scenario without explaining why and what happened next.
By the time the security forces had shot and killed 19 people and injured dozens more, Ms. Pandey had left the protest. Things had moved so quickly and gotten so violent that her group issued an online call urging everyone to leave. But forces that said they were associated with Mr. Gurung’s group, Hami Nepal, issued a counter order, urging people to return.
Tanuja is still shocked that the revolution has taken place:
“We wanted reform, not a revolution,” said Tanuja Pandey, 25, who helped first publicize the protest on her Gen Z group’s social media.
“I don’t know what happened, but the whole thing was hijacked,” she said.
If she claims she is a “leader” of the protests, she can’t just say “the whole thing was hijacked.” She is not a common person now. She should at least try to expose who hijacked the protest.
The NYT’s journalism also does not help. It does not explore the hijackers or if Tanuja’s statement was legitimate or not.
Moreover, the last scene of the article is out of place and cringeworthy:
A week after the protests began, Ms. Pandey celebrated her 25th birthday in Kathmandu. She was still keeping a low profile, fearing arrest or worse.
A hard rain obscured the gaggle of Gen Z protesters splashing across the paving stones to a small restaurant run by sympathizers. Lawyers and environmental activists, influencers and cultural preservationists, Ms. Pandey’s friends toasted with brass cups of milky rice wine. They feasted on deep-fried intestines stuffed with lard and dipped in fermented chile. They sang songs from the Beatles, Bob Dylan and Bollywood.
“To an accidental revolution,” they toasted.
Ms. Pandey looked serious.
“What happens now,” she asked. “Will Nepal change?”
Her friends turned quiet. They swallowed more wine. The rain beat down, fierce and warm.
Final Opinion
The New York Times article on Nepal’s revolution is rich is storytelling but poor in journalism. It does not answer even the basic of questions in many cases. Moreover, there are discrepancies in the description of events and characters.
I think the most devastating is generalization of Nepal’s Gen Zs as nonchalant and politically unaware. Misan Rai eating grapefruit amidst the protest and Tanuja Pandey gulping down wine on her birthday party despite an uncertain political future portray Nepalese Gen Z activists as carefree youths involved in something they can’t barely understand. Also, some of the scenes show how Nepalese youths crave for power and have a violent tendency.
The article, as a whole, fails to raise hope about the “revolution”. But that’s how I have felt since the evening of September 9. So, if it did not bring hope, can we still call it a revolution?
Constitution Study #13: A discussion of Article 30, the Right to Clean Environment, its implications and challenges in Nepal
We can’t live healthily without clean environment. The Constitution of Nepal recognises this necessity and guarantees the Right to Clean Environment as a fundamental right. However, as with the fundamental rights discussed in this Constitution Study series, attaining clean environment is an uphill task.
In this post, we discuss…
Right to Clean Environment in the Constitution
Article 30 of the Constitution states:
(1) Every citizen shall have the right to live in a clean and healthy environment.
(2) The victim shall have the right to obtain compensation, in accordance with law, for any damage caused by environmental pollution or degradation.
(3) This Article shall not be deemed to prevent the making of necessary legal provisions for a proper balance between environment and development in development works of the nation.
Difficulties in Implementation
Although the Constitution guarantees a clean environment for everyone, and the victims have the right to compensation for damage, environmental degradation is a huge problem, especially in the urban areas. Dusty congested roads, unmanageable traffic, and non-existent sewage management have been chronic problems, even in the capital city, Kathmandu.
Lack of proper urban planning and implementation of existing plans have made cities hazardous to live. Pollution-induced diseases are on the rise. For instance, 75 percent of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease cases, 46 percent of strokes, 44 percent of ischemic heart disease, 41 percent of lower respiratory infections, 38 percent of lung cancer, 30 percent of neonatal issues like low birth weight and preterm birth, and 20 percent of diabetes (Source: World Bank Report on Clean Air in Nepal).
Moreover, smog from forest and field fires disturbs the normal functioning of people all over Nepal. Since the smog originates not only in Nepal but also in India, transborder pollution has been a major environmental issue of late.
Also, an increase in natural disasters has led to the destruction of the habitable environment in many parts of Nepal.
Plans for better environment
1. SDGs
The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, integrate environmental sustainability as a central pillar of development. Several goals explicitly relate to achieving the right to clean environment:
SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation): Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all, including reducing pollution, eliminating dumping, and minimising release of hazardous chemicals.
SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy): Promote renewable energy and energy efficiency, reducing environmental impacts of energy generation.
SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities): Reduce adverse environmental impacts of cities, including air quality and waste management.
SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production): Ensure sustainable use of natural resources and reduce waste generation.
