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How Nepal Forms a Government: The 5-Step Constitutional Roadmap

Constitution Study #17: A step-by-step description of the constitutional provisions (Article 76) for forming a government in Nepal

The period following a general election in Nepal is often chaotic. News cycles fill with talk of negotiations, power-sharing deals, and political “horse-trading”, leaving many citizens confused about what comes next. The uncertainty around which party or coalition wins or forms a government is a bigger battleground than the polls themselves.

Yet, amidst this perceived chaos, the Constitution of Nepal provides a surprisingly clear, step-by-step roadmap for forming a government. This framework, detailed in Article 76, is designed to navigate the complexities of a multi-party system. This article breaks down that complex constitutional process into five simple, understandable steps, framing it as a constitutional drama of escalating stakes.

Steps of government formation in Nepal according to Article 76.

Step 1: The Straightforward Path – A Clear Majority

The first and most straightforward method for forming a government is outlined in Article 76, Clause (1) of the Constitution. If a single political party wins a clear majority of seats in the House of Representatives, the President appoints the parliamentary leader of that party as the Prime Minister. This is the simplest and most stable path to forming a government.

This scenario represents the ideal for stable governance, as it provides a clear mandate and avoids the need for complex negotiations. However, in Nepal’s political landscape, a single-party majority has become a rarity. This is largely due to a political culture where parties are often feudalistic in nature and centred around their topmost leaders rather than cohesive ideologies, frequently resulting in fractured electoral mandates. The instability that challenges Nepal’s governance often stems from the fact that this first, ideal step is seldom achieved.

Step 2: When No One Wins Outright – The Art of the Coalition

When no single party secures a majority, the process moves to Article 76, Clause (2). Under this provision, the President appoints a member of the House of Representatives who can prove they have majority support through an alliance of two or more parties. This is the formation of a coalition government.

This is the most common path to power, reflecting a political culture where parties, often centred on individual leaders rather than ideology, engage in intense political broking. This necessity for compromise contributes directly to the “frequent changes in government” that challenge Nepal’s stability, as alliances are often transactional and built on fragile power-sharing agreements rather than durable policy consensus. Managing the competing demands of coalition partners often leads to policy gridlock and fragile alliances.

Election coalitions can break down, and new government coalitions can form, as evidenced in the aftermath of the 2022 elections. The then CPN Maoist (Centre) ran the elections along with Nepali Congress, but when the time for forming the government came, it broke the alliance and joined the other parties: CPN (UML), Rastriya Swatantra Party, Rastriya Prajatantra Party, People’s Socialist Party, Janamat Party, and Nagrik Unmukti Party, and three independents, with Pushpa Kamal Dahal heading the government.

Step 3: If Coalitions Crumble – The Largest Party’s Chance

If a coalition government cannot be formed within thirty days, the Constitution provides a third option under Article 76, Clause (3). The President will then appoint the parliamentary leader of the single largest party in the House of Representatives as Prime Minister. However, this appointment is conditional. As per Clause (4), this Prime Minister must win a “vote of confidence” from the House within thirty days to remain in power.

This provision acts as a critical safeguard to prevent complete political deadlock when coalition talks fail. It ensures that a government can be formed, even if it lacks an upfront majority. However, this type of minority government is inherently fragile. This precariousness forces the largest party to govern not by mandate, but by perpetual negotiation, often making it vulnerable to the shifting allegiances of smaller parties.

In 2023, after the CPN (UML) withdrew its support for Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the Nepali Congress had the opportunity to lead according to this provision. However, the Congress did not take a risk and joined with the CPN (UML). KP Sharma Oli was once again appointed Prime Minister according to Article 76(2).

Step 4: The Last Attempt – Any Member’s Claim

Where Step 3 empowers the leader of the single largest party, Step Four dramatically widens the field. If the minority Prime Minister from Step Three fails to win the vote of confidence, the process moves to a crucial and often contentious final attempt under Article 76, Clause (5). The President will then appoint any member of the House who can present grounds (e.g., letters of support from a sufficient number of members) demonstrating they are able to win a vote of confidence. This Prime Minister must also secure that vote of confidence within thirty days, as stipulated in Clause (6).

This clause is the constitution’s most radical attempt to break parliamentary gridlock. By allowing any member to stake a claim, it theoretically bypasses the rigid, hierarchical party structures that often cause deadlock. It opens the door for consensus candidates to emerge from outside the established leadership, but has also become a focal point of constitutional debate, as it can trigger intense political maneuvering and legal challenges regarding what constitutes valid “grounds” for a claim.

Step 5: Dissolution and a New Election

If all previous attempts fail, including the Prime Minister appointed in Step 4 being unable to secure a vote of confidence, the process reaches its definitive conclusion under Article 76, Clause (7). In this event, the President, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, will dissolve the House of Representatives and call for new general elections to be held within six months.

This is the constitution’s last resort: a political circuit breaker designed to prevent a complete system overload by returning power to its ultimate source—the people. This step embodies the principle of popular sovereignty enshrined in the constitution’s preamble, ensuring that when the elected representatives fail, the ultimate authority returns to the people. However, it comes at a significant cost, ushering in a period of political instability and the considerable expense of another national election.

Conclusion: A Framework for Stability or a Recipe for Intrigue?

The Constitution of Nepal lays out a detailed, multi-layered process for government formation. It is designed to exhaust every possible avenue for creating a functional government from the elected parliament before returning to the voters for a new mandate. This five-step cascade is a direct response to the nation’s complex political realities. This cycle of formation and dissolution at the federal level has cascading effects, often delaying the implementation of laws and policies crucial for empowering Nepal’s provincial and local governments and deepening its fragile federalism.

This leaves us with a critical question for the future of Nepal’s democracy: does this intricate, multi-stage process serve as a robust framework for stability in a fragmented polity, or does this complexity create perverse incentives for the political manoeuvring and constitutional brinkmanship it is designed to prevent?

Is a 2/3rds Majority in the House of Representatives Enough for a Constitutional Amendment?

Constitution Study #16: An analysis of the probability of the amendment of the Constitution of Nepal through the House of Representatives

Point no. 5 of the December 10 agreement between the government and the Gen Z representatives decided to set up a commission that will recommend subjects in the Constitution that need amendment. The incumbent government cannot address the issue because it has been set up to conduct elections for the fresh House of Representatives after the youth movement of September 8 and 9 swept all three organs of the state. But can the lower house alone amend the Constitution even if it has a 2/3rds majority?

The answer lies in understanding the process of amendment, the formation of the Parliament, and the political mistakes made by a “new” party in the previous election.

An infographic showing a steep path for constitution amendment through House of Representatives and National Assembly

1. How is the Constitution amended?

The amendment of the Constitution of Nepal is governed primarily by Article 274, which establishes a rigid but adaptable framework.

1.1 The Unamendables

Clause (1) of Article 274 makes it clear that:

No amendment shall be made to this Constitution in manner to be prejudicial to sovereignty, territorial integrity, independence of Nepal and sovereignty vested in the people.

This clause, too, is immune to any amendment (Article 274(2)).

