On September 16, 2026, Himal Southasian published an article on Mary Shepherd Slusser, one of the first American researchers on Nepal studies. Written by Erin L. Thompson, the article investigates how Slusser bought stolen idols, paintings, and other artefacts in Kathmandu and shipped them to her home country. Slusser also built her scholarly career based on these stolen goods. The article brings out several issues: (1) Slusser’s saviour complex, (2) Nepali people’s negligence and undervaluation of their own culture, and (3) legal loopholes that allowed everything to happen. Some reactions regarding Slusser brings out the fourth problem: the moral failure in not calling out Slusser even after the truth has surfaced.
In this post, you’ll read about…
1. Mary Shepherd Slusser’s Saviour Complex
Mary Slusser first came to Nepal in November 1965 with her husband Harry Robert (“Bob”) Slusser, who worked with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). She lived in Nepal for around six years and in 1982, published Nepal Mandala: A Cultural Study of the Kathmandu Valley in two volumes. She also had a collection of over 500 artefacts, which are now dispersed across at least 8 museums in the U.S.
Slusser enjoyed her stay in Nepal. She likened Nepal to a big museum where one can walk in and but whatever they like. However, she also believed that development in Nepal, supported by USAID, should come at the cost of losing its culture.
USAID’s modernizing projects would bring the hitherto medieval country into the twentieth century, but it would require sacrificing Nepal’s unique culture.
–Erin L. Thompson
According to Slusser, artworks in Nepal were better kept in foreign museums where they could be studied by future generations.
Once artworks “cease to function and indeed are jeopardized in the milieu for which they were intended,” they should be acquired by foreign museums, “where they will be cherished for future generations.” Visitors to these museums would then “learn something about the quality of Nepalese culture they could not have otherwise imagined.”
–Erin L. Thompson
This statement contradicts her previous statement about Nepal. If Nepal was already a museum, why would the heritages of Nepal have to be sent to foreign museums?
Nepal had opened up for foreigners already, allowing them to stay, wander, or research the country. The architecture, sculptures, paintings, woodworks, music, and dances were all for them to explore. Instead of leaving them as they are though, Slusser wanted the country to adopt Western “culture”. And in doing so, not only destroy our culture (and associated history) but also centralize foreign museums as places to study Nepal.
Shifting the blame entirely on to the locals, Slusser maintained that these sacred artworks had been voluntarily:
… “sold by a younger generation in exchange for the wherewithal to buy motorcycles, televisions and other things that increasingly were viewed as of greater value.”
Mary Shepherd Slusser, instead of buying stolen artefacts, could have done the right thing by reporting the thefts to the local authorities. Nepal’s Ancient Monument Preservation Act, 1956 was already in effect, and it did not allow sale of artefacts under one hundred years. She could have helped the authorities catch the thieves and restore the artefacts. However, because of her saviour complex,
she was so convinced that she “did the right thing” by buying these paintings that she published an article in 2003 describing how she took them out of Nepal, where they were “disintegrating from lack of care”, so that they could be housed in the protective environs of a museum.
…
But her “care” sometimes physically damaged these artefacts.
–Erin L. Thompson
But was it just care and saviour complex? Slusser’s career and the funds she received tell a slightly different story. Before she came to Nepal, she had already worked for the CIA.
Slusser’s classified reports were for internal governmental use only. At the time, she thought they were consulted by State Department analysts as they shaped US foreign policy. It was only much later that she realised she had been working in intelligence, “probably for the CIA.”
–Erin L. Thompson
Was her work in Nepal under the CIA payroll? It’s unclear. But the Smithsonian did give her $1000 and printed forms to track her purchases so that they reached the museum. In 1960, Eugene I. Kenz of the Smithsonian was preparing displays to educate the American public about the East. Slusser was enrolled in a task to create a collection just before she came to Nepal. The article by Erin Thompson does not tell clearly if all the items in the collection were stolen, but the Smithsonian does not seem to have cross-verified with Nepalese authorities either. Also, most of the collections were private until Slusser decided to donate them much later in her life.
The Rockefeller connection is another thread that brings in a lot of suspicion on her activities. John D. Rockefeller, the patriarch of one of the most affluent and influential American families, had amassed wealth through petroleum. His descendant, John D. Rockefeller III had established the JDR 3rd Fund. The fund provided grants:
“To promote mutual understanding and respect between the countries of Asia and the United States through cultural exchange in the visual and performing arts.”
In 1969, Porter A McCray, the director of the JDR 3rd Fund visited Kathmandu. He sought ways to preserve Nepal’s “endangered artworks and monuments”. The then US ambassador to Nepal Carol Laise recommended that Slusser should be given the grant from the Fund. Initially, Slusser got a total of $33,0331. Later, as she worked on publishing her articles and books, she received an additional $41,000. In 1982, she produces her two-volume book, Nepal Mandala: A Cultural Study of the Kathmandu Valley.
Slusser’s connections with the Smithsonian and Rockefellers suggest a bigger institutional hand in her activities in Nepal and her scholarly career.
2. Nepalese Negligence
It would be wrong to blame Mary Slusser alone. Erin Thompson highlights a few residents of the Kathmandu Valley who sold stolen items to Slusser regularly. One of them was a Shakya.
One of those who came to bargain while sitting cross-legged on Slusser’s floor among his wares was a man whose family name was Shakya. Until 1959, he had been a Tibet trader. For many centuries, merchants from the Shakyas and other Newar Buddhist clans in the Kathmandu Valley had made the month-long journey into Tibet, leading caravans that carried Indian textiles and rice to trade for wool and gold dust. Some of this gold ended up adorning sacred artworks when the Tibet traders built shrines with the fortunes they earned.
–Erin L. Thompson
The other was a “Tambakar” or Tamrakar.
Although the painting wasn’t as old as she had hoped, Slusser still liked it enough to hang it in her bedroom when she returned to the United States. But she seems to have told her sources that she was once again looking for an older painting. Between late August and late September 1967, they sold her five of them.
The first four, all dated to the late 14th or the early 15th century, came from a seller whose family name she recorded as “Tambakar.” (This was probably a mishearing of “Tamrakar.”) He first offered her a large painting of a nude female figure with glowing red skin, a garland of human heads swinging around her body as she dances. After Slusser bought it, “Tambakar” returned over the next few days with another three paintings that showed pairs of deities embracing each other in the midst of acrobatic copulation.
–Erin L. Thompson
These accounts show that Slusser enabled a black market in which the locals sold their precious artefacts for a small amount of money. The lack of respect towards their own heritage and their eagerness to sell anything is painful and disheartening. Unfortunately, disrespect and negligence towards history and culture in Nepal continues even today as seen in an earlier article published here. Such an attitude also served Slusser’s saviour complex.
3. Legal Loopholes and Complexities
Mary Shepherd Slusser’s actions were also enabled by legal loopholes and diplomatic protocols. While Nepal’s law did not allow selling of items over 100 years, due to a lack of laboratory tests, older artefacts could easily be called newer.
The country’s Ancient Monument Preservation Act, passed in 1956, banned the export of artefacts if they were more than a hundred years old. Slusser only had to bring the pieces she purchased for the Smithsonian to Nepal’s Department of Archaeology to have them cleared for export as modern handicrafts.
–Erin L. Thompson
When Slusser happened to possess an extremely ancient and rare object, she noted:
I don’t think even the King could O.K. its export. … I know I can only get it out of Nepal thru APO (Army Post Office).
The Army Post Office service was primarily an American military service also available to government staffs in distant countries. The postal service provided complete discretion. Moreover, because anything sent through it was treated as a diplomatic bag, Nepal could not check the contents. Slusser utilized the legal and diplomatic loophole to the fullest. Furthermore, the note is an evidence that Slusser knew about the laws and procedures of Nepal, and that she had to work around them. She sent the stolen items to her sister, Dorothy G Payer Shepherd, a curator at the Cleveland Museum of Art.
Now that the artefacts are in a foreign country, Nepal has to go through a great deal of trouble to bring them back home. According to Thompson:
Foreign museums and collectors that hold such works generally resist repatriation claims. They argue that these pieces must have been voluntarily sold by their original owners and thus that they are justified in keeping them. Nepal has successfully reclaimed dozens of stolen sculptures in recent years, with each case requiring enormous amounts of research to overturn this assumption. Researchers have had to track down old police reports, interview community members who can testify about the artefacts’ disappearances, and find enough additional evidence to prove that the pieces were stolen rather than sold.
Since the burden of proof falls on the nation claiming repatriation, and the process of repatriation is lengthy and troublesome, Nepal has made only a few successes. These successes help us look forward with hope even though failures are common. The power of the internet in identification of lost ancient artefacts and repatriation (which instigated investigation into Slusser’s work) is also a silver lining.