SDG 13 (Climate Action): Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.
SDG 14 & 15 (Life Below Water & Life on Land): Reduce water and terrestrial pollution, halt biodiversity loss, and restore degraded ecosystems.
2. Sixteenth Plan
The Sixteenth Plan (2024/25–2028/29) focuses on different environmental issues, including:
Environmental Dimension
Key Actions in the 16th Plan
Climate Change & Mitigation
Implementation of emission-reduction strategies, renewable energy, and energy-efficient policies
Green Economy & Biodiversity
Minimizing development impacts; promoting clean infrastructure; natural resource conservation
Financing & Coordination
Accessing international climate finance; engaging stakeholders; multi-agency collaboration
SDGs & LDC Graduation Strategy
Embedding climate risk management within broader development and transition frameworks
3. Laws and Policies
Nepal has adopted laws and policies to meet SDGs as well as the right to clean environment. Some of them are:
Environment Protection Act 2019 and related regulations provide a legal framework for pollution control, EIA/IEE requirements, and environmental accountability.
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs): Under the Paris Agreement, Nepal has committed to reaching net-zero emissions by 2045.
Nepal has established 20 protected areas (national parks, wildlife reserves, conservation areas) covering over 23% of its territory—well above the global target of 17%.
Conclusion
Despite having the Right to Clean Environment is a constitutional mandate, Nepal has not been able to implement it properly due to political constraints, lack of coordination between the three federal units, lack of awareness among people, and transboundary pollution. It is of utmost importance to align policies towards clean environment and sustainable development, improve coordination between the federal levels, and address transboundary pollution through diplomatic approaches.
Constitution Study #10: Analysis of the Fundamental Rights and Policies on Social Justice and Inclusion
Months before the promulgation of the Constitution on Ashwin 3, 2072 (September 20, 2015) debates on social justice, inclusion, and reservation had pervaded the Constituent Assembly and the streets. At Tri-Chandra Multiple Campus, where I was doing my bachelor’s at that time, there would be heated debates between friends. Some were favour of the policies, some against, and still some demanding a nuanced and balanced approach. Although the policies are etched in the Constitution through the Preamble, Fundamental Rights, and State Policy, the following questions are still relevant:
1. Is social justice necessary in Nepal?
2. Has inclusion changed anything?
3. Can we afford the current model of reservation?
This article, a continuation of the Constitution Study series, gets into the constitutional promises, actual practice, and way forward in the matters of social justice, inclusion, and reservation.
In this post, you’ll read about…
How Did Social Justice, Inclusion, and Reservation Find their Way into the Constitution?
1. Initiation in the Democratic Era (2007-2017)
Democracy is often thought of as an idea that automatically includes everyone in the state structure and governance. The truth is: it is not enough. Nepal’s democratic movements in 2007 B.S. (1951) barely scratched the Rana oligarchy and gave power to another group of elites.
2. Reversal in the Panchayat Era
The Panchayat era (2017-2046) stripped even the right to voting. It created a monolinguist, monocultural, and monoreligious nationalism in a country with diverse languages, cultures, and religions. On the surface, Nepal was united by a single language, culture, and religion, but underneath the seed of conflict was brewing.
3. Resurgence during Civil War
The Jana Aandolan of 2046 brought on the surface some issues related to women and Dalits, but it still could not accept the diversity as the national characteristic. While the Maoist movement did not begin with the issues of social justice and inclusion, it picked the idea to mobilize and motive more people into the war against the government. The narrative of historical injustice struck the chord of the marginalized, and they went wholeheartedly into the war.
4. Outcry during the Constituent Assembly Era
Issues of social justice, inclusion, and reservation found their way into the mainstream after the 2062/63 Jana Aandolan II. The Madhesh Aandolan of 2063 and 2064 aggressively demanded federalism and correction of historical injustices. Movements of Aadivasi Janajatis (indigenous groups), women, Dalits, and others before the promulgation of the Constitution institutionalized the issue.
5. Constitutional Implementation Era
There are still some debates regarding social justice, inclusion, and reservation despite constitutional promises. Complaints about elite capture have raised concerns on the fair and just implementation of those provisions and if it is necessary to amend the Constitution and other laws.
6. Nepal’s Global Commitments
Apart from the above domestic movements, Nepal’s ratification of different international human rights laws also gave way to social justice, inclusion, and reservations for the marginalized, such as:
CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women)
CRC (Convention on the Rights of the Child)
ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights)
ICESCR (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)
UNCRPD (Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities)
The Constitution’s Bold Promise and Its Global Roots
Article 18 of the Constitution enshrines Equality before Law, guaranteeing non-discrimination based on origin, religion, race, caste, tribe, sex, physical condition, condition of health, marital status, pregnancy, economic condition, language, region, ideology or any other status. It also introduces affirmative action, mandating the state to enact special laws and policies for the protection, empowerment, and representation of marginalized communities, including women, Dalits, indigenous groups, Madhesis, Tharus, Muslims, people with disabilities, and backward regions.