1.2 Procedure for amendment

A Bill to amend or repeal any other article may be introduced in either House of the Federal Parliament (the House of Representatives or the National Assembly). Once a Bill is introduced, it must be publicly published within thirty days to ensure the general public is informed of the proposed changes.

If a proposed amendment involves altering provincial borders or affects the exclusive powers of provinces listed in Schedule-6, a more complex “federal” check is triggered:

  • Provincial Consent: The Speaker or Chairperson of the House where the Bill originated must send it to all Provincial Assemblies for consent within thirty days.
  • Timeframe and Voting: Each Provincial Assembly must approve or reject the Bill by a majority of its total members within three months.
  • Veto Power: If a majority of the Provincial Assemblies (at least four out of seven) notify the Federal Parliament that they reject the Bill, the amendment Bill becomes inoperative.
  • Federal Progression: If the three-month period expires without a response from an Assembly, the Federal Parliament may proceed with the Bill regardless.

Any other bill must be passed by at least a two-thirds majority of the total number of the “then members” of both Houses of the Federal Parliament (Article 274(8)). This high threshold prevents frequent or unstable changes driven by narrow political majorities.

1.3 Presidential authentication

After the Bill is adopted by both Houses, it is submitted to the President for final approval. The President must authenticate the Bill within fifteen days of receipt, at which point the Constitution is officially amended. The President has no discretionary power or veto over constitutional amendments that have fulfilled these procedures.

2. How does the Federal Parliament form?

Nepal has a bicameral system of legislature (Article 83), according to which there are two houses, the lower House of Representatives (HoR) and the upper National Assembly (NA).

2.1 Composition of the House of Representatives

The HoR consists of a total of 275 members, of which 165 (60%) members are elected through the first-past-the-post (FPTP) electoral system. The 110 (40%) members are elected through the proportional electoral system, where voters vote for political parties.

2.2 Composition of the National Assembly

The National Assembly (Rastriya Sabha) of Nepal is the permanent House of the Federal Parliament. It is formed through a combination of indirect elections and presidential nominations, consisting of a total of 59 members.

i. Elected 56 members

From each of Nepal’s seven provinces, eight members are elected to the National Assembly. These members are chosen by an Electoral College composed of:

  • Members of the Provincial Assembly.
  • Chairpersons and Vice-Chairpersons of Rural Municipalities,
  • Mayors and Deputy Mayors of Municipalities.

The weightage of votes varies between Provincial Assembly members and local-level officials, as determined by federal law. To ensure inclusivity, the eight members from each province must include:

  • At least three women,
  • One Dalit,
  • One person with a disability or from a minority community.

ii. Nominated 3 members

The remaining three members are nominated by the President on the recommendation of the Government of Nepal. This group must include at least one woman.

3. Why is gaining a 2/3rds majority difficult?

If we look at the past two elections since the promulgation of the Constitution, the chance of a party gaining a simple majority (138 seats) is slim. This is due to high competition, shifting alliances, and the effect of the proportional system. The number of votes parties gain after crossing a threshold of 3% of the total valid votes cast to the parties using Sainte-Laguë method for reducing the overrepresentation of large parties determines the final outcome.

In the 2017 federal elections, CPN-UML gained 80 (~48%) seats in the FPTP system but gained only 41 (37%) seats in the proportional system. This was a result of the “Left Alliance” set up by the UML, Maoist Centre, and Naya Shakti.

In 2022, the equations were even more interesting. The Left Alliance had broken up, and the Nepali Congress (NC) won 57 (34.5%) seats in the FPTP elections. But it secured only 32 seats in the proportional. CPN-UML was the winner in the proportional system with 34 (31%) seats despite winning 44 (26%) seats in the FPTP.

4. A Scenario: Will there be an amendment if RSP gains a 2/3rds majority?

History has shown that winning even a simple majority in one House is difficult, and a supermajority in both Houses seems like a pipe dream. But let’s imagine a scenario.

Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP) was the fourth largest in the 2022 federal elections. While it mostly got its seats by catering to younger urbanites, it has also gained a loyal mass of supporters from the villages. Many believe that its Chairperson Rabi Lamichhane has been a victim of political conspiracy in cases related to fraud and money laundering while he worked as a TV presenter. The cases are still ongoing, but let’s suppose he and his party win a 2/3rds majority. And later, respecting the youth movement, the HoR passes the Constitution Amendment Bill.

Now the bill goes to the National Assembly. As of December 2025, the NA has 26 members from NCP, 16 from NC, and 11 from UML. The equation might change after the National Assembly elections, which have to be done in January 2026. Since the coalition of UML and NC was ousted in the movement, they are revengeful of the September movement. The UML 11th General Convention held recently is evidence that it rejects Gen-Z rebellion. That’s why there is a high chance they won’t let the amendment pass.

The biggest problem, however, is that RSP and new parties have no representation in the National Assembly. The local elections were held in May 2022 before the general elections for federal and provincial assemblies in November of the same year. RSP formed in June, following the success of independent candidates at the local level. It registered only for the federal elections and not for the provincial assemblies. The party has also been vocal against the provincial setup, but the stance/blunder means that it has no role in the provinces as well as the NA.

Although the Constitution has been amended twice, it was because of a wide consensus within all the major parties then. This time, there is very little possibility for such consensus. The only hope is that somehow the major parties agree to amend the Constitution, but realistically, it seems impossible.

5. Conclusion

The Constitution of Nepal is flexible to allow amendments to meet the changes that come with time. However, it is also rigid because the ease of updates may allow selfish interests to creep in, as with the Interim Constitution 2063, which got amended 12 times in 9 years.

The representatives of the youth movement chose to go with voting for a new parliament through a government that has been challenged in the court. Given the influence older parties have had in all the institutions of Nepal, believing that they will correct themselves without revenge is naive. There is The youth movement aspired to solve problems, but it has not solved any. It has raised doubts and fears. As such, the amendments at this moment seem more akin to fantasy.

7 Constitutional Loopholes and Provisions that Give Superpower to Political Parties in Nepal

Constitution Study #15: Analysis of the constitutional loopholes and provisions that permit hegemony of political parties

No constitution is perfect. It is an ever-changing, dynamic document. The 2015 Constitution of Nepal envisions “the people’s competitive multiparty democratic system of governance” in its Preamble. There is a dedicated Part in the Constitution regarding the political parties. These provisions and constitutional loopholes, however, allow political parties to exert undue influence over all institutions.

An infographic showing how political parties can use constitutional loopholes to control important institutions

1. Article 270

Part 29 of the Constitution has provisions relating to the political parties. Article 269 allows their registration with the Election Commission, unless their names, objectives, and insignia “jeopardise the religious and communal unity of the country or fragment the country”. Article 270(1), however, prevents prohibition on political parties. Article 270(2) takes it a step further, preventing a single political ideology, philosophy, or programme from taking over.

(1) Any law, arrangement or decision so made as to impose any restriction on the formation and operation of a political party and on the generation of publicity in order to secure support and cooperation from public-in-general for the ideology, philosophy and programme of the party pursuant to Article 269 shall be deemed to be inconsistent with this Constitution and shall, ipso facto, be void.