4. Moral Failures
After the article was published and shared on social media, I saw a few comments which did not care if Slusser stole many of the artefacts she wrote about. They believed that her contribution to the study of Nepali culture was still invaluable.
Surfing the web, I came across this article: Is cancel culture coming to Himalayan Studies? Remarks on a recent critique of the life and work of Mary Shepherd Slusser by Charles Ramble. It is a criticism of a 2023 article by Emiline Smith and Erin L Thompson (the same author of the recent Himal Southasian article) titled ‘A case study of academic facilitation of the global illicit trade in cultural objects: Mary Slusser in Nepal’ and published in the International Journal of Cultural Property2. Ramble particularly attacks “the authors’ advocacy of a prohibition on the publication of unprovenanced artefacts”.
Ramble argues that Smith and Thompson’s emphasis on Slusser’s early childhood to depict her adult tendencies is weak (which I agree), but also says:
“…evidence of Mary Slusser’s particular degeneracy is rather thin – or at least unremarkable, since such activities, and far worse, are spread over such a large surface of offenders – it has had to be manufactured by selecting passages of her writings and recollections and educating the reader in how these should be understood by right-thinking citizens.”
This is something I absolutely disagree with. Slusser’s notes (as seen above) have clearly shown that she actively sought working around the established laws and norms. She enabled thieves instead of turning them over to local authorities and wrongly assumed that she was taking care of those items by sending them to the museums. Ramble’s argument that Slusser’s “degeneracy is rather thin” is classic whataboutism. However insignificant it may seem, it is clear that Slusser promoted criminal activities and violated laws. Furthermore, she built a career based on the stolen artefacts, which is morally wrong as well. And if there are many such cases, this case will show way for even more investigations.
Ramble’s stress that Smith and Thompson demean Slusser is a moral failure itself. If bringing into light the character of someone whose career was based on crime disrespectful, what exactly is respectful?
5. Conclusion
Mary Shepherd Slusser may have contributed to writing articles and books on culture of Nepal, but it is not respectful to Nepal if it is based on theft and deceit. Nepal has lost not only the artefacts but also generations of ceremonies and worshipping. Traditions have stopped entirely. The role of a well-known “scholar” in enabling such a loss is disheartening and erodes whatever little trust the Nepali people place on foreign researchers.
On the other hand, the investigation on Slusser’s shady work was also done by foreigners and Thompson is helping directly in repatriation attempts. So, it might be wrong to put everyone in the same basket. Nepalese like Alisha Sijapati (mentioned in the original article) are also looking for the lost monuments through the internet and extensive research.
The loss of Nepal’s cultural heritage is immense. It’s distressing that our own people sold artefacts for some money. But the situation is changing. We are becoming more aware of the value of our culture. We are also working to find out the stolen artefacts and bring them back to their rightful places. Unlike what Slusser said, they don’t belong to foreign museums; they belong to the Gods and people of Nepal from whom they were stolen and taken away stealthily.
Footnotes
This is a really absurd number. Since the Thompson’s article does not show hard evidence, I have doubts.
Apparently, three years ago, Thompson had written with Smith an article on a peer-reviewed journal before Himal Southasian published the current article in discussion. Since I didn’t have a full access to the article by Smith and Thompson, I had no other choice but to follow Ramble’s arguments.
The exponential proliferation of artificial intelligence (AI), complex machine learning architecture, and pervasive cloud computing are accelerating the global digital economy. At the heart of this digital metamorphosis are data centres. These resource-intensive facilities have evolved rapidly from passive repositories into aggressive computational engines for sustaining the modern global economy. From a market valued at approximately USD 386 billion in 2025, the industry is projected to exceed USD 1.1 trillion by 2035. Nearly 100 gigawatts (GW) of new capacity is expected to come online between 2026 and 2030 alone, doubling global capacity.
The speed of this expansion is, however, bringing up a systemic global resource crisis. The unprecedented increase in demands for electricity, water, and land to train and operate advanced generative models has already strained national power grids, compromised corporate environmental sustainability commitments, and incited socio-political backlash in established digital hubs, including those in the (US).
Consequently, global technology conglomerates and major hyperscale operators, viz. Microsoft, Meta, Amazon, and Google, are actively scouting for alternative locations that can offer abundant renewable energy, a favourable climate for natural cooling, fewer jurisdictions, and cost-effective industrial operational environments. In this context, Nepal has emerged as a potential candidate for a “green data hub”. The eleventh point of the Policies and Programmes for the FY 2026/2027 (2083/84) also reflects the aspiration of developing green computing and high-capacity data centres.
Nepal’s prospect is challenged by a volatile political environment, fluctuating hydropower, and intense geopolitical rivalries between India, China, and the US. Therefore, the persisting question is: “Is Nepal ready?” This article examines the global prospect of AI data centres and the applicability of their extension to Nepal.
In this post…
1. Macroeconomics of the Data Centre Market
1.1 Market Size and Growth Trajectory
The global data centre market stood at approximately USD 386 billion in 2025 and is on a steep upward trajectory. The market is expected to exceed USD 1.1 trillion by 2034–2035, representing a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of approximately 11–12%. The data centre solutions segment, encompassing hardware and software, is even more dynamic, projected to grow from USD 449 billion in 2024 to USD 1.1 trillion by 2030 at a CAGR of nearly 20%.
Data Centre Market Size 2025 to 2035 (USD Billion)
Physical capacity growth is equally dramatic. Global data centre capacity grew fivefold between 2005 and 2025 to reach 114 GW. The sector is projected to increase by a further 97 GW between 2025 and 2030 — effectively doubling again in five years — potentially reaching 200 GW by 2030. This rapid growth is expected to require up to USD 3 trillion in investment by 2030.
1.2 Demand Drivers
AI and Machine Learning
AI represented around 25% of all data centre workloads in 2025. By 2030, this is expected to reach 50%. According to McKinsey, generative AI alone could account for roughly 40% of data centre demand in 2030. The major hyperscalers have announced combined long-term commitments exceeding USD 500 billion in this sector.
Cloud Computing & Digital Transformation
Cloud computing remains the foundational driver of data centre growth. The number of large hyperscale data centres reached 1,136 by end-2024, roughly double the total five years earlier. Record leasing activity in early 2025 was fuelled by hyperscalers and cloud service providers. The shift to distributed cloud architectures and hybrid cloud models continues to expand the market.
Edge Computing
Edge computing, i.e., placing compute closer to data sources, is driving a new category of smaller, distributed facilities. The edge data centre market is projected to grow from USD 15.4 billion in 2024 to USD 39.8 billion by 2030 at a CAGR of 17.1%, fuelled by 5G deployments and Internet of Things (IoT) adoption.
1.3 Energy: The Major Constraint
Energy Consumption Trends
Unlike traditional cloud computing paradigms, which rely primarily on central processing units (CPUs) handling sequential, transactional workloads, AI model training and real-time inference require massive, interconnected clusters of graphics processing units (GPUs) and specialized tensor processing units (TPUs) operating in highly synchronous parallel configurations. This architectural change has drastically increased the power consumption of server racks. traditional enterprise data centre racks consumed between 5 to 10 kilowatts (kW) of continuous power. In stark contrast, modern AI-optimized racks regularly exceed 40 kW and are rapidly pushing toward 100 kW per rack.
Data Centre Electricity Consumption in 2024. Source: IEA
New engineering paradigms have emerged to address the issues. The market has witnessed a rapid development and deployment of liquid immersion cooling technologies, phase-change materials, and advanced thermal management systems to resolve the extreme thermal exhaust generated by these high-density computational workloads. Leading tech companies are utilizing AI to optimize their hardware efficiencies. For instance, Google reported that between May 2024 and May 2025, it successfully reduced the median energy consumption per Gemini prompt by a factor of 33, and the associated carbon footprint by a factor of 44. These impressive gains were driven by more efficient model architectures, accurate quantized training algorithms, and optimized idling protocols.
However, these per-unit efficiency gains are being overwhelmed by the sheer volume of global compute demand. This dynamic is a textbook illustration of the Jevons Paradox: an economic principle wherein an increase in the efficiency with which a resource is used tends to lower the operational cost, which in turn exponentially stimulates an increase in the total rate of consumption of that resource. As AI becomes cheaper and faster to run on a per-query basis, its integration into every facet of the global economy deepens, driving aggregate power demands to unprecedented levels.
Data centres already consume approximately 2% of global electricity (410 TWh in 2024), with U.S. consumption alone reaching about 190 TWh. The IEA projects that the global consumption could double to 945 TWh globally by 2030.