Similarly, Article 24 prohibits untouchability and caste-based discrimination in any form. Article 42 guarantees the Right to Social Justice, enabling marginalized groups to participate in state bodies on the basis of proportional inclusion.
State Policies (Article 51(j)) also include the matters of social justice and inclusion. It guides the State to work towards building an environment to allow the participation of diverse groups in governance, and ensuring their political, social, cultural, and economic protection.
But do these lofty provisions translate into meaningful transformation?
Positive Outcomes
Data from the Economic Survey 2081/82shows that social indicators such as education and health have improved overall, but gaps persist:
The Human Development Index is 0.622, which is still low compared to regional peers.
Education statistics reveal glaring disparities. Community schools with predominantly marginalized students consistently perform worse than institutional schools. SEE results show deep inequalities in quality and accessEconomic Survey 2081-82.
In social security, over 3.5 million people benefit from allowance schemes (elderly, disabled, widows), but reports of exclusion and misuse remain frequent.
Nepal’s 16th Five-Year Plan also highlights the goal of creating a just and equitable society, explicitly targeting:
Increased participation of women, Dalits, Madhesis, and other marginalized groups in decision-making.
Reduction in multidimensional poverty.
Inclusive economic growth through social protection and targeted investments.
However, the same plan admits to persistent inequality, elite capture, and weak implementation mechanisms, especially at the local level.
Persisting Challenges
Lack of civic awareness and knowledge (sometimes even denial) on historical inequalities, and attitude of the rulers and the ruled keep bringing up problems in effectively implementing the constitutional provisions of social justice and inclusion. These problems can be summarized as:
Implementation Gap: Laws exist, but mechanisms are weak, underfunded, or politicized.
Elite Capture: Affirmative action benefits the dominant voices within marginalized categories, while the poorest remain excluded.
Data Deficiency: Many groups are invisible in national surveys and policy planning, making targeted interventions difficult.
Social Attitudes: Deep-rooted biases in bureaucracy, politics, and society obstruct real transformation.
Even programs meant to uplift the marginalized are often politicized, leaving the truly marginalized behind.
We must confront the bitter truth: A policy that looks fair on paper can still feel unjust in practice.
The Way Forward
If we want real change, we must ask tough questions and act boldly:
Is inclusion reaching the poorest within marginalized groups? If not, we need audits and reforms to prevent elite capture. We may even have to limit the number and period of reservations an individual can get.
Are our education and healthcare systems inclusive by design?
Can we make inclusion part of everyday governance?
Are we prudent enough to let the Constitution and laws guide us?
We are not doing favour by implementing social justice and inclusivity. They are not gifts. They are orientation towards basic human rights. And the longer we delay its full realization, the more fragile our democracy becomes.
Constitution Study #9: A reflection on the conflict between the Right to Information and the Culture of Secrecy
In this post, we discuss…
Case Studies on Right to Information and Right to Communication
According to a report published by FreedomInfo, in 2010, following deadly communal unrest in Kapilvastu, local leaders sought the government’s investigation report to secure fair compensation. The Home Ministry initially refused, citing cabinet secrecy. Undeterred, they appealed to the National Information Commission (NIC), an institution established by the Right to Information Act, 2064 (2007). The commission ordered the government to release the report, which was delivered a year later.
During King Gyanendra’s direct rule after February 1, 2005, Radio Sagarmatha, South Asia’s first independent FM station was banned for broadcasting an interview of Prachanda, the black-listed Maoist leader. The station filed a complaint against the Royal Government’s movement in the Supreme Court. Radio Sagarmatha resumed its broadcast 48 hours and 47 hours following the Supreme Court’s verdict upholding the right to communication.
The above examples show that information is power, and communication is key to unlock it. In a democratic society, access to information and freedom of communication are not only constitutional rights, but also essential tools for transparency, accountability, and informed public opinion. The Constitution of Nepal enshrines both the Right to Information (Article 27) and the Right to Communication (Article 19) as fundamental rights. Together, these rights create a framework through which citizens can engage with the state, demand accountability, and participate meaningfully in governance.
Understanding the Rights
Right to Information (RTI)
Article 27 of the Constitution of Nepal states:
“Every citizen shall have the right to demand and receive information on any matter of his or her interest or of public interest. Provided that no one shall be compelled to provide information on any matter which must be maintained confidential in accordance with law.”