(2) Any law, arrangement or decision so made as to allow for participation or involvement of only a single political party or persons having similar political ideology, philosophy or programme in the elections or in the political system of, or in the conduct of governance of the State shall be deemed to be inconsistent with this Constitution and shall, ipso facto, be void.

The proviso is a constitutional safeguard against dictatorship, but it is actually a double-edged sword because the political parties gain absolute power to do anything as long as they claim they are acting within the Constitution. And as Lord Acton said:

Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

2. Control over Poll Candidates

Article 84(2) mandates a closed-list proportional representation (PR) system for 110 members of the House of Representatives, where voters cast ballots for a party, not an individual. The selection process of the candidates is often opaque. Also, even though the method is supposed to encourage representatives from the marginalised communities, candidates who are in or close to the party leadership get shortlisted. As a result, there is a centralisation of power within the party hierarchy, as the leadership determines the prioritised order of candidates on the list, effectively deciding who will be elected.

But then the 165 candidates for the first-past-the-post (FPTP) are also those who are favoured by the party leadership. Election “tickets” are given to those who can flatter the party leaders with money and obsequies and not the ones who have actually worked at the grassroots level.

3. Forming the Federal and Provincial Executives

The entire constitutional process for forming a government is predicated on the actions, alliances, and numerical strength of political parties. Whether a government is formed by a single majority party, a coalition of parties, or the largest party in a hung parliament, its existence is inherently a product of inter-party and intra-party politics. This makes the executive branch directly dependent on party dynamics, ensuring that partisan considerations remain central to its formation and survival. Moreover, when alliances shift at the federal level, the effect is seen in the provincial government and vice versa.

4. Enforcement of Party Discipline upon the Elected Representatives

A key instrument of party control is found in Article 89(e) and its equivalent, Article 180(e). They stipulate that a member of the Federal or the Provincial parliament loses their seat if their political party provides official notification that they have defected (left the party or voted against the party line in the parliament).

This anti-defection clause grants party leadership immense power over individual legislators. It can compel the MPs to vote strictly along party lines, potentially overriding their personal conscience or the specific interests of their constituents, thus centralising authority within the party structure and diminishing the autonomy of elected representatives.

Party leadership can ensure loyalty post-election through the credible threat of expulsion and subsequent loss of their parliamentary seat.

5. Issuing Ordinances 

Under Article 114, the President, on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers, can promulgate an ordinance when Parliament is not in session. While necessary for addressing urgent matters, this power can be used by the executive to bypass legislative debate and scrutiny, particularly if parliamentary sessions are deliberately delayed or prorogued. This constitutional loophole has the potential to be used to further interests of political parties or other groups.

However, the legislative check requires that any ordinance be tabled before Parliament once it convenes and ceases to be effective if not adopted, or automatically after sixty days.

6. Appointment of Non-Elected Ministers

Article 78 permits the appointment of a person who is not a member of the Federal Parliament as a minister, with a six-month deadline to gain membership. While it can be used to bring technocratic expertise into government, it could also be exploited to appoint political allies who have failed to secure an electoral mandate. Non-elected party members have even made budgets and long-term policies undermining the concept of representative governance.

The risk is partially mitigated by Article 78(4), which explicitly bars a person who lost the election to the then House of Representatives from such an appointment, but the provision, overall, creates a potential loophole that could undermine the principle of a legislature-derived executive.

7. The Game of Appointments

The greatest leverage political parties have is the ability to influence appointments of the Judges, including the Chief Justice, the Attorney General, and the members of various constitutional commissions.

Inclusion of the Minister for Law and Justice, a jurist appointed by the Prime Minister, and a senior advocate or an advocate recommended by the highly politicised Nepal Bar Association in the Judicial Council (Article 153) allows firm control of political parties in the judiciary.

The Constitutional Council (Article 284), which recommends the Chief Justice and Chiefs and officials of Constitutional Bodies, consists of the Prime Minister as the Chairperson and key legislative leaders as members. Article 284(1) allows the Minister of Law and Justice to become the member of the Constitutional Council while making a recommendation for the appointment of the Chief Justice. This provision creates a formal channel for executive and legislative influence over appointments in the Election Commission, CIAA, NHRC, and so on.

The structure of these key institutions creates a potential avenue for politicising the judiciary and constitutional commissions, thereby entrenching the role of political parties in a process that is essential to judicial independence and to the impartial functioning of commissioners tasked with holding the executive, the legislature, and political parties accountable.

Conclusion: A System of Potential Party Hegemony

In the interactions managed in the Constitution, political parties emerge as critical fulcrums upon which governance pivots. They act as the primary conduits of political authority, mediating power across all three branches in all three levels through control over electoral lists (Article 84) and the enforcement of party discipline via anti-defection laws (Article 89(e)).

Ultimately, the stability and effectiveness of Nepal’s constitutional framework depend not on the separation of its state organs but on the faithful adherence by all political and institutional actors to the principles of checks and balances, the failure of which has led to the current constitutional crisis.

An infographic about Nepal's current constitutional crisis

Nepal’s Constitutional Crisis: When a 27-Hour Protest Rewrites the Rules of Power

Constitution Study #14: Clash of the Constitutional Mandate and Popular Uprising

A Nation at a Constitutional Crossroads

In a move that has shaken Nepal’s political foundations, the Gen Z-led anti-corruption movement on September 8-9 swept the KP Sharma Oli government from power. In the ensuing political vacuum, President Ramchandra Paudel executed an unprecedented solution: the September 12 appointment of former chief justice Sushila Karki as interim Prime Minister. This decision, followed by the dissolution of the House of Representatives, was hailed by some as a necessary response to the popular will but has plunged the nation into its most profound constitutional crisis yet.

An infographic about Nepal's current constitutional crisis

This is more than a mere political debate; it is a fundamental stress test of Nepal’s young constitution. The appointment has ignited a fierce legal battle, pitting the raw power of popular sovereignty against the established bulwarks of judicial precedent and the separation of powers. As ten petitions challenging the government’s legitimacy land at the Supreme Court, Nepal is forced to confront a question that will define its democratic future: Are the rules that govern the state absolute, or can they be rewritten by the force of a people’s movement?

1. The Blueprint for Power: How Nepal’s Executive is Supposed to Work

The current crisis is unintelligible without a firm grasp of Nepal’s constitutional blueprint for executive power, specifically the procedures laid out in Part-7 of the Constitution. Article 74 establishes a “multi-party competitive federal democratic republican parliamentary form of governance.” This framework is not merely a suggestion; it is the binding charter for political legitimacy.

At its core, Article 76 provides a clear, step-by-step process for appointing a Prime Minister. The President is to appoint the leader of the parliamentary party that commands a majority in the House of Representatives. Recognizing the complexities of coalition politics, the article also provides a sequence of fallback options in clauses (2), (3), and (5) for scenarios where no single party holds a majority. This constitutional playbook is the only established path to forming a government, which the recent political rupture cast aside.