Data Centre Electricity Consumption by Region. Source: IEA
Fossil Fuel Consumption
The AI boom is inadvertently prolonging the lifecycle of fossil fuels. The IEA notes that though renewable energy is expanding at an annual average rate of 22% and supplying about 27% of current consumption, coal (~30%) and natural gas (~26%) still dominate. Nuclear power accounts for 15%. The IEA forecasts that natural gas and coal will still be required to satisfy over 40% of the additional electricity demand through 2030.
Metric
2025 Value
2030 Projection
CAGR
Global Market Size
~USD 386 billion
~USD 700+ billion
~11–12%
Global Capacity
~114 GW
~200 GW
~12–14%
Global Electricity Demand
410 TWh (Approx. 2024 baseline)
945 TWh (nearly 3% of global demand)
N/A
Global Fuel Demand
Coal: 30; Renewables: 27%; Gas: 26%; Nuclear: 15%
Coal and Gas to meet >40% of new demand
N/A
Hyperscale Facilities
~1,136 large facilities
Significa8nt increase
N/A
Server Rack Density
Traditional Cloud: 5-10 kW per rack
AI Training: 40 kW to 100+ kW per rack
N/A
AI Share of Workloads
~25%
~50%
Rapid growth
Average Construction Cost
USD 10.7M/MW
USD 11.3M+/MW
~6%/yr
Summary of Data Centre Stats. Source: Various
1.4 Regional Landscape
The distribution of the data centre economy reflects a huge disparity. In 2025, North America occupied the largest market share (40%) whereas the Middle East and Africa have less than a 2% share.
Region
2025 Market Share
Key Markets
Growth Outlook & CAGR to 2030
North America
~40–41%
Northern Virginia, Atlanta, Phoenix, Dallas
17% CAGR; lowest vacancy (2.3%); fastest growth
Asia-Pacific
Second largest
China, India, Japan, Southeast Asia, Australia
12–23% CAGR; fastest-growing; 32–57 GW capacity
Europe
~25%
London, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, Paris, Dublin
10% CAGR; power & permitting constraints
Latin America
Emerging
Santiago, Querétaro, São Paulo
Growing; cost-effective alternatives to US
Middle East and Africa
< 1–2%
UAE, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Nigeria
15–16% CAGR; rapid growth from low base
1.5 Investment and FDI
Data centres have become one of the most attractive asset classes for global investment. Greenfield investment in the sector rose by approximately USD 125 billion in 2025, while international project finance increased by USD 30 billion. This surge helped push global FDI up 14% in 2025 to an estimated USD 1.6 trillion.
However, this investment is highly concentrated in France, the US, and the Republic of Korea. Emerging markets seeking to attract this capital face stiff competition and must offer compelling value propositions around power, connectivity, regulatory clarity, and total cost of operation.
2. Socio-Political Backlash and Market Reallocation
The voracious resource appetite of these facilities has sparked severe socio-political backlash in established markets. In the United States, an estimated $156 billion worth of data centre projects were officially blocked, severely delayed, or cancelled in 2025 alone due to a confluence of grid capacity constraints and environmental litigation.
Communities are increasingly mobilizing against the daily emissions of massive diesel backup generators. Furthermore, agricultural and municipal water conflicts are escalating. A single Meta facility in Georgia, for instance, utilizes approximately 500,000 gallons of water daily for its evaporative cooling arrays, directly competing with local farming requirements during drought conditions.
In response to such frictions and the broader threat of utility grid oversupply, hyperscalers are exhibiting strategic hesitation. Investment analysts from TD Cowen reported in early 2026 that Microsoft had terminated select leases with at least two private data centre operators across multiple US markets, cancelling hundreds of megawatts of capacity due to severe power delivery delays. The firm likened this to Meta’s previous withdrawal from data centre leases during the scaling down of its metaverse initiatives. Furthermore, Microsoft has paused Statements of Qualifications (SOQs) for multiple domestic sites, leading to market speculation regarding temporary AI compute overcapacity, or alternatively, a strategic reallocation of capital expenditures toward international markets with fewer regulatory frictions.
3. Geopolitics and Weaponization of Cloud Computing
Data centres are critical national security infrastructure. Weaponization of cloud computing and strategic competition between the US and China have defined the geopolitics in recent years. The US has imposed restrictions on the sale and transfer of advanced semiconductors (most notably Nvidia‘s cutting-edge architectures) to Chinese entities. The rationale is to strategically throttle China’s advances in AI-driven military logistics, autonomous weapons systems, and domestic surveillance apparatuses.
Despite restrictions, the Chinese state entities, research institutions, and tech giants are renting raw computing power from hyperscale data centres located in third-party countries. For example, in late 2025, investigations revealed that INF Tech, a Shanghai-based start-up, had been remotely accessing approximately 2,300 restricted, leading-edge Blackwell chips housed in an Indonesian data centre to train complex AI systems for scientific applications. Similarly, Chinese tech giants Alibaba and ByteDance have leveraged Nvidia clusters housed in Southeast Asian facilities to train their latest large language models. In another significant manoeuvre, China’s Tencent executed a $1.2 billion agreement with a Japanese cloud provider to secure remote access to 15,000 advanced B200 chips.
This regulatory loophole is forcing US policymakers to fundamentally reassess their strategy. To maintain the efficacy of hardware embargoes, the US will inevitably have to implement and enforce complex export restrictions on cloud computing services themselves. This means Washington will dictate not just who can purchase chips but also who can remotely log into servers globally, effectively weaponizing access to digital infrastructure.
Geotechnology disputes, thus, are new realities in international relations and diplomacy. Cross-border data flows, which were the unquestioned bedrock of the early internet, now face strict national oversight under the evolving doctrine of “digital sovereignty”. Governments fear that allowing sensitive citizen or government data to be processed on foreign soil exposes them to extraterritorial surveillance, economic espionage, or sudden geopolitical leverage.
This dynamic is fuelling intense competition for influence across the Global South. Both China and India view themselves as the natural leaders of this bloc. While India has facilitated strategic diplomatic manoeuvres, such as enabling the African Union’s entry into the G20, and aims to attract USD 200 billion in data centre investments to position itself as a trusted, development-focused AI partner for the developing world. The signing of the MOU between Nepal’s Kathmandu University and India’s BHASINI on June 6, 2026, for the development of artificial intelligence, digital public infrastructure, and natural language processing (NLP) in the presence of the foreign ministers of both countries is a significant geopolitical move.
China still has a massive financial superiority over India. Its outward direct investment (ODI) in 2023 amounted to nearly $180 billion, dwarfing India’s $110 billion. Beijing utilizes this capital to integrate nations into its technological sphere; for instance, Pakistan operates within the China Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) and hosts special economic zones designed explicitly to attract relocated Chinese technological firms under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In this fiercely contested environment, any nation offering to host neutral data infrastructure becomes an immediate focal point for superpower proxy competition.
4. Nepal’s Position
4.1 Current State of Data Centre and IT Services
Nepal’s data centre industry is nascent but growing. The first government-owned facility, the Government Integrated Data Centre (GIDC), was set up in 2009. The country’s first commercial data centre was established by Access World Tech Pvt. Ltd. in 2013. Most facilities are clustered around Kathmandu.
As of 2025–2026, Nepal has its first data centre company, Ncell. It’s Nakkhu Data Centre has been recently certified Tier 3. The first Tier 3 certified and purpose-built data centre, however, is Data World (a subsidiary of WorldLink Communications). It has 14 strategically located facilities across the country. A new development milestone arrived in May 2026 when Bichuten announced plans to build Tier 4 Hyperscale Data Centres in Chobhar, Kathmandu and Birgunj. These two will have a combined capacity of 5 MW, with all power sourced from Nepalese hydroelectric sources.
The IT service sector is growing as well. Given Nepal’s challenging topography and landlocked status, it is exceedingly difficult for physical Nepalese manufactured goods to compete with the industrial-scale output of neighbouring India and China. However, the “weightless” and borderless nature of IT service exports presents a distinct comparative advantage. Current trends indicate significant latent potential. By 2022, Nepal exported IT services worth an estimated Rs 67 billion, and the sector is now generating over $1 billion annually. These IT service exports contribute approximately 1.4% to the country’s GDP and bolster foreign currency reserves by 5.5%.
4.2 Political Vision
The government has established highly ambitious targets to exponentially accelerate this growth. Policymakers aim to increase IT service export earnings from the current $1 billion to an astounding $30 billion by 2030, alongside the creation of 500,000 specialized domestic jobs to absorb a young national workforce projected to reach 22 million by the end of the decade.