This right empowers citizens to access government-held information, including policies, decisions, budgets, expenditures, and plans. It is a legal tool for fighting corruption, ensuring justice, and promoting good governance.
Right to Communication
Article 19 guarantees the freedom of opinion and expression, as well as the freedom of the press, publication, and broadcasting, provided that these rights do not:
Undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or national unity,
Violate public decency or morality,
Encourage caste, ethnic, gender, or religious discrimination or hatred,
Jeopardize the harmonious relations between federal units.
This right ensures that individuals and media can communicate, report, and express freely, with reasonable legal restrictions.
Procedures for Obtaining Public Information
To operationalize RTI, Nepal enacted the Right to Information Act, 2064 (2007). The Act outlines the following procedures:
Filing a Request: Any Nepali citizen can file a request with a Public Information Officer (PIO) in the concerned office by filling out a standard form or writing an application.
Response Time: The PIO must provide the information within 15 days. In case of threats to life or liberty, the time limit is 24 hours.
Refusal and Appeal: If the information is denied or not provided, the applicant can appeal to the National Information Commission (NIC).
No Need for Reason: The applicant is not required to state the reason for seeking information.
The Economic Survey also emphasizes digital progress in governance, such as broader access to information and banking through ICT expansion.
Exceptions: What Information is Not Accessible
Both the Constitution and the RTI Act list certain exemptions. The following categories are considered restricted:
Matters that jeopardize national security or sovereignty
Information that undermines foreign relations
Internal deliberations of public bodies
Confidential information relating to individuals’ privacy
Trade secrets or intellectual property of private institutions
Ongoing investigations where disclosure may impede justice
These limitations attempt to balance openness with legitimate state and individual interests.
Connection with the Right to Privacy
While RTI promotes transparency, Article 28 of the Constitution guarantees the Right to Privacy. This includes:
Privacy of personal life, residence, property, documents, correspondence, and reputation
Protection from arbitrary surveillance or disclosure of personal information
Therefore, RTI must be carefully implemented to not infringe upon the privacy rights of individuals. For instance, information about a person’s health, bank account, or family life cannot be disclosed without lawful justification.
This tension between transparency and privacy necessitates a nuanced approach. The state must develop clear guidelines and train public officers to differentiate between public interest and private confidentiality.
Tension between RTI and the Culture of Secrecy
As we have often seen in this Constitution Study series, there are always gaps between constitutional provisions and implementations. Nepal’s government and bureaucracy have a culture of secrecy because of rampant corruption and the silo problem. The government listed 154 kinds of information as “classified,” in 2008. The National Information Commission ordered the government to revise the list.
In 2011, the government again tried to classify 88 types of documents as inaccessible, but the Supreme Court ruled against the decision. In 2023, The government listed 87 documents as “classified”, including those related to procurement (which should actually be transparent), but the list is unavailable in the public domain.
The Right to Information and the Right to Communication are pillars of Nepal’s constitutional democracy. They empower citizens, ensure accountability, and enhance public participation. However, their misuse and over-restriction can undermine these very goals. To strike the right balance, the state must improve legal awareness, ensure institutional readiness, digitize access, and respect privacy. Only then can these rights truly serve their constitutional promise of building an open and just society.
On the occasion of World Population Day on July 11 (Ashadh 27), Nepal published a new population policy. The Prime Minister’s statement, “Get married at twenty and have three children by thirty,” got huge attention in the social media. As with many of the statements the PM makes, it turned into jokes and memes. Many youths also criticised the government for creating unemployment and focusing on sending the productive population abroad. Although the statement created a buzz, it also made the youths on social media miss serious concerns put forth by the National Population Policy, 2082.
The 2021 National Population and Housing Census (NPHC) averages Nepal’s annual growth rate of 0.92% per year in the decade 2068-2078 B.S. (2011-2021). This is a decline from 1.35% per year in the 2068 (2011) Census. Similarly, the total fertility rate (TFR) has fallen to 1.94, well below the desired 2.1. In the last decade, population policies talked about demographic dividend—the higher number of youths contributing to national development. The new trends indicate that Nepal may be losing that edge and have raised many concerns for the future.
1.1 Potential Negative Demographic Dividend
A decrease in the population growth rate implies a smaller number of children and the reduction of the active population, aged 15-59, in the future. Although Nepal hasn’t been able to utilise its 62% active population, a reduction indicates an even worse scenario, where there will be a shortage of human resources for production. This will negatively affect human capital formation and the economic growth.