2. The Political Rupture: A Protest, a President, and an Unprecedented Appointment

The crisis unfolded with breathtaking speed. Following the ousting of the KP Sharma Oli government by a massive Gen Z-led anti-corruption movement on September 8-9, the nation’s political order was upended. On September 12, President Ramchandra Paudel, acting on the recommendation of movement representatives, appointed former chief justice Sushila Karki to lead an interim government. On Prime Minister Karki’s recommendation, the President then dissolved the House of Representatives and gave the new government a six-month mandate to conduct parliamentary elections, scheduled for March 5. This rapid sequence of events, occurring over just a few days, bypassed the established constitutional process and triggered an immediate judicial backlash in the form of ten petitions filed in the Supreme Court.

These petitions challenge two distinct but deeply intertwined actions: the formation of Karki’s government and her subsequent recommendation to dissolve the House. The challenge to Karki’s appointment is therefore foundational; if her premiership is deemed unconstitutional, then her recommendation to dissolve the House—the second major point of contention—is invalid from the start.

3. The Core of the Controversy: Can a Former Chief Justice Become Prime Minister?

The petitioners’ case against Sushila Karki’s premiership hinges on a direct, literal reading of a single constitutional clause designed to safeguard judicial independence. They argue that her appointment as Prime Minister is an unambiguous breach of Article 132 (2), which is intended to prevent the politicization of the judiciary. The article states:

“No person who has once held the office of Chief Justice or a Justice of the Supreme Court shall be eligible for appointment to any government office, except as otherwise provided for in this Constitution.”

However, a sophisticated counter-argument has emerged, positing that this clause does not apply to the prime ministership. Ram Lohani, Associate Professor, Tribhuvan University first argues that the Prime Minister’s post is not an office that the President “assigns” someone to work in. Whereas the President has discretion in other appointments, Article 76 obligates the President to appoint any person who meets the constitutional criteria, such as commanding a majority. The Prime Minister is therefore not “put to work” by the President but rather assumes an office by constitutional right.

This leads to the second, crucial distinction: the difference between a “government office” and a “political post“. Lohani argues that Article 132’s prohibition applies only to the former. He notes that other constitutional articles, such as 238(8) and 240(8), explicitly permit former members of constitutional commissions to hold “political posts” while barring them from other “government service.” This distinction, he argues, implies that political roles like Prime Minister fall outside the scope of the prohibition placed on former justices. This clash between a literal interpretation and a nuanced, structural one lies at the heart of the legal controversy.

4. A Dissolved House: Constitutional Move or a Breach of Precedent?

The second constitutional challenge targets the dissolution of the House of Representatives, an act petitioners claim is both unconstitutional and a direct repudiation of the Supreme Court’s own landmark rulings. The argument carries significant weight, as:

“The court had reinstated the House of Representatives twice after it was dissolved by the then Oli-led government in 2020 and 2021. It had ruled that the constitution envisions a full five-year term for the lower house.”

Petitioners contend that in endorsing the dissolution, President Paudel violated his primary duty under Article 61: “to abide by and protect the Constitution.”

In response, supporters of the move, including some constitutional experts, frame the dissolution not as a legal breach but as a “political solution to a political problem.” They argue that the extraordinary circumstances, born from a popular uprising against a failing political class, demand a departure from rigid legalism. This perspective is articulated forcefully by senior advocate Dinesh Tripathi:

“In the changed context, decisions should be made accordingly by the court. This is the change brought about by a political movement.”

This viewpoint asks the court to prioritize the perceived spirit of political change over its own carefully constructed precedent, presenting a direct challenge to the court’s role as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional text.

Conclusion: Law, Spirit, and the Path Forward

Nepal now stands at a precipice, forced to reconcile the rigid text of its Constitution with the undeniable force of a popular movement demanding a political reset. The creation of an extra-parliamentary government and the dissolution of the House represent a profound departure from the constitutional order, justified by its architects as a necessary response to an existential crisis of governance.

The Supreme Court’s impending decision will be its most consequential to date. The verdict will not only determine the legality of Karki’s government but, more importantly, will define the very nature of Nepal’s constitutional democracy. At stake is a fundamental question:

Is this a singular, emergency-driven deviation from the rules, or does it set a precedent for a new, extra-constitutional pathway to power that could be abused in the future?

The court’s ruling will determine whether Nepal’s democratic institutions are resilient enough to withstand political storms or fragile enough to break under the weight of popular pressure.

Smoggy Kathmandu threatening the Right to Clean Environment

Right to Clean Environment in Nepal is an Arduous Task

Constitution Study #13: A discussion of Article 30, the Right to Clean Environment, its implications and challenges in Nepal

We can’t live healthily without clean environment. The Constitution of Nepal recognises this necessity and guarantees the Right to Clean Environment as a fundamental right. However, as with the fundamental rights discussed in this Constitution Study series, attaining clean environment is an uphill task.

Right to Clean Environment in the Constitution

Article 30 of the Constitution states:

(1) Every citizen shall have the right to live in a clean and healthy environment.

(2) The victim shall have the right to obtain compensation, in accordance with law, for any damage caused by environmental pollution or degradation.

(3) This Article shall not be deemed to prevent the making of necessary legal provisions for a proper balance between environment and development in development works of the nation.

Difficulties in Implementation

Although the Constitution guarantees a clean environment for everyone, and the victims have the right to compensation for damage, environmental degradation is a huge problem, especially in the urban areas. Dusty congested roads, unmanageable traffic, and non-existent sewage management have been chronic problems, even in the capital city, Kathmandu.

Lack of proper urban planning and implementation of existing plans have made cities hazardous to live. Pollution-induced diseases are on the rise. For instance, 75 percent of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease cases, 46 percent of strokes, 44 percent of ischemic heart disease, 41 percent of lower respiratory infections, 38 percent of lung cancer, 30 percent of neonatal issues like low birth weight and preterm birth, and 20 percent of diabetes (Source: World Bank Report on Clean Air in Nepal).

Moreover, smog from forest and field fires disturbs the normal functioning of people all over Nepal. Since the smog originates not only in Nepal but also in India, transborder pollution has been a major environmental issue of late.

Similarly, river pollution has increased the risk of water-borne diseases, more prominently in the urban areas. Landfill management is also a challenging aspect of urbanization in Nepal.

Also, an increase in natural disasters has led to the destruction of the habitable environment in many parts of Nepal.

Plans for better environment

1. SDGs

The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, integrate environmental sustainability as a central pillar of development. Several goals explicitly relate to achieving the right to clean environment:

  • SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation): Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all, including reducing pollution, eliminating dumping, and minimising release of hazardous chemicals.
  • SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy): Promote renewable energy and energy efficiency, reducing environmental impacts of energy generation.
  • SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities): Reduce adverse environmental impacts of cities, including air quality and waste management.
  • SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production): Ensure sustainable use of natural resources and reduce waste generation.
  • SDG 13 (Climate Action): Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.
  • SDG 14 & 15 (Life Below Water & Life on Land): Reduce water and terrestrial pollution, halt biodiversity loss, and restore degraded ecosystems.