To facilitate this transition, the government has drafted the Digital Nepal Framework (DNF) 2.0 in 2025. Expanding upon the original 2019 DNF 1.0, which sought to digitize eight key sectors through 80 distinct initiatives, the draft DNF 2.0 identifies data hosting and cloud infrastructure readiness as critical dependencies for national socioeconomic transformation. The framework explicitly prioritizes the establishment of energy-efficient, green data centres that align with international benchmarks like LEED and Uptime Institute standards. The framework also encompasses broad digitalization efforts, including a National Biometric ID system (with 17 million citizens already registered), eHaat Bazaar platforms for precision agriculture, and the widespread implementation of Digital Signatures. The Policies and Programmes for FY 2083-84 (2026-27) also reflect these aspirations.
Market projections reflect optimism regarding these policy shifts. The Nepal Data Center Market is forecast to grow from an estimated $171.86 million in infrastructure value in 2024 to $530.52 million by 2035, representing a CAGR of 10.00%. The broader data centre services market is expected to reach $407.15 million by 2035 at a 10.44% CAGR. Domestic players are already scaling up. For instance, WorldLink Communications has attracted significant FDI from the British International Investment (BII) and the Dolma Impact Fund to expand its enterprise solutions and subsidiary Data World Limited.
Nepal Market
Current / Baseline
Future Target (2030/2035)
IT Service Exports
~$1.0 Billion (2024)
$30.0 Billion (Target 2030)
IT Sector Job Creation
Current informal dominance (82%)
+500,000 specialized jobs (Target 2030)
Data Center Infrastructure Market
$171.86 Million (2024)
$530.52 Million (Forecast 2035)
Data Center Total Market Size
N/A (Emerging)
$407.15 Million (Forecast 2035)
Summary Stats for Nepal’s IT and Data Centre Market
4.3 The Case FOR Nepal as a Data Centre Hub
Abundant Clean & Affordable Hydroelectric Power
Nepal’s most compelling competitive advantage is its extraordinary hydropower endowment. The country has an estimated hydropower potential of approximately 83,000 MW, of which around 43,000 MW is considered technically and economically feasible. As of April 2026, 4,340 MW has been harnessed, meaning the vast majority of this resource remains untapped.
Nepal has already become the first country in South Asia to sell surplus electricity on the Indian Energy Exchange market. By the 2025–2026 fiscal year, Nepal is projected to have a maximum surplus of 2,456 MW available for export. Crucially, almost all of the country’s electricity comes from hydropower, a renewable source that is increasingly prioritised by data centre operators seeking to meet net-zero commitments.
Energy costs represent the single largest operating expense for data centres, typically comprising 30–40% of total costs. Clean, affordable power directly addresses the dominant constraint facing the global industry today.
Natural Cooling Advantage
Nepal’s Himalayan geography offers significant natural cooling. Data centres generate enormous heat and require sophisticated (and energy-intensive) cooling systems. Nepal’s cool mountain climate, particularly at higher altitudes, could reduce power consumption for cooling, improving Power Usage Effectiveness (PUE) ratios. Some existing Nepalese facilities already report PUE figures below 1.4, competitive with global benchmarks. Combined with abundant cold river water for water-side cooling, Nepal’s natural environment could substantially lower the total cost of data centre operation.
Strategic Location Between Two Giant Economies
Nepal is landlocked between India and China, two of the world’s largest and fastest-growing data economies. India’s data centre market is projected to reach over 4 GW capacity by 2030, expanding at a compound annual growth rate (CAGR) of 23%. Asia-Pacific as a whole is the fastest-growing data centre region globally, with a projected 12–23% CAGR. Nepal’s geographic position could, if adequately connected, offer low-latency reach to both markets and serve as a neutral hub for regional data processing and storage.
By positioning itself as a sovereign, green data conduit, Nepal can cleverly leverage its strategic geography to attract competing streams of infrastructure financing. The United States, viewing secure digital infrastructure as a core component of its broader Indo-Pacific Strategy, is already heavily involved in modernizing the nation’s energy sector. The $500 million Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) Nepal Compact is explicitly designed to increase the availability of electricity by financing critical high-voltage cross-border transmission lines, such as the Nijgadh–Motihari 400 kV link.
Green Brand Positioning
The global data centre industry is under mounting pressure to decarbonize. Hyperscalers are competing to secure renewable energy at scale, and renewable energy credentials are increasingly a prerequisite for major contracts. Nepal, where virtually 100% of electricity comes from hydropower, is in a unique position to offer one of the world’s greenest data centre environments. This green positioning could be a decisive differentiator when competing for environmentally conscious US operators subject to investor ESG (Environment, Social, and Governance) scrutiny.
Emerging Policy Momentum and Low Land Costs
The almost two-thirds majority government provides a political window to establish clear policy frameworks and incentive structures for foreign data centre investment. Land costs in Nepal remain a fraction of those in established markets. In primary U.S. markets, average monthly asking rates now exceed USD 200 per kW, which Nepal could substantially undercut. The combination of low land prices, cheap power, and natural cooling could offer a compelling total cost of ownership for certain workloads.
FDI Diversification and Economic Development
Nepal is heavily reliant on remittances (accounting for roughly 25–27% of GDP) and tourism. Data centre investment would bring in substantial FDI, creating skilled employment, building technical capacity, and generating long-term recurring revenue from power sales and services. Each direct data centre job is estimated to create 7.4 ancillary jobs in the broader economy. Investment in data centres would also accelerate Nepal’s own digital transformation, expanding access to cloud services, e-commerce, and digital public services.
4.4 The Case AGAINST
Seismic Vulnerability
Nepal sits on one of the world’s most seismically active zones. The 2015 Gorkha earthquake (7.8 Mw) caused catastrophic infrastructure damage and is a stark reminder of the country’s exposure. In September 2024, flooding and landslides affected 20 hydropower plants and reduced electricity production by at least 1.1 GW. For data centre operators, particularly hyperscalers housing mission-critical workloads, seismic risk is a serious deterrent.
Connectivity Bottlenecks
Nepal is landlocked and entirely dependent on its neighbours for international internet connectivity. The country’s internet bandwidth flows through India and China, both of which have been known to restrict cross-border data flows for geopolitical reasons. This creates a single point of failure for any data centre claiming to offer reliable global connectivity. Latency to key U.S. or European markets is high compared to established hubs in Singapore, the UAE, or even India.
For U.S.-based companies considering Nepal for data hosting, the connectivity question is near-disqualifying for latency-sensitive workloads. It may be less of an issue for cold storage, backup, archival, or batch AI training workloads, but these are lower-value use cases that generate less revenue.
Absence of Regulatory Framework
As of June 2026, Nepal has no comprehensive legal or regulatory framework governing data centres and their environmental impact, foreign data hosting, or data sovereignty. Local residents adjacent to existing, smaller-scale data centres in the Kathmandu Valley (such as the Ncell facility in Nakkhu) already report severe noise and vibration pollution, a continuous, low-frequency humming from cooling arrays that causes nearby houses to vibrate and disrupts sleep patterns. When grid failures occur, these facilities activate massive diesel generators, which residents report emit toxic black smoke daily.
For U.S. companies subject to U.S. data governance requirements (including potential export control regulations, data localisation rules under contracts with U.S. federal agencies, and GDPR-equivalent obligations for European user data), the absence of a clear Nepalese data centre regulatory framework is a significant obstacle. There is no equivalent of Singapore’s Model Data Centre framework, Ireland’s data centre planning guidance, or India’s new Digital Personal Data Protection Act to provide investment certainty.
Infrastructure and Skills Gap
Nepal’s existing data centre infrastructure is small-scale and domestically focused. The country has no experience connecting hydropower directly to a hyperscale data centre. Transmission infrastructure, substations, and grid stability are not yet calibrated for the power demands of large facilities. The skilled technical workforce required to operate and maintain hyperscale data centres, viz., electrical engineers, cooling specialists, network engineers, data centre technicians, etc., is scarce.
Building this workforce requires significant investment in training and potentially substantial salary premiums to attract talent.
Seasonal Power Variability
Nepal’s hydropower output is significantly seasonal. During the monsoon season (June–September), rivers run high and power is abundant, sometimes exceeding domestic and export demand. Although the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) projects that the nation will technically stop electricity imports during the dry season by 2026 and possess a maximum surplus of 2456 MW, independent analysts warn that the underlying supply remains highly fragile. During winter dry seasons, however, river flows drop sharply, and Nepal has historically imported electricity from India.