1.2 Aging Population
In 2068, the population above 60 was 8.1% of the total population. The population of the elderly is now 10.21%. Improved health care has and will shoot up the number even higher in the coming decades. The government may have to spend more on the elderly’s health. The reduced active population will have to spend more on the care of their parents, creating economic pressure.
1.3 Underutilisation of Infrastructure
A lower population may not have the need for a large number of infrastructures. Also, the lack of human resources owes to the decline in development and economic activities.
1.4 Reversal of Family Planning Programmes
The government will now have to encourage youths to have more children, and the PM’s statement seems relevant in that context. However, the majority of the youth are not ready to get married, let alone have three children by their thirties. Employment opportunities are scarce, inflation is high, and there is no encouragement to industries and entrepreneurship. Given our situation, it is easier to press for a lower number of children. How can one think of marrying and having three children when surviving alone is a struggle?
2. Rapid Out-Migration
Nepal has a high rate of out-migration. For instance, in 2023, the Department of Immigration’s data showed that 70,915 (36,663 men and 34,251 women) left the country to reside elsewhere permanently. Similarly, 808,415 Nepali citizens went for foreign employment, of which 89.5% were males. Moreover, 108,542 (~55% male and 45% female) students went abroad to pursue their studies. Very few return back to Nepal. Out-migration driven by globalisation has not only reduced the population but also deprived Nepal of skilled human resources vital for national development.
The fact that more people are settling in other countries with their families means that Nepal is losing its source of remittance. Although the Nepalese diaspora has been contributing to various development endeavours, it is uncertain whether they will continue doing so if they don’t have any familial roots in Nepal.
3. Drastic Change in Technology
In the last five years, technology has changed at a breakneck pace, changing the way the world operates. Many labour-intensive works are now being replaced by automation, robotics, and artificial intelligence (AI). Nepal lags behind in the development and adoption of new technologies. There is also a possibility of reduced labour demand in developed countries. The National Population Policy acknowledges that the rapid growth in technology might elevate the problem of unemployment at home and abroad.
Policy Proposals to Solve the Above Problems
To address the problems caused by low growth rate, the National Population Policy 2082 proposes to revisit and revise family planning programs to align with current and future demographic trends and strengthen reproductive health services. The open-ended policy wording means that for now, the government will work towards increasing birth rate and modifying family planning programmes.
The policy aims to make foreign employment skill-based, prioritise the knowledge on AI, and utilize the human resources on national development. For internal migration, the policy aims to strengthen information and data systems, increase economic activities in rural areas to create employment, and systematize internal migration through integrated settlement development.
For addressing the challenges brought about by technology, the policy proposes revising the education system to be entrepreneurship, and production-focused, prioritize skill and competence enhancement in new technologies and artificial intelligence (AI) for Nepali workers, and increasing investment in productive sectors like tourism, modern agriculture, infrastructure development, and forest product processing to expand employment and self-employment opportunities.
Ground Realities
Despite elaborate policy proposals, the ground realities show a different picture. Infrastructures are subpar, the quality of education is questionable, the influence of globalisation is insurmountable, and the frustration of the youth is higher than Mount Everest. There is no way the government can stop the youth from going abroad in search of opportunities. It might even encourage out-migration to improve the economy via remittance. Unless Nepal improves infrastructures and encourages the youth for entrepreneurship and mass employment, the National Population Policy has very little chance of success.
Constitution Study #8: An analysis of eroding faith on justice in Nepal
In this article, we discuss…
Political Meddling and Public Distrust in Justice
In recent years, public confidence in Nepal’s judiciary has eroded to alarming levels. From controversial rulings to suspected backdoor deals, the very institution meant to safeguard fairness and the rule of law now finds itself entangled in political webs.
Recent Examples of Political Interference:
Attempt of Impeachment against Chief Justice Sushila Karki (2017): On April 30, 2017, 239 Members of Parliament (MPs) filed the impeachment motion against Karki. It was the first time any Chief Justice had faced impeachment. The then Judge of the Supreme Court Cholendra Shamsher Rana ruled against the move on May 5 and reinstated Karki.
Chief Justice Cholendra Shamsher Rana’s Suspension (2022): Rana faced impeachment proceedings not solely due to his alleged misconduct, but also due to political realignments. Reports suggested political parties coordinated the move when he resisted some executive appointments—blurring the lines between accountability and retaliation.
Impunity in Corruption Cases: Several politicians implicated in high-profile scams (e.g., the Lalita Niwas land grab, gold smuggling cases, and fake Bhutanese refugee scandal) have either evaded prosecution or benefited from procedural delays. Courts appear reluctant to confront power centers.
Selective Enforcement: Political opponents often face swift charges, while ruling party members are granted procedural leniency, bail, or silence from investigative agencies.