2. Sixteenth Plan

The Sixteenth Plan (2024/25–2028/29) focuses on different environmental issues, including:

Environmental DimensionKey Actions in the 16th Plan
Climate Change & MitigationImplementation of emission-reduction strategies, renewable energy, and energy-efficient policies
Green Economy & BiodiversityMinimizing development impacts; promoting clean infrastructure; natural resource conservation
Financing & CoordinationAccessing international climate finance; engaging stakeholders; multi-agency collaboration
SDGs & LDC Graduation StrategyEmbedding climate risk management within broader development and transition frameworks

3. Laws and Policies

Nepal has adopted laws and policies to meet SDGs as well as the right to clean environment. Some of them are:

  • Environment Protection Act 2019 and related regulations provide a legal framework for pollution control, EIA/IEE requirements, and environmental accountability.
  • Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs): Under the Paris Agreement, Nepal has committed to reaching net-zero emissions by 2045.
  • Kathmandu Valley AirQuality Management Action Plan, 2020 at the municipalities within Kathmandu Valley.
  • Ongoing investment in solar, micro-hydro, and biogas projects for rural electrification.
  • Climate resilience projects funded through the Green Climate Fund (GCF) and Climate Change Policy (2019).
  • Protection of endangered species, such as rhinos and tigers.
  • Community forestry programmes (with over 22,000 forest user groups) have empowered local communities in sustainable forest management.

Silver Linings

Although the task of maintaining the right to clean environment has been difficult, there are some notable attempts.

  • The following lawsuits have worked towards ensuring the right to clean environment:
Case / IssueOutcome / Significance
Godawari Marble industry (1992)Recognized environmental right within Right to Life; affirmed locus standi
Bagmati River dumping (2000–01)Stopped dumping; required environmental assessments
Vehicular pollution (2003)Enforced emissions standards; cleaner fuels
Illegal brick kilns (2005)Ordered closure of polluting kilns
Groundwater misuse (2010)Enforced regulation of groundwater extraction
Fewa Lake cable car (2018)Protected ecosystem; highlighted environmental rights
Nijgadh airport (2019–22)Halted project due to flawed EIA
Climate law case (2018–19)Mandated new climate law and implementation of policies
Chure excavation (2023)Declared ecocide; halted harmful extraction
Ongoing PILs (2025)Public interest litigation a growing tool for environmental justice
  • Nepal generates over 90% of its electricity from hydropower, contributing to SDG 7.
  • A New York Times article has recently reported that 76% of the imported cars in Nepal are electric.
  • Nepal has established 20 protected areas (national parks, wildlife reserves, conservation areas) covering over 23% of its territory—well above the global target of 17%.

Conclusion

Despite having the Right to Clean Environment is a constitutional mandate, Nepal has not been able to implement it properly due to political constraints, lack of coordination between the three federal units, lack of awareness among people, and transboundary pollution. It is of utmost importance to align policies towards clean environment and sustainable development, improve coordination between the federal levels, and address transboundary pollution through diplomatic approaches.

Right to Education in Nepal

Right to Education in Nepal: Progress and Persistent Challenges

Constitution Study #12: A look into Article 31 of the Constitution of Nepal

Quality and equitable education is the pre-requisite for advancement of individuals as well as other constitutional rights, such as dignified life, employment, equality, and participation. In Nepal, Right to Education is a special constitutional provision to equip every citizen with the tools to participate fully in national life. The Sixteenth Plan recognizes that human capital development, promoted by education, is crucial to economic transformation. Yet, as with many promises in our Constitution Study Series, the challenge lies in delivery.

What the Constitution Says on Right to Education

Article 31, the Right to Education, in the Constitution of Nepal (Article 31) guarantees:

(1) Every citizen shall have the right of access to basic education.

(2) Every citizen shall have the right to get compulsory and free education up to the basic level and free education up to the secondary level from the State.

(3) The citizens with disabilities and the indigent citizens shall have the right to get free higher education in accordance with law.

(4) The visually impaired citizens shall have the right to get free education through brail script and the citizens with hearing or speaking impairment, to get free education through sign language, in accordance with law.

(5) Every Nepali community residing in Nepal shall have the right to get education in its own mother tongue and, for that purpose, to open and operate schools and educational institutes, in accordance with law.

These provisions are consistent with Nepal’s international commitments under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 26) and Sustainable Development Goal 4.

Progress in Numbers

From the Sixteenth Plan:

IndicatorCurrent StatusSixteenth Plan Target
(2028/29)
Long-term Vision
(2043/44)
Literacy rate (5+ years)76.3% (2022/23)85%+99%
Gross enrolment in higher education17.77% (2022/23)32%
Gender parity index in educationPrimary: 1.02, Secondary: 1.05Maintain >1Maintain >1
Net enrolment rate (Grade 1–8)~95%100%100%
Dropout rate (basic level)~7%<3%Near 0%
Technical & vocational enrolment share20.7%30%
Schools with internet access35.5%80%100%

Key Achievements

There have been some progress in the education sector in Nepal, as suggested by the following data.:

  1. Rising literacy: The rate of literacy has been rising, especially among women, from 25% in the early 1990s to nearly 70% in 2021.
  2. Increased higher education enrolment: It has tripled since the 2000s.
  3. Targeted inclusion programs: Scholarships for Dalit and marginalized students, free textbooks, and mid-day meal programs in some provinces have increased school enrolment.
  4. Digital expansion: Online learning initiatives and school internet access have advanced the 2019 pandemic.

Challenges in Meeting the Right to Education

Despite annual budget allocation of about ten percent, achievements in education sector have been meagre. The peristent challenges in implementing Right to Education include:

  1. Quality vs. Quantity
    While enrolment rates are high, learning outcomes are often poor. Many grade 5 students struggle with grade 2-level reading comprehension.
  2. Geographical Disparities
    Mountain and rural districts face teacher shortages, multi-grade classrooms, and seasonal school closures due to weather.
  3. Dropouts and Transition Gaps
    Economic pressures lead to early school leaving, especially for girls—linked to child marriage, household labor, or migration.
  4. Inequity in Higher Education Access
    Although higher education enrolment is rising, it is disproportionately urban. Technical and vocational training opportunities are still limited.
  5. Digital Divide
    Internet penetration in schools is uneven; many rural students have no access to devices or stable connectivity.

The Way Forward

To close the gap between constitutional ideals and reality:

  • Update curriculum to meet national and international needs and standards.
  • Upgrade teacher training and link incentives to performance and retention in remote areas.
  • Expand school infrastructure, including labs, libraries, and digital access points.
  • Increase scholarships beyond secondary level to include vocational and tertiary education for marginalized communities.
  • Promote mother tongue instruction in early grades to improve comprehension and reduce dropouts.
  • Align education with labor market needs through stronger technical/vocational programs.

Nepal has the vision, constitutional mandate, and policy roadmap. The challenge now is ensuring that the Right to Education is not just an enrolment number, but a lived reality for every child.

A person having to leave Nepal for foreign employment symbolizing problems in implementation of Right to Employment and Labour

Right to Employment and Labour in Nepal: An Unfulfilled Promise?

Constitution Study #11: An analysis of Articles 33 and 34

In Nepal, Right to Employment and Labour are fundamental rights. Yet many Nepalis leave the country for employment and labour. It’s not because we are lazy or don’t want to work. We have cultivated crops in the deserts of the Gulf, constructed buildings and ships in the Middle East, Malaysia, and South Korea, and taken care of children and elderly in the nursing homes of Europe and Australia. So, what’s going wrong–our policies or the way we are implementing them?