This seasonal mismatch, which is one of the factors challenging Nepal’s EV revolution, is a material risk for data centre operators who require 99.9%+ uptime, year-round, without fluctuation. This scenario also negates the “green compute” value proposition that initially attracts them. The prime minister’s assertion in parliament that increasing household consumption will result in power cuts is a clear deterrent for large-scale data centre operation. Addressing this requires significant investment in storage-type hydropower plants, battery storage, or guaranteed backup arrangements, none of which are currently in place at scale.
Geopolitical and Policy Instability
Nepal’s political history is marked by frequent government changes — the country has had over a dozen governments in the past two decades. Political protests and riots are also common. As such, policy continuity for long-horizon infrastructure investments (data centres have 15- to 25-year asset lives) is a legitimate concern. The government’s vision is compelling, but it depends on sustained political will across multiple electoral cycles.
Additionally, Nepal’s position between India and China creates complex geopolitical dynamics. India has imposed restrictions on the export of power from projects with Chinese involvement.
On the other hand, the dynamics in US-China relations could give rise to intense geopolitical rivalry. If US operators establish advanced computing facilities in Nepal, these servers become highly prized strategic assets for China. Because Nepal is physically linked to China via the 4 Gbps Rasuwagadhi optical fibre route, Beijing could easily lease computational bandwidth from US facilities based in Kathmandu. Moreover, any data centre that attracts Chinese investment or uses Chinese hardware could face complications with U.S. customers who are subject to U.S. national security review processes (such as CFIUS reviews or restrictions under the CHIPS Act framework).
This places Kathmandu in an impossible diplomatic position. Refusing the US could risk American sanctions, the immediate withdrawal of hyperscale FDI, and the freezing of MCC infrastructure funds. Conversely, accommodating US demands and severing Chinese data access would enrage Beijing, likely triggering economic coercion, border trade blockades, or a halt to Chinese infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative. This proxy conflict is already visible. During the recent visit of US Assistant Secretary of State Samir Paul Kapur to Kathmandu in April 2026, Chinese diplomat Cao Jing held near-parallel meetings, explicitly warning Nepal against the ramifications of the MCC Compact and urging the rejection of US satellite networks like Starlink.
Compounding this geopolitical friction is Nepal’s own chaotic approach to data sovereignty. The newly implemented Data Centre and Cloud Service Directives, 2025, mandate strict data localization, requiring all foreign operators to enlist with the local Department of Information Technology and mandating that domestic financial payment systems host their data strictly with these enlisted entities. Additionally, the Nepalese government has expressed intent to restrict the transmission of “sensitive data” outside its borders to enforce social media censorship and ensure local tax compliance. These heavy-handed, government-mandated backdoors and stringent localization prerequisites are highly unappealing to Western hyperscalers, who demand jurisdictional autonomy to protect global user privacy and shield their proprietary models from state interference.
No Proof of Concept Yet
Perhaps the most fundamental challenge is the absence of a demonstrated track record. There is no operational hyperscale or even mid-scale foreign-owned data centre in Nepal. There is no evidence that the economic case of cheap hydropower + natural cooling offsetting seismic construction premiums + connectivity costs actually works in practice. Without a pilot facility that validates the business model, risk-averse institutional capital will remain on the sidelines. This creates a classic chicken-and-egg problem: no investment without evidence, no evidence without investment.
4.5 Comparative Scorecard
Factor
Nepal’s Position
Verdict
Renewable Energy
~83,000 MW potential; nearly 100% hydro grid
Strong Advantage
Energy Cost
Low; competitive with regional peers
Advantage
Natural Cooling
Himalayan climate; cool temperatures
Advantage
Policy Formulation
New policies with focus on data centre and green computing
Promising
Skilled Workforce
Limited; significant gap vs. global benchmarks
Weakness
Regulatory Framework
Data centres absent from EIA and other regulations
Critical Gap
Seismic Risk
High; among most active zones globally
Major Challenge
Geopolitical Entanglement
Complex; India-China Dynamics; US cloud export controls conflicting with Chinese terrestrial fibre access.
Risk Factor
Connectivity
Landlocked geography; absolute physical reliance on Indian/Chinese fibre.
Significant Weakness
4.6 Strategic Recommendations for Nepal
1. Establish a legal and regulatory framework. Draft and pass a Data Centre Act that addresses building standards for seismic zones; environmental impact requirements; data sovereignty and cross-border transfer rules; and a licensing regime for foreign operators. Draw on Singapore, Ireland, and India as models.
2. Build a proof-of-concept facility. Partner with a development finance institution (such as the IFC or ADB) and a credible technology operator to construct and operate a single mid-scale (5–10 MW) internationally certified data centre powered directly by a dedicated hydropower source. Document the full economics.
3. Invest in hydropower generation, transmission and grid stability. The connection between hydropower generation and data centre campuses requires dedicated and reliable transmission infrastructure and backup systems to address seasonal variability. This is a prerequisite, not an afterthought.
4. Resolve connectivity dependency. Work with India and Bangladesh, and potentially directly with submarine cable landing stations via Bangladesh, to diversify and secure international bandwidth. Explore partnerships with regional internet exchange points.
5. Develop the workforce pipeline. Partner with Tribhuvan University and technical institutes to create data centre operations and engineering curricula. Establish apprenticeship agreements with international operators.
6. Target appropriate workload types first. Rather than competing head-on with Singapore or the UAE for latency-sensitive workloads, focus initially on cold storage, AI training (batch, not real-time inference), backup and archival, and sustainability-driven offloading from carbon-heavy facilities.
7. Create a stable investment environment. Offer political stability and security against riots; long-term tax certainty (10+ year agreements); land lease guarantees; and repatriation of profits provisions that survive changes in government. Consider a special economic zone model for data centre campuses.
5. Conclusion
Nepal’s proposition as a data centre hub is genuinely compelling in theory. The combination of vast untapped clean energy, natural cooling, and low land costs addresses the most acute constraint facing the global industry today: power. The political will is present. The timing as the world scrambles for green computing capacity is, in principle, favourable.
However, the structural challenges are substantial and largely unaddressed. Seismic risk, connectivity dependence, regulatory vacuum, workforce gaps, and seasonal power variability are deal-breakers for hyperscalers operating at the frontier of global digital infrastructure, where uptime and data sovereignty are non-negotiable.
Nepal’s most realistic near-term path is to build credible proof with one well-documented, internationally certified, hydropower-connected facility and let the economics speak. If the math works, the investment will follow. If it does not, Nepal will have learned a critical lesson before committing national resources at scale.
The opportunity is real. The hard work of converting ambition into investable reality has barely begun.