The judiciary’s proximity to party interests has created a justice system that feels arbitrary, inconsistent, and aligned with power rather than principle. This has weakened the moral authority of the courts and shaken citizens’ belief in equal justice.
What Does the Constitution Say?
Despite the current realities, the Constitution provides a comprehensive framework for justice in Nepal:
Article 20: Right to Justice
Guarantees the right to fair trial, legal counsel, and presumption of innocence.
Emphasizes judicial independence and impartiality.
Article 21: Rights of Crime Victims
Ensures victims’ rights to information, participation, compensation, and dignified treatment.
Article 42: Right to Social Justice
Mandates proportional inclusion of women, Dalits, Adivasis, Madhesis, Muslims, backward regions, and gender minorities in state bodies.
The Constitution, on paper, envisions justice not only as due process in courts but as a tool of social transformation. Justice in Nepal is not just about being heard—it’s about being seen, represented, and uplifted.
Loopholes That Enable Political Influence
While the Constitution upholds judicial independence in principle, several weaknesses open the door for manipulation:
Judicial Council Composition (Article 153):
The Chief Justice heads the Council, but its members include a minister, the senior-most justice of the Supreme Court, a nominee of the President (on executive advice), and a senior advocate recommended by Nepal Bar Association.
The fact that three of five members are directly affiliated to politics (and there is a high possibility of the Chief Justice and the Judge to be politically oriented as well) allows ruling parties to influence judge appointments, transfers, and promotions.
Impeachment as a Political Tool (Article 101):
Judges can be impeached by a fourth of Parliament members. While this ensures accountability, it can also be abused as a weapon by political factions.
Delay in Judicial Appointments:
The executive has frequently delayed nominations to influence court compositions during key cases.
No Constitutional Limit on Interim Orders:
Frequent, ambiguous interim orders from courts create a perception of tactical favoritism, especially when sensitive political or corruption cases are involved.
Why People Are Losing Faith
The erosion of judicial credibility isn’t merely procedural—it’s deeply emotional and experiential. People lose faith when:
Cases drag on for years without resolution.
Judges with known political leanings preside over politically sensitive cases.
Victims of caste-based violence or rape fail to get justice while perpetrators are shielded by local or national politicians.
Legal aid remains inaccessible for those who can’t afford it, making justice a privilege for the rich.
In Fiscal Year 2022/23, Nepal scored 0.52 in the Rule of Law Index—barely halfway to an ideal system. That doesn’t mean there is no justice in Nepal. It means that the law works—sometimes. For some. But for millions of Nepalis, especially those from rural, Dalit, and indigenous communities, it works slowly, selectively, or not at all. Surveys and government reports suggest these groups rarely seek legal redress unless absolutely necessary—and when they do, they often feel unheard, humiliated, or dismissed.
The Path Forward: Reclaiming Justice
Justice in Nepal can be saved, but only through urgent reforms rooted in transparency, inclusivity, and courage.
Suggested Reforms
Revamp the Judicial Council: Exclude executive members; ensure the Council is independent with balanced representation from civil society, bar associations, and retired justices.
Transparent Appointment Processes: Publish criteria and reasoning for judicial nominations, transfers, and promotions.
Strengthen Legal Aid: Expand the budget and outreach of legal aid centers, particularly in marginalized and remote areas.
Language and Accessibility Reform: Provide translation and legal materials in local languages; make courtrooms less intimidating for laypeople.
Empower Local Justice Systems: Incorporate indigenous dispute resolution mechanisms under constitutional safeguards to serve communities historically left behind.
Establish Independent Judicial Oversight: Create an autonomous ethics commission for judges to investigate misconduct separate from parliamentary impeachment.
Conclusion: A Constitution is Only as Strong as Its Execution
The Constitution of Nepal speaks eloquently of justice—legal and social, personal and collective. But when laws are manipulated and courts become extensions of political games, the promise becomes a lie.
Justice must be rebuilt—not through slogans or courtroom formalities, but by restoring dignity to the powerless, accountability to the powerful, and trust to the people. Without that, justice in Nepal will remain, tragically, a word in a book few can afford to believe in.
In a recent social media post, Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli shared an image boldly stating, I am a Jhole). It was a provocative twist on a term repeatedly used to mock political sycophants — the Jhole, those who carry their leaders’ ideological and literal bags with unquestioning loyalty. By embracing the label, Oli turned it on its head, drawing parallels to Tyrion Lannister’s iconic line from Game of Thrones:
“Never forget what you are. The rest of the world will not. Wear it like armour, and it can never be used to hurt you.”