Right to Employment and Labour

Article 33 of the Constitution of Nepal (2015) declares the Right to Employment as a fundamental right. It states:

Every citizen shall have the right to employment. [Article 33(1)]

and

Every citizen shall have the right to choose employment. [Article 33(2)]

Article 34 guarantees the Right to Labour. It allows labourers (anyone who does physical or intellectual work for an employer in consideration of remuneration) to have:

  • fair labour practice [Article 34(1)]
  • appropriate remuneration, facilities and contributory social security [Article 34(2)] and
  • form and join trade unions and to engage in collective bargaining, in accordance with law.

International Commitments

Nepal is a signatory to major International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions, including:

  • ILO Convention No. 14 (Weekly Rest (Industry))
  • Convention No. 29 (Forced Labour),
  • Convention No. 98 (Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining),
  • Convention No. 131 (Minimum Wage)
  • Convention No. 138 (Minimum Age), and
  • Convention No. 182 (Worst Forms of Child Labour).

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 23) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Article 6) also affirm the right to work, fair wages, and decent working conditions.

The constitutional provisions and international commitments on right to employment and labour sound like Nepal values its workers. But promises are far from being fulfilled.

The Ground Reality: Exploitation and Exclusion

Lack of employment opportunties in Nepal is driven by a mostly service-orientated public sector and a slow-growing private sector with little to no opportunities for career growth. Many private institutions don’t even provide minimum basic salary to lower-level employees.

Exploitation of labour is rampant in Nepal, especially, but not limited to the informal sector and among the rural and the marginalized. Even the 16th Plan (2024/25–2028/29) acknowledges this gap. It notes that informal employment still dominates the labour market, with nearly two-thirds of jobs falling outside formal protections, a recipe for exploitation.

Child labour, bonded labour (especially among the Dalit communities), wage theft in the construction and domestic work sectors, and lack of safety standards in manufacturing remain persistent problems. Domestic workers, many of whom are women, and those in high-risk sectors like mining are often excluded from social security. Even white-collar government employees have low remuneration, and only recenlty getting access to contribution-based social security.

The absence of adequate and effective inspection means that companies get away with violations of labour laws. As a result, thousands of labourers suffer in silence. Many leave the country in frustration.

The Great Departure: Why Nepalis Work Abroad

Jobs are linked to dignity. Absence of dignified jobs kills dreams, and people migrate. As per the Economic Survey, more than 774,000 Nepalis received labour permits for foreign employment in FY 2022/23 alone. This does not even count the undocumented workers going to India or trafficked people using alternative routes.

The emigration in search of employment is often a compulsion for many. Jobs in Nepal are either unavailable, underpaid, unsafe, or reserved for the connected few. The 16th Plan admits:

The production and employment sectors have not grown in proportion to the country’s population and its aspirations”.

The stunted growth of productive sectors have brought challenges in implementing right to employment and labour.

A Glimmer of Hope?

The Constitution is alive and the 16th Plan is ambitious. It vows to:

  • Increase the formal sector’s share of employment from 36.5% to 70% by 2043,
  • Raise labour force participation to 72%,
  • Expand trainings for at least one million youths.
  • Promote productive employment and decent jobs as a strategy for poverty alleviation.

However, the Economic Survey 2080/81 reminds us that Nepal’s economy remains largely remittance-driven. The contribution of remittance to GDP stood at 21.2%, while the primary sectors like agriculture and manufacturing continue to shrink in their GDP share.

The promise of employment-led growth requires, in addition to policies, political will, labour reforms, skill development, and the courage to challenge vested interests that lead to labour exploitation. It will definitely lead to protection and implementation of the right to employment and labour.

What next?

Should we abandon hope? Or can we demand that the right to employment and labour be more than just ink on paper?

We push for:

  • Strengthening of the private sector by creating competitive environment,
  • Implementation of the Labour Act, 2074 with strict monitoring and punishments for violations,
  • Expansion of social security coverage to informal workers,
  • Empowerment of labour unions,
  • Investment in job-creating sectors, especially manufacturing and agriculture,
  • Returnee reintegration and skill-matching programs.

And most importantly, we must continue to ask questions. Because silence, after all, is the worst kind of exploitation.

A symbolic movement for social justice and inclusion

Social Justice, Inclusion, and Reservation: Absolute Necessity or Necessary Evil?

Constitution Study #10: Analysis of the Fundamental Rights and Policies on Social Justice and Inclusion

Months before the promulgation of the Constitution on Ashwin 3, 2072 (September 20, 2015) debates on social justice, inclusion, and reservation had pervaded the Constituent Assembly and the streets. At Tri-Chandra Multiple Campus, where I was doing my bachelor’s at that time, there would be heated debates between friends. Some were favour of the policies, some against, and still some demanding a nuanced and balanced approach. Although the policies are etched in the Constitution through the Preamble, Fundamental Rights, and State Policy, the following questions are still relevant:

1. Is social justice necessary in Nepal?

2. Has inclusion changed anything?

3. Can we afford the current model of reservation?

This article, a continuation of the Constitution Study series, gets into the constitutional promises, actual practice, and way forward in the matters of social justice, inclusion, and reservation.

How Did Social Justice, Inclusion, and Reservation Find their Way into the Constitution?

1. Initiation in the Democratic Era (2007-2017)

Democracy is often thought of as an idea that automatically includes everyone in the state structure and governance. The truth is: it is not enough. Nepal’s democratic movements in 2007 B.S. (1951) barely scratched the Rana oligarchy and gave power to another group of elites.

2. Reversal in the Panchayat Era

The Panchayat era (2017-2046) stripped even the right to voting. It created a monolinguist, monocultural, and monoreligious nationalism in a country with diverse languages, cultures, and religions. On the surface, Nepal was united by a single language, culture, and religion, but underneath the seed of conflict was brewing.

3. Resurgence during Civil War

The Jana Aandolan of 2046 brought on the surface some issues related to women and Dalits, but it still could not accept the diversity as the national characteristic. While the Maoist movement did not begin with the issues of social justice and inclusion, it picked the idea to mobilize and motive more people into the war against the government. The narrative of historical injustice struck the chord of the marginalized, and they went wholeheartedly into the war.

4. Outcry during the Constituent Assembly Era

Issues of social justice, inclusion, and reservation found their way into the mainstream after the 2062/63 Jana Aandolan II. The Madhesh Aandolan of 2063 and 2064 aggressively demanded federalism and correction of historical injustices. Movements of Aadivasi Janajatis (indigenous groups), women, Dalits, and others before the promulgation of the Constitution institutionalized the issue.

5. Constitutional Implementation Era

There are still some debates regarding social justice, inclusion, and reservation despite constitutional promises. Complaints about elite capture have raised concerns on the fair and just implementation of those provisions and if it is necessary to amend the Constitution and other laws.