जब हामी पृथ्वीनारायण शाहको बारेमा सोच्दछौं, दिमागमा आउने छवि लगभग सधैं एक अथक सैन्य विजेताको हुन्छ। उहाँ त्यो राजा हुनुहुन्छ जसले आफ्नो तरवारको धारले दर्जनौं साना राज्यहरूलाई नेपाल राष्ट्रमा एकीकृत गर्नुभयो। यो तस्वीर सत्य भए पनि अपूर्ण छ। यसले योद्धाको पछाडिको वास्तुकारलाई सम्झन्छ।
पृथ्वीनारायण शाहको एकीकरण अभियानको वास्तविक प्रतिभा केवल उनको सैन्य रणनीतिमा मात्र थिएन तर उनको परिष्कृत, दूरदर्शी र प्रायः निर्दयी आर्थिक राज्यकलामा थियो। उनले जितको युद्ध जति उग्र रूपमा लडे, आफ्ना शत्रुहरूको अर्थतन्त्रलाई घाँटी थिचेर आफ्नो नयाँ राज्यको लागि संरक्षणवादी जग बसाले। यो नदेखिने आर्थिक शक्तिहरूको कथा हो जसले साँच्चै राष्ट्रलाई आकार दियो।
यस लेखमा…
५ आर्थिक रणनीतिहरू
१. आत्मसमर्पणका लागि प्रेरित गर्ने
काठमाडौं उपत्यकाका समृद्ध मल्ल राज्यहरू विरुद्ध पृथ्वीनारायण शाहको प्राथमिक रणनीति प्रत्यक्ष आक्रमण थिएन तर योजनाबद्ध आर्थिक घाँटी थिच्नु थियो। १७४४ मा रणनीतिक हिमाली किल्ला नुवाकोट कब्जा गरेपछि, उनले उपत्यकालाई तिब्बतसँग जोड्ने मुख्य व्यापार मार्गको नियन्त्रण कब्जा गरे – मल्ल अर्थतन्त्रको जीवनरक्त।
यो एकल चालसँगै, उनले दण्डनीय आर्थिक नाकाबन्दी स्थापना गरे। मल्ल राजाहरूलाई एक पटक एकल भन्सार शुल्क तिर्ने सामानहरूले अब उनलाई दोस्रो, छुट्टै शुल्क तिर्नु पर्थ्यो। यसले व्यवस्थित रूपमा उपत्यकालाई आकर्षक ट्रान्स-हिमालय व्यापारबाट काट्यो जुन यसको धनको प्राथमिक स्रोत थियो। टाढाको रणनीतिकार हुनुको सट्टा, उनी यो नयाँ आर्थिक हतियारको हातमा प्रयोग हुने सूक्ष्म प्रबन्धक थिए। तिब्बतबाट सुन खरिद गर्ने जिम्मेवारीमा रहेका आफ्ना एजेन्टलाई लेखेको पत्रमा उनले आफ्नो चतुर, व्यावहारिक दिमाग प्रकट गरे:
“सुन न गाली १६ रुपैयाँ तोला दिन्छ भने किन्नु। यसरी किन्न घटिया सुन न लिनु । तिब्बतीहरू सुनमा पितलको धुलो मिसाउने हुनाले सो कुराको विचार गरी सुन किन्नु ।… सोह्र रुपैयाँ तोला दिँयेनन् भने सोह्रमा एक सुक्का थपेर पनि किन्नू । थोरै सुन पाइने भए १७ रुपैयाँ तोला देखि न बढ्नु तथा १०–१२ हजार तोला सुन पाइये औ गालेर बेच्छन् भने १८ रुपैयाँ तोला दिएर पनि किन्नु।”
राजधानीमा आफ्नो अन्तिम आक्रमण हुनुभन्दा धेरै अघि, पृथ्वीनारायण शाहले बाहिरबाट आर्थिक संकटको सिर्जना गरे, जसले गर्दा निर्णायक युद्धहरू आउँदा मल्ल राज्यहरू आर्थिक रूपमा कमजोर र आन्तरिक रूपमा कमजोर भएको सुनिश्चित भयो।
२. हिमालयका असम्भव विश्वव्यापी व्यापारीहरू
पृथ्वीनारायण शाहको उदय हुनुभन्दा पहिले, यस क्षेत्रको चहलपहल व्यापारलाई उल्लेखनीय रूपमा विविध व्यापारी समूहद्वारा नियन्त्रित गरिएको थियो। तिनीहरूमध्ये प्रमुख काठमाडौँका नेवार व्यापारीहरू थिए, जसले तिब्बतसँग गहिरो व्यावसायिक सम्बन्ध स्थापित गरेका थिए, र राम्रोसँग जोडिएका कश्मीरी मुस्लिम व्यापारीहरू थिए, जसका व्यापारिक घरहरू भारतदेखि ल्हासासम्म फैलिएका थिए।
सबैभन्दा अचम्मको कुरा के छ भने, अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय व्यापारीहरूको एक प्रमुख समूह गोसाईं तपस्वीहरू थिए। यी पूजनीय पवित्र पुरुषहरूले आफ्नो धार्मिक हैसियत र आवागमनको स्वतन्त्रतालाई सीमा पार गर्न प्रयोग गरे, उच्च मूल्य, कम मात्राको सामानको शक्तिशाली व्यापारीको रूपमा काम गरे। नाकाबन्दीले उनीहरूको व्यवसायलाई कमजोर बनायो, र यी प्रभावशाली व्यापारीहरू – गोसाईं, कश्मीरी र नेवारहरू – पृथ्वी नारायण शाहको विरुद्धमा लागे। आफ्नो हताशतामा, तिनीहरू उनका उग्र विरोधी बने, ब्रिटिश इस्ट इन्डिया कम्पनीलाई उनको विरुद्ध सैन्य अभियान सुरु गर्न पनि उक्साए।
३. विदेशी शक्तिहरूलाई खाडीमा राख्ने कट्टरपन्थी दृष्टिकोण
आफ्नो विजय पूरा गरेपछि, पृथ्वी नारायण शाहले संरक्षणवादको कट्टरपन्थी आर्थिक नीति लागू गरे। उनको अटल लक्ष्य व्यापारबाट हुने सबै नाफा नेपाल भित्र र नेपालीहरूको हातमा रहोस् भन्ने थियो। उनको योजना विदेशी व्यापारीहरूलाई देशको भित्री भागमा प्रवेश गर्न निषेध गर्ने थियो। बरु, उनले पर्सा जस्ता सीमामा तोकिएका व्यापारिक चौकीहरूको कल्पना गरे, जहाँ सबै अन्तर्राष्ट्रिय व्यापार सञ्चालन हुनेछ।
यो नीति युरोपेली उपनिवेशवादको गहिरो र पूर्वज्ञानी डरबाट प्रेरित थियो। उनले देखे कि कसरी एशियाभरि राजनीतिक र सैन्य अधीनताको लागि वाणिज्यलाई बहानाको रूपमा प्रयोग गरिँदैछ। ब्रिटिश इस्ट इन्डिया कम्पनीको बारेमा उनको दृष्टिकोण एक शक्तिशाली चेतावनीमा कैद गरिएको थियो:
“दक्षिणका समुद्रको बादशाहसँग घा ता राख्नु तर त्यो महाचोर छ”
उनले बुझे कि विदेशी व्यापारीहरूलाई स्वतन्त्र लगाम दिनु भनेको शक्तिशाली संस्थालाई पाइला राख्न निमन्त्रणा हो। यो केवल सिद्धान्त मात्र थिएन; यो फलामको मुट्ठीले लागू गरिएको नीति थियो। आफ्नो विजय पछि, उनले विदेशी व्यापारीहरूलाई मात्र प्रतिबन्ध लगाएनन् – उनले तिनीहरूलाई निष्कासित गरे। जसरी उनले क्यापुचिन मिसनरीहरूलाई हटाए, त्यसरी नै उनले शक्तिशाली गोसाई व्यापारीहरूलाई पनि निष्कासित गरे, आफ्नो प्रभावको नेटवर्क भएको कुनै पनि बाह्य समूहलाई हटाउने आफ्नो पूर्ण दृढ संकल्प प्रदर्शन गरे।
४. एक राष्ट्र, एक सिक्का एक समयमा बनाउने
शताब्दीऔंदेखि, काठमाडौँ उपत्यकाका मल्ल राजाहरूले बनाएका चाँदीका सिक्काहरू हिमालयको विश्वसनीय, प्रमुख मुद्रा थिए, जुन आकर्षक तिब्बत व्यापारको लागि आवश्यक थियो। तर समयसँगै, शासकहरूले सस्तो धातुहरूले तिनीहरूलाई कमजोर बनाउन थालेपछि तिनीहरूको गुणस्तर घट्दै गयो, जसले गर्दा शताब्दीऔं पुरानो विश्वास क्षय भयो।
रणनीतिक खुलापनलाई पहिचान गर्दै, पृथ्वीनारायण शाहले मल्लहरूको आर्थिक सार्वभौमिकतामा प्रत्यक्ष आक्रमण गरे। १७४९ मा पहाडी क्षेत्रहरूमा आफ्नै उच्च गुणस्तरका चाँदीका सिक्काहरू टकसार गर्ने उनी पहिलो राजा बने। यो आर्थिक विध्वंसको एक उत्कृष्ट अभ्यास थियो। तिब्बतमा स्वीकृति सुनिश्चित गर्न, उनले मल्ल सिक्काहरूको सामान्य शैली र तौलको नक्कल गरे। यो नयाँ, शुद्ध मुद्रा केवल विनिमयको माध्यम मात्र थिएन; यो मल्लहरूको प्रतिष्ठालाई चकनाचुर पार्न गरिएको एक विघटनकारी नवप्रवर्तन थियो।
५. तिब्बतले बेलायतीहरूको होइन, नेपालको पक्षमा रहेको आश्चर्यजनक कारण
पृथ्वीनारायण शाहको नाकाबन्दीले नेपाल हुँदै परम्परागत व्यापार मार्ग बन्द गरेपछि, ब्रिटिश इस्ट इन्डिया कम्पनीले एउटा खुलापन देख्यो। तिब्बतसँग प्रत्यक्ष व्यावसायिक सम्बन्ध स्थापित गर्न उत्सुक गभर्नर, वारेन हेस्टिंग्सले १७७४ मा पञ्चेन लामासँग वार्ता गर्न जर्ज बोगल नामक दूत पठाए।
नतिजा विपरीत आयो। बेलायतीहरूबाट सतर्क र चीनको कट्टर ब्रिटिश विरोधी नीतिहरूबाट प्रभावित तिब्बतीहरू आफ्नो मनसायप्रति गहिरो शंका गर्थे। गोरखा विजयबाट उत्पन्न अवरोधका बाबजुद पनि, उनीहरूले अन्ततः नेपाल हुँदै आफ्नो शताब्दी पुरानो, यदि अस्थायी रूपमा टुटेको भए पनि, व्यापार सम्बन्धमा अडिग रहन रुचाए। उनीहरूले ज्ञात नेपालीहरूलाई अज्ञात र सम्भावित खतरनाक ब्रिटिशहरू भन्दा राम्रो साझेदारको रूपमा देखे। बोगलको मिसन असफलता थियो, जुन पुरानो नेपाल-तिब्बत आर्थिक सम्बन्धको स्थायी शक्तिको प्रमाण थियो जुन ब्रिटिश साम्राज्यले पनि सजिलै तोड्न सक्दैनथ्यो।
वाणिज्य साम्राज्य
पृथ्वी नारायण शाहको विरासत केवल सैन्य विजेताको भन्दा धेरै जटिल छ। उनी एक दूरदर्शी आर्थिक वास्तुकार थिए जसले बुझेका थिए कि राष्ट्रहरू युद्धभूमिमा मात्र नभई बजार र टक्सारहरूमा पनि निर्माण हुन्छन्। उपत्यकाको व्यावसायिक घाँटी थिच्ने र यसको मुद्राको विध्वंसदेखि, शक्तिशाली विदेशी व्यापारीहरूको बहिष्कार र ब्रिटिश साम्राज्यलाई नै पराजित गर्नेसम्म, एकीकरणको लागि उनको खाका आर्थिक युद्धको जित जत्तिकै सैन्य शक्तिको विजय थियो।
उनको कथाले हामीलाई सोच्नको लागि गहिरो प्रश्न छोड्छ: यदि यो उग्र संरक्षणवादी दृष्टिकोण शताब्दीयौंसम्म कायम राखिएको भए नेपाल र क्षेत्रको आर्थिक मार्ग कसरी फरक हुन सक्थ्यो?