Psychologically, it was a masterstroke. What had once been a symbol of ridicule is now recast as a badge of honour. It arms party cadres with moral confidence and a ready-made justification for loyalty. It strengthens in-group identity and inoculates against public criticism. In a time of waning ideological clarity and rising cynicism, such reaffirmation is emotionally powerful.
But this reframing comes at a steep cost.
The idea of being a Jholecontradicts the very essence of democratic citizenship. Nepal is at a juncture where political awakening, not blind allegiance, is the need of the hour. When being a Jhole becomes aspirational, it signals a dangerous retreat from critical engagement. It celebrates hierarchy over participation, obedience over dialogue, and ideology over truth.
In a country reeling from institutional decay, corruption, and disillusionment with mainstream politics, embracing the Jhole identity is not brave — it is escapist. A true patriot cannot afford to be a bag carrier of any leader or party. We must ask questions, demand accountability, and have the courage to stand apart when needed. Ideological loyalty should come from understanding and belief, not from submission.
Ironically, the moment a leader wears the insult as a crown is also the moment the rest of the party members boldly follow suit. By accepting the term Jhole, they normalise a culture where subservience is rewarded and independent thought is suspect. They cultivate an indifferent leadership that does not care about the problems ordinary citizens face.
This is not a personal attack on the Prime Minister but a plea to every Nepali:
Let us not be flattered into submission. We must be more than Jholes — we must be citizens.
In a democracy, the highest duty is not to follow but to question. That is the only way we break the chain of servitude.
Disclaimer: This piece reflects critical reflection on public discourse and is intended to encourage democratic engagement, not to target any individual personally.
Constitution Study #7: A Deep Dive into Article 18 and the Struggle for Real Equality
Aspirations of equality—the state of having equal status and opportunities—inspired a decade-long armed revolution from 1996 to 2006. The civil war promised to end inequalities brought about by systematic and social discrimination, nominal decentralisation, and the lack of fair political and economic opportunities. Yet biases and persecution based on gender, caste, religion, and economic class persist.
Are we really equal? What does the Constitution of Nepal say? What is happening in practice? If the constitution guarantees equality before the law, why do inequalities remain?
(1) All citizens shall be equal before law. No one shall be denied the equal protection of law.
This provision aligns with the Right to Live with Dignity (Article 16), which we discussed previously.
Article 18 further asserts:
(2) No discrimination shall be made in the application of general laws on grounds of origin, religion, race, caste, tribe, sex, physical condition, disability, condition of health, marital status, pregnancy, economic condition, language or region, ideological conviction or on similar other grounds.
(3) The State shall not discriminate among citizens on grounds of origin, religion, race, caste, tribe, sex, economic condition, language, region, ideological conviction or on similar other grounds.
The prevention of discrimination is further reinforced through Article 24. It bans discrimination and untouchability in any private and public places, including workplace, production and distribution of goods, services, and facilities, and even criminalises such actions.
This does not, however, prevent the State from making special legal provisions for the protection and empowerment of groups facing historical or structural disadvantages—such as women, Dalits, indigenous nationalities, Madhesi, Tharu, Muslims, persons with disabilities, backward regions, gender minorities, and even indigent Khas Arya.
Such special provisions, enshrined in the Article 18 (3) reappear in the rights of women (Art. 38), children(Art. 39), Dalits (Art. 40), senior citizens(Art. 41), the Right to Social Justice (Art. 42), and the Right to Social Security (Art. 43), proportional representation in the parliament, and allocation of spots for a woman and a Dalit woman in the Wards of Local Bodies.
Article 18 also eliminates gender discrimination stating:
(4) No discrimination shall be made on the ground of gender with regard to remuneration and social security for the same work.
(5) All offspring shall have the equal right to the ancestral property without discrimination on the ground of gender.
These provisions on paper form a robust framework for equality. But the deeper question remains: Are they honoured in practice, or are they simply constitutional aspirations still out of reach for many Nepalis?
2. Is Equality Only on Paper?
Despite the lofty promises of Article 18, Nepal continues to grapple with structural inequalities that prevent its citizens from enjoying real equality before the law. These constitutional guarantees are often undercut by the lived reality of systemic bias, social discrimination, and uneven access to justice.
2.1 Legal Protections, Selective Justice
The Constitution also upholds the Right to Justice under Article 20, which guarantees:
“Every person shall have the right to a fair trial by an independent, impartial and competent court…”
Yet, elites accused of corruption or abuse of power often receive lenient treatment—or see cases against them delayed indefinitely or dismissed. Meanwhile, ordinary citizens endure prolonged trials and harsher punishments even for minor violation or dissent.
This selective application of justice creates a double standard: one law, two treatments.
2.2 Discrimination and Unequal Access
Even though Article 24 criminalizes caste-based discrimination and Article 18 bars prejudice based on identity or economic status, violations are still widespread.