6. Nepal’s Global Commitments

Apart from the above domestic movements, Nepal’s ratification of different international human rights laws also gave way to social justice, inclusion, and reservations for the marginalized, such as:

  • CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women)
  • CRC (Convention on the Rights of the Child)
  • ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights)
  • ICESCR (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights)
  • UNCRPD (Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities)

The Constitution’s Bold Promise and Its Global Roots

Article 18 of the Constitution enshrines Equality before Law, guaranteeing non-discrimination based on origin, religion, race, caste, tribe, sex, physical condition, condition of health, marital status, pregnancy, economic condition, language, region, ideology or any other status. It also introduces affirmative action, mandating the state to enact special laws and policies for the protection, empowerment, and representation of marginalized communities, including women, Dalits, indigenous groups, Madhesis, Tharus, Muslims, people with disabilities, and backward regions.

Similarly, Article 24 prohibits untouchability and caste-based discrimination in any form. Article 42 guarantees the Right to Social Justice, enabling marginalized groups to participate in state bodies on the basis of proportional inclusion.

State Policies (Article 51(j)) also include the matters of social justice and inclusion. It guides the State to work towards building an environment to allow the participation of diverse groups in governance, and ensuring their political, social, cultural, and economic protection.

But do these lofty provisions translate into meaningful transformation?

Positive Outcomes

Data from the Economic Survey 2081/82 shows that social indicators such as education and health have improved overall, but gaps persist:

  • The Human Development Index is 0.622, which is still low compared to regional peers.
  • Education statistics reveal glaring disparities. Community schools with predominantly marginalized students consistently perform worse than institutional schools. SEE results show deep inequalities in quality and accessEconomic Survey 2081-82.
  • In social security, over 3.5 million people benefit from allowance schemes (elderly, disabled, widows), but reports of exclusion and misuse remain frequent.

Nepal’s 16th Five-Year Plan also highlights the goal of creating a just and equitable society, explicitly targeting:

  • Increased participation of women, Dalits, Madhesis, and other marginalized groups in decision-making.
  • Reduction in multidimensional poverty.
  • Inclusive economic growth through social protection and targeted investments.

However, the same plan admits to persistent inequality, elite capture, and weak implementation mechanisms, especially at the local level.

Persisting Challenges

Lack of civic awareness and knowledge (sometimes even denial) on historical inequalities, and attitude of the rulers and the ruled keep bringing up problems in effectively implementing the constitutional provisions of social justice and inclusion. These problems can be summarized as:

  • Implementation Gap: Laws exist, but mechanisms are weak, underfunded, or politicized.
  • Elite Capture: Affirmative action benefits the dominant voices within marginalized categories, while the poorest remain excluded.
  • Data Deficiency: Many groups are invisible in national surveys and policy planning, making targeted interventions difficult.
  • Social Attitudes: Deep-rooted biases in bureaucracy, politics, and society obstruct real transformation.

Even programs meant to uplift the marginalized are often politicized, leaving the truly marginalized behind.

We must confront the bitter truth: A policy that looks fair on paper can still feel unjust in practice.

The Way Forward

If we want real change, we must ask tough questions and act boldly:

  1. Is inclusion reaching the poorest within marginalized groups?
    If not, we need audits and reforms to prevent elite capture. We may even have to limit the number and period of reservations an individual can get.
  2. Are our education and healthcare systems inclusive by design?
  3. Can we make inclusion part of everyday governance?
  4. Are we prudent enough to let the Constitution and laws guide us?

We are not doing favour by implementing social justice and inclusivity. They are not gifts. They are orientation towards basic human rights. And the longer we delay its full realization, the more fragile our democracy becomes.

Right to Information vs Culture of Secrecy

Right to Information and Right Communication in Nepal

Constitution Study #9: A reflection on the conflict between the Right to Information and the Culture of Secrecy

Case Studies on Right to Information and Right to Communication

According to a report published by FreedomInfo, in 2010, following deadly communal unrest in Kapilvastu, local leaders sought the government’s investigation report to secure fair compensation. The Home Ministry initially refused, citing cabinet secrecy. Undeterred, they appealed to the National Information Commission (NIC), an institution established by the Right to Information Act, 2064 (2007). The commission ordered the government to release the report, which was delivered a year later.

During King Gyanendra’s direct rule after February 1, 2005, Radio Sagarmatha, South Asia’s first independent FM station was banned for broadcasting an interview of Prachanda, the black-listed Maoist leader. The station filed a complaint against the Royal Government’s movement in the Supreme Court. Radio Sagarmatha resumed its broadcast 48 hours and 47 hours following the Supreme Court’s verdict upholding the right to communication.

The above examples show that information is power, and communication is key to unlock it. In a democratic society, access to information and freedom of communication are not only constitutional rights, but also essential tools for transparency, accountability, and informed public opinion. The Constitution of Nepal enshrines both the Right to Information (Article 27) and the Right to Communication (Article 19) as fundamental rights. Together, these rights create a framework through which citizens can engage with the state, demand accountability, and participate meaningfully in governance.

Understanding the Rights

Right to Information (RTI)

Article 27 of the Constitution of Nepal states:

“Every citizen shall have the right to demand and receive information on any matter of his or her interest or of public interest. Provided that no one shall be compelled to provide information on any matter which must be maintained confidential in accordance with law.”

This right empowers citizens to access government-held information, including policies, decisions, budgets, expenditures, and plans. It is a legal tool for fighting corruption, ensuring justice, and promoting good governance.

Right to Communication

Article 19 guarantees the freedom of opinion and expression, as well as the freedom of the press, publication, and broadcasting, provided that these rights do not:

  • Undermine the sovereignty, territorial integrity, or national unity,
  • Violate public decency or morality,
  • Encourage caste, ethnic, gender, or religious discrimination or hatred,
  • Jeopardize the harmonious relations between federal units.

This right ensures that individuals and media can communicate, report, and express freely, with reasonable legal restrictions.

Procedures for Obtaining Public Information

To operationalize RTI, Nepal enacted the Right to Information Act, 2064 (2007). The Act outlines the following procedures:

  1. Filing a Request: Any Nepali citizen can file a request with a Public Information Officer (PIO) in the concerned office by filling out a standard form or writing an application.
  2. Response Time: The PIO must provide the information within 15 days. In case of threats to life or liberty, the time limit is 24 hours.
  3. Refusal and Appeal: If the information is denied or not provided, the applicant can appeal to the National Information Commission (NIC).
  4. No Need for Reason: The applicant is not required to state the reason for seeking information.

The Economic Survey also emphasizes digital progress in governance, such as broader access to information and banking through ICT expansion.

Exceptions: What Information is Not Accessible

Both the Constitution and the RTI Act list certain exemptions. The following categories are considered restricted:

  • Matters that jeopardize national security or sovereignty
  • Information that undermines foreign relations
  • Internal deliberations of public bodies
  • Confidential information relating to individuals’ privacy
  • Trade secrets or intellectual property of private institutions
  • Ongoing investigations where disclosure may impede justice

These limitations attempt to balance openness with legitimate state and individual interests.

Connection with the Right to Privacy

While RTI promotes transparency, Article 28 of the Constitution guarantees the Right to Privacy. This includes:

  • Privacy of personal life, residence, property, documents, correspondence, and reputation
  • Protection from arbitrary surveillance or disclosure of personal information

Therefore, RTI must be carefully implemented to not infringe upon the privacy rights of individuals. For instance, information about a person’s health, bank account, or family life cannot be disclosed without lawful justification.