When we think of King Prithvi Narayan Shah, the image that comes to mind is almost always one of a relentless military conqueror. He unified dozens of petty principalities into the nation of Nepal with the edge of his sword. This picture, while true, is incomplete. It misses the architect behind the warrior.
The true genius of Prithvi Narayan Shah’s unification campaign was not just in his military tactics but in his sophisticated, visionary, and often ruthless economic statecraft. He waged a war of commerce as fiercely as he waged a war of conquest, strangling his enemies’ economies and laying a protectionist foundation for his new kingdom. This is the story of the unseen economic forces that truly shaped a nation.
In this post, you’ll read about…
The 5 Economic Strategies
1. How to Strangle an Economy into Submission
Prithvi Narayan Shah’s primary strategy against the prosperous Malla kingdoms of the Kathmandu Valley was not a frontal assault but a calculated economic strangulation. After capturing the strategic hill fort of Nuwakot in 1744, he seized control of the main trade route linking the valley to Tibet, the lifeblood of the Malla economy.
With this single move, he established a punishing economic blockade. Goods that once paid a single customs duty to the Malla kings now had to pay a second, separate duty to him. This systematically cut off the valley from the lucrative trans-Himalayan commerce that was its primary source of wealth. Far from being a distant strategist, he was a hands-on micromanager of this new economic weapon. In a letter to his agent in charge of purchasing gold from Tibet, he revealed his shrewd, pragmatic mind:
“If they give pure gold for 16 rupees per tola, buy it… If they don’t give it for 16, add a quarter-rupee… If much gold is available, don’t go above 17… but if 10-12 thousand tolas can be had and sold at a profit, then buy it even for 18 rupees per tola.”
Long before his final assault on the capital, Prithvi Narayan Shah engineered an economic crisis from the outside, ensuring the Malla kingdoms were financially weakened and internally fragile when the decisive battles came.
2. The Unlikely Global Traders of the Himalayas
Before Prithvi Narayan Shah’s rise, the region’s bustling trade was controlled by a remarkably diverse group of merchants. Prominent among them were the Newar traders of Kathmandu, who had established deep commercial ties with Tibet, and the well-connected Kashmiri Muslim merchants, whose trading houses spanned from India to Lhasa.
Most surprisingly, a key group of international traders were the Gosain ascetics. These revered holy men used their religious status and freedom of movement to travel across borders, acting as powerful merchants of high-value, low-volume goods. The blockade crippled their business, and these influential traders, namely, the Gosains, Kashmiris, and Newars turned against Prithvi Narayan Shah. In their desperation, they became his fierce opponents, even instigating the British East India Company to launch a military expedition against him.
3. A Radical Vision to Keep Foreign Powers at Bay
After completing his conquest, Prithvi Narayan Shah implemented a radical economic policy of protectionism. His unwavering goal was to ensure all profits from trade remained within Nepal and in the hands of Nepalis. His plan was to prohibit foreign traders from entering the country’s interior. Instead, he envisioned designated trading posts at the border, such as Parsa, where all international business would be conducted.
This policy was driven by a deep and prescient fear of European colonialism. He saw how commerce was being used as a pretext for political and military subjugation across Asia. His view of the British East India Company was captured in a powerful warning:
Maintain relations with the emperor of the southern seas, but he is a great thief.
He understood that allowing foreign traders free rein was an invitation for a powerful entity to gain a foothold. This wasn’t just theory; it was policy enforced with an iron fist. After his victory, he didn’t just restrict foreign traders—he expelled them. Just as he had removed the Capuchin missionaries, he cast out the powerful Gosain traders, demonstrating his absolute resolve to eliminate any external group with its own network of influence.
4. Forging a Nation, One Coin at a Time
For centuries, the silver coins minted by the Malla kings of the Kathmandu Valley were the trusted, dominant currency of the Himalayas, essential for the lucrative Tibet trade. But over time, their quality had degraded as rulers began debasing them with cheaper metals, eroding that centuries-old trust.
Recognizing a strategic opening, Prithvi Narayan Shah launched a direct assault on the Mallas’ economic sovereignty. Starting in 1749, he became the first king in the hill regions to mint his own high-quality silver coins. This was a masterstroke of economic subversion. To ensure acceptance in Tibet, he mimicked the general style and weight of the Malla coins. This new, pure currency was not just a medium of exchange; it was a disruptive innovation designed to shatter the Mallas’ prestige.
5. The Surprising Reason Tibet Sided with Nepal, Not the British
After Prithvi Narayan Shah’s blockade sealed off the traditional trade route through Nepal, the British East India Company saw an opening. The governor, Warren Hastings, eager to establish a direct commercial link with Tibet, dispatched an envoy named George Bogle in 1774 to negotiate with the Panchen Lama.
The outcome was counter-intuitive. The Tibetans, wary of the British and influenced by China’s staunchly anti-British policies, were deeply suspicious of their intentions. Despite the disruption caused by the Gorkha conquest, they ultimately preferred to stick with their centuries-old, if temporarily broken, trade relationship through Nepal. They saw the known Nepalis as a better partner than the unknown and potentially dangerous British. Bogle’s mission was a failure, a testament to the enduring strength of the age-old Nepal-Tibet economic connection that not even the British Empire could easily break.
Conclusion: An Empire of Commerce
Prithvi Narayan Shah’s legacy is far more complex than that of a mere military conqueror. He was a visionary economic architect who understood that nations are built not only on battlefields but also in marketplaces and mints. From the commercial strangulation of the valley and the subversion of its currency to the exclusion of powerful foreign traders and the outmanoeuvring of the British Empire itself, his blueprint for unification was as much a triumph of economic warfare as it was of military might.
His story leaves us with a profound question to ponder: How might the economic trajectory of Nepal and the region have been different if this fiercely protectionist vision had been maintained for centuries?
Constitution Study #17: A step-by-step description of the constitutional provisions (Article 76) for forming a government in Nepal
The period following a general election in Nepal is often chaotic. News cycles fill with talk of negotiations, power-sharing deals, and political “horse-trading”, leaving many citizens confused about what comes next. The uncertainty around which party or coalition wins or forms a government is a bigger battleground than the polls themselves.
Yet, amidst this perceived chaos, the Constitution of Nepal provides a surprisingly clear, step-by-step roadmap for forming a government. This framework, detailed in Article 76, is designed to navigate the complexities of a multi-party system. This article breaks down that complex constitutional process into five simple, understandable steps, framing it as a constitutional drama of escalating stakes.
Forming a government in Nepal:
Step 1: The Straightforward Path – A Clear Majority
The first and most straightforward method for forming a government is outlined in Article 76, Clause (1) of the Constitution. If a single political party wins a clear majority of seats in the House of Representatives, the President appoints the parliamentary leader of that party as the Prime Minister. This is the simplest and most stable path to forming a government.