Recent Findings
According to the Economic Survey 2081-82:
Dalits and disadvantaged communities continue to lag in education, employment, and political representation.
While human development indicators have improved overall (reaching 0.622), inequality persists across provinces. For instance:
Gandaki leads in economic growth (5.51%), while Sudurpashchim remains lowest (3.32%).
Local budgets and access to services are unevenly distributed, with underfunding common in backward and remote areas.
These disparities mean that geographic location and birth identity still largely determine one’s opportunities—a clear breach of Article 18(3).
2.3 Gender and Economic Inequality
Article 18(4) and (5) aim to eradicate gender-based inequality in pay and inheritance. Yet:
Women and gender minorities remain underrepresented in decision-making roles.
A wage gap persists in many sectors.
Marginalized groups have limited access to land ownership, formal banking, and education—despite state-backed affirmative policies.
2.4 Public Perception and Trust Deficit
The 16th Plan of Nepal underscores “inclusive development,” but does not shy away from admitting that trust in public institutions has eroded due to inequality, corruption, and lack of responsiveness.
When citizens do not feel protected by the law or adequately represented in governance, the very legitimacy of the constitutional state is called into question.
3. Why Inequality Persists Despite the Constitution
Nepal’s Constitution boldly enshrines the ideals of equality (Article 18) and justice (Article 20), but these promises often fail to materialize in the lived experiences of many citizens. Why? The persistence of inequality in Nepal can be traced to a combination of historical exclusion, weak institutions, and socio-political inertia.
3.1 Historical and Cultural Legacy
Nepal’s social fabric has long been shaped by entrenched hierarchies—most notably caste, ethnicity, and patriarchy. Though untouchability is criminalized under Article 24, many Dalits and Janajatis still face discrimination in daily life, from public spaces to religious institutions. The state itself historically favoured the Khas-Arya male elite, creating structural inequality in education, employment, and political access.
3.2 Weak Implementation of Progressive Laws
Nepal has one of the most progressive constitutions in South Asia, yet implementation lags behind:
Police and local authorities often fail to register complaints of discrimination or violence, especially when victims belong to marginalized groups.
Judiciary remains under-resourced and male-dominated, with only 3% women in judicial positions (Economic Survey 2081-82).
Many local governments still lack capacity or willingness to enforce inclusion measures.
3.3 Skewed Economic Structure
Economic power remains concentrated among dominant groups:
Dalits, Muslims, and gender minorities are overrepresented in informal, low-paying, and insecure work.
Access to land, credit, and formal employment remains heavily skewed.
While poverty rates have declined nationally, multidimensional poverty remains high in Karnali (39.5%) and Madhesh(16th Plan), reflecting deeply rooted economic exclusion.
3.4 Structural Barriers in Education and Representation
Disparities in school infrastructure, teacher quality, and language of instruction disproportionately affect Dalit, Madhesi, and rural students.
Despite constitutional quotas, marginalized communities remain underrepresented in key decision-making roles, particularly in the bureaucracy and judiciary.
Symbolic representation has often replaced meaningful power-sharing, resulting in tokenism rather than transformation.
3.5 Political Tokenism and Elite Capture
Political parties routinely use identity-based candidates to attract votes, but rarely empower them to challenge entrenched systems.
Inclusion measures are often co-opted by elites of marginalized groups, who benefit personally but fail to advance their communities’ interests.
Affirmative action lacks proper monitoring, data, and enforcement, allowing loopholes and misuse.
3.6 Planning Without Accountability
Even national development plans recognize the gap between vision and reality:
“There is a lack of disaggregated and reliable data for effective targeting,” — 16th Plan, Government of Nepal
This means policies are often misdirected or fail to reach those who need them most. Coordination between federal, provincial, and local governments also remains weak, limiting impact on ground.
4. The Unfinished Revolution
Today, on the Day of the Elimination of Caste Discrimination and Untouchability, Nepal must reflect honestly. The war may be over, but the revolution is unfinished. If the state cannot deliver on its promise of equality and justice, the credibility of the entire constitutional framework risks being hollowed out.
Equality before the law should not depend on wealth, power, or identity. It must be lived reality—not just constitutional poetry.
5. A Call for Constitutional Realization
The gap between constitutional ideals and social reality is stark. When equality before law becomes a privilege rather than a right, and justice is contingent upon status, the foundation of democracy is eroded. Upholding Articles 18 and 20 requires not only legal reforms but structural change, public accountability, and genuine political will.
Nepal must move beyond symbolic guarantees to substantive equality and justice—only then can it truly call itself a republic of the people.
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