This tension between transparency and privacy necessitates a nuanced approach. The state must develop clear guidelines and train public officers to differentiate between public interest and private confidentiality.

Tension between RTI and the Culture of Secrecy

As we have often seen in this Constitution Study series, there are always gaps between constitutional provisions and implementations. Nepal’s government and bureaucracy have a culture of secrecy because of rampant corruption and the silo problem. The government listed 154 kinds of information as “classified,” in 2008. The National Information Commission ordered the government to revise the list.

In 2011, the government again tried to classify 88 types of documents as inaccessible, but the Supreme Court ruled against the decision. In 2023, The government listed 87 documents as “classified”, including those related to procurement (which should actually be transparent), but the list is unavailable in the public domain.

Besides corruption, another reason for problems in classification of documents in Nepal is the lack of clear provisions in the Right to Information Act and the lack of its coordination with the Secrecy of Documents Act 2039 (1982).

Conclusion

The Right to Information and the Right to Communication are pillars of Nepal’s constitutional democracy. They empower citizens, ensure accountability, and enhance public participation. However, their misuse and over-restriction can undermine these very goals. To strike the right balance, the state must improve legal awareness, ensure institutional readiness, digitize access, and respect privacy. Only then can these rights truly serve their constitutional promise of building an open and just society.

A symbolic image of justice in Nepal under the control of shadowy figures while the others are in trouble

Crisis of Justice in Nepal: Who Gets It and Who Doesn’t

Constitution Study #8: An analysis of eroding faith on justice in Nepal

Political Meddling and Public Distrust in Justice

In recent years, public confidence in Nepal’s judiciary has eroded to alarming levels. From controversial rulings to suspected backdoor deals, the very institution meant to safeguard fairness and the rule of law now finds itself entangled in political webs.

Recent Examples of Political Interference:

  • Attempt of Impeachment against Chief Justice Sushila Karki (2017): On April 30, 2017, 239 Members of Parliament (MPs) filed the impeachment motion against Karki. It was the first time any Chief Justice had faced impeachment. The then Judge of the Supreme Court Cholendra Shamsher Rana ruled against the move on May 5 and reinstated Karki.
  • Chief Justice Cholendra Shamsher Rana’s Suspension (2022): Rana faced impeachment proceedings not solely due to his alleged misconduct, but also due to political realignments. Reports suggested political parties coordinated the move when he resisted some executive appointments—blurring the lines between accountability and retaliation.
  • Impunity in Corruption Cases: Several politicians implicated in high-profile scams (e.g., the Lalita Niwas land grab, gold smuggling cases, and fake Bhutanese refugee scandal) have either evaded prosecution or benefited from procedural delays. Courts appear reluctant to confront power centers.
  • Selective Enforcement: Political opponents often face swift charges, while ruling party members are granted procedural leniency, bail, or silence from investigative agencies.

The judiciary’s proximity to party interests has created a justice system that feels arbitrary, inconsistent, and aligned with power rather than principle. This has weakened the moral authority of the courts and shaken citizens’ belief in equal justice.

What Does the Constitution Say?

Despite the current realities, the Constitution provides a comprehensive framework for justice in Nepal:

Article 20: Right to Justice

  • Guarantees the right to fair trial, legal counsel, and presumption of innocence.
  • Emphasizes judicial independence and impartiality.

Article 21: Rights of Crime Victims

  • Ensures victims’ rights to information, participation, compensation, and dignified treatment.

Article 42: Right to Social Justice

  • Mandates proportional inclusion of women, Dalits, Adivasis, Madhesis, Muslims, backward regions, and gender minorities in state bodies.

The Constitution, on paper, envisions justice not only as due process in courts but as a tool of social transformation. Justice in Nepal is not just about being heard—it’s about being seen, represented, and uplifted.

Loopholes That Enable Political Influence

While the Constitution upholds judicial independence in principle, several weaknesses open the door for manipulation:

  1. Judicial Council Composition (Article 153):
    • The Chief Justice heads the Council, but its members include a minister, the senior-most justice of the Supreme Court, a nominee of the President (on executive advice), and a senior advocate recommended by Nepal Bar Association.
    • The fact that three of five members are directly affiliated to politics (and there is a high possibility of the Chief Justice and the Judge to be politically oriented as well) allows ruling parties to influence judge appointments, transfers, and promotions.
  2. Impeachment as a Political Tool (Article 101):
    • Judges can be impeached by a fourth of Parliament members. While this ensures accountability, it can also be abused as a weapon by political factions.
  3. Delay in Judicial Appointments:
    • The executive has frequently delayed nominations to influence court compositions during key cases.
  4. No Constitutional Limit on Interim Orders:
    • Frequent, ambiguous interim orders from courts create a perception of tactical favoritism, especially when sensitive political or corruption cases are involved.

Why People Are Losing Faith

The erosion of judicial credibility isn’t merely procedural—it’s deeply emotional and experiential. People lose faith when:

  • Cases drag on for years without resolution.
  • Judges with known political leanings preside over politically sensitive cases.
  • Victims of caste-based violence or rape fail to get justice while perpetrators are shielded by local or national politicians.
  • Legal aid remains inaccessible for those who can’t afford it, making justice a privilege for the rich.

In Fiscal Year 2022/23, Nepal scored 0.52 in the Rule of Law Index—barely halfway to an ideal system. That doesn’t mean there is no justice in Nepal. It means that the law works—sometimes. For some. But for millions of Nepalis, especially those from rural, Dalit, and indigenous communities, it works slowly, selectively, or not at all. Surveys and government reports suggest these groups rarely seek legal redress unless absolutely necessary—and when they do, they often feel unheard, humiliated, or dismissed.

The Path Forward: Reclaiming Justice

Justice in Nepal can be saved, but only through urgent reforms rooted in transparency, inclusivity, and courage.

Suggested Reforms

  1. Revamp the Judicial Council: Exclude executive members; ensure the Council is independent with balanced representation from civil society, bar associations, and retired justices.
  2. Transparent Appointment Processes: Publish criteria and reasoning for judicial nominations, transfers, and promotions.
  3. Strengthen Legal Aid: Expand the budget and outreach of legal aid centers, particularly in marginalized and remote areas.
  4. Language and Accessibility Reform: Provide translation and legal materials in local languages; make courtrooms less intimidating for laypeople.
  5. Empower Local Justice Systems: Incorporate indigenous dispute resolution mechanisms under constitutional safeguards to serve communities historically left behind.
  6. Establish Independent Judicial Oversight: Create an autonomous ethics commission for judges to investigate misconduct separate from parliamentary impeachment.

Conclusion: A Constitution is Only as Strong as Its Execution

The Constitution of Nepal speaks eloquently of justice—legal and social, personal and collective. But when laws are manipulated and courts become extensions of political games, the promise becomes a lie.

Justice must be rebuilt—not through slogans or courtroom formalities, but by restoring dignity to the powerless, accountability to the powerful, and trust to the people. Without that, justice in Nepal will remain, tragically, a word in a book few can afford to believe in.

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