This scenario represents the ideal for stable governance, as it provides a clear mandate and avoids the need for complex negotiations. However, in Nepal’s political landscape, a single-party majority has become a rarity. This is largely due to a political culture where parties are often feudalistic in nature and centred around their topmost leaders rather than cohesive ideologies, frequently resulting in fractured electoral mandates. The instability that challenges Nepal’s governance often stems from the fact that this first, ideal step is seldom achieved.
Step 2: When No One Wins Outright – The Art of the Coalition
When no single party secures a majority, the process moves to Article 76, Clause (2). Under this provision, the President appoints a member of the House of Representatives who can prove they have majority support through an alliance of two or more parties. This is the formation of a coalition government.
This is the most common path to power, reflecting a political culture where parties, often centred on individual leaders rather than ideology, engage in intense political broking. This necessity for compromise contributes directly to the “frequent changes in government” that challenge Nepal’s stability, as alliances are often transactional and built on fragile power-sharing agreements rather than durable policy consensus. Managing the competing demands of coalition partners often leads to policy gridlock and fragile alliances.
Election coalitions can break down, and new government coalitions can form, as evidenced in the aftermath of the 2022 elections. The then CPN Maoist (Centre) ran the elections along with Nepali Congress, but when the time for forming the government came, it broke the alliance and joined the other parties: CPN (UML), Rastriya Swatantra Party, Rastriya Prajatantra Party, People’s Socialist Party, Janamat Party, and Nagrik Unmukti Party, and three independents, with Pushpa Kamal Dahal heading the government.
Step 3: If Coalitions Crumble – The Largest Party’s Chance
If a coalition government cannot be formed within thirty days, the Constitution provides a third option under Article 76, Clause (3). The President will then appoint the parliamentary leader of the single largest party in the House of Representatives as Prime Minister. However, this appointment is conditional. As per Clause (4), this Prime Minister must win a “vote of confidence” from the House within thirty days to remain in power.
This provision acts as a critical safeguard to prevent complete political deadlock when coalition talks fail. It ensures that a government can be formed, even if it lacks an upfront majority. However, this type of minority government is inherently fragile. This precariousness forces the largest party to govern not by mandate, but by perpetual negotiation, often making it vulnerable to the shifting allegiances of smaller parties.
In 2023, after the CPN (UML) withdrew its support for Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the Nepali Congress had the opportunity to lead according to this provision. However, the Congress did not take a risk and joined with the CPN (UML). KP Sharma Oli was once again appointed Prime Minister according to Article 76(2).
Step 4: The Last Attempt – Any Member’s Claim
Where Step 3 empowers the leader of the single largest party, Step Four dramatically widens the field. If the minority Prime Minister from Step Three fails to win the vote of confidence, the process moves to a crucial and often contentious final attempt under Article 76, Clause (5). The President will then appoint any member of the House who can present grounds (e.g., letters of support from a sufficient number of members) demonstrating they are able to win a vote of confidence. This Prime Minister must also secure that vote of confidence within thirty days, as stipulated in Clause (6).
This clause is the constitution’s most radical attempt to break parliamentary gridlock. By allowing any member to stake a claim, it theoretically bypasses the rigid, hierarchical party structures that often cause deadlock. It opens the door for consensus candidates to emerge from outside the established leadership, but has also become a focal point of constitutional debate, as it can trigger intense political maneuvering and legal challenges regarding what constitutes valid “grounds” for a claim.
Step 5: Dissolution and a New Election
If all previous attempts fail, including the Prime Minister appointed in Step 4 being unable to secure a vote of confidence, the process reaches its definitive conclusion under Article 76, Clause (7). In this event, the President, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, will dissolve the House of Representatives and call for new general elections to be held within six months.
This is the constitution’s last resort: a political circuit breaker designed to prevent a complete system overload by returning power to its ultimate source—the people. This step embodies the principle of popular sovereignty enshrined in the constitution’s preamble, ensuring that when the elected representatives fail, the ultimate authority returns to the people. However, it comes at a significant cost, ushering in a period of political instability and the considerable expense of another national election.
Conclusion: A Framework for Stability or a Recipe for Intrigue?
The Constitution of Nepal lays out a detailed, multi-layered process for government formation. It is designed to exhaust every possible avenue for creating a functional government from the elected parliament before returning to the voters for a new mandate. This five-step cascade is a direct response to the nation’s complex political realities. This cycle of formation and dissolution at the federal level has cascading effects, often delaying the implementation of laws and policies crucial for empowering Nepal’s provincial and local governments and deepening its fragile federalism.
This leaves us with a critical question for the future of Nepal’s democracy: does this intricate, multi-stage process serve as a robust framework for stability in a fragmented polity, or does this complexity create perverse incentives for the political manoeuvring and constitutional brinkmanship it is designed to prevent?
Constitution Study #15: Analysis of the constitutional loopholes and provisions that permit hegemony of political parties
No constitution is perfect. It is an ever-changing, dynamic document. The 2015 Constitution of Nepal envisions “the people’s competitive multiparty democratic system of governance” in its Preamble. There is a dedicated Part in the Constitution regarding the political parties. These provisions and constitutional loopholes, however, allow political parties to exert undue influence over all institutions.
How the Political Parties Gain Superpower…
1. Article 270
Part 29 of the Constitution has provisions relating to the political parties. Article 269 allows their registration with the Election Commission, unless their names, objectives, and insignia “jeopardise the religious and communal unity of the country or fragment the country”. Article 270(1), however, prevents prohibition on political parties. Article 270(2) takes it a step further, preventing a single political ideology, philosophy, or programme from taking over.
(1) Any law, arrangement or decision so made as to impose any restriction on the formation and operation of a political party and on the generation of publicity in order to secure support and cooperation from public-in-general for the ideology, philosophy and programme of the party pursuant to Article 269 shall be deemed to be inconsistent with this Constitution and shall, ipso facto, be void.
(2) Any law, arrangement or decision so made as to allow for participation or involvement of only a single political party or persons having similar political ideology, philosophy or programme in the elections or in the political system of, or in the conduct of governance of the State shall be deemed to be inconsistent with this Constitution and shall, ipso facto, be void.
The proviso is a constitutional safeguard against dictatorship, but it is actually a double-edged sword because the political parties gain absolute power to do anything as long as they claim they are acting within the Constitution. And as Lord Acton said:
Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
2. Control over Poll Candidates
Article 84(2) mandates a closed-list proportional representation (PR) system for 110 members of the House of Representatives, where voters cast ballots for a party, not an individual. The selection process of the candidates is often opaque. Also, even though the method is supposed to encourage representatives from the marginalised communities, candidates who are in or close to the party leadership get shortlisted. As a result, there is a centralisation of power within the party hierarchy, as the leadership determines the prioritised order of candidates on the list, effectively deciding who will be elected.
But then the 165 candidates for the first-past-the-post (FPTP) are also those who are favoured by the party leadership. Election “tickets” are given to those who can flatter the party leaders with money and obsequies and not the ones who have actually worked at the grassroots level.
3. Forming the Federal and Provincial Executives
The entire constitutional process for forming a government is predicated on the actions, alliances, and numerical strength of political parties. Whether a government is formed by a single majority party, a coalition of parties, or the largest party in a hung parliament, its existence is inherently a product of inter-party and intra-party politics. This makes the executive branch directly dependent on party dynamics, ensuring that partisan considerations remain central to its formation and survival. Moreover, when alliances shift at the federal level, the effect is seen in the provincial government and vice versa.
4. Enforcement of Party Discipline upon the Elected Representatives
A key instrument of party control is found in Article 89(e) and its equivalent, Article 180(e). They stipulate that a member of the Federal or the Provincial parliament loses their seat if their political party provides official notification that they have defected (left the party or voted against the party line in the parliament).
This anti-defection clause grants party leadership immense power over individual legislators. It can compel the MPs to vote strictly along party lines, potentially overriding their personal conscience or the specific interests of their constituents, thus centralising authority within the party structure and diminishing the autonomy of elected representatives.
Party leadership can ensure loyalty post-election through the credible threat of expulsion and subsequent loss of their parliamentary seat.
5. Issuing Ordinances
Under Article 114, the President, on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers, can promulgate an ordinance when Parliament is not in session. While necessary for addressing urgent matters, this power can be used by the executive to bypass legislative debate and scrutiny, particularly if parliamentary sessions are deliberately delayed or prorogued. This constitutional loophole has the potential to be used to further interests of political parties or other groups.
However, the legislative check requires that any ordinance be tabled before Parliament once it convenes and ceases to be effective if not adopted, or automatically after sixty days.
6. Appointment of Non-Elected Ministers
Article 78 permits the appointment of a person who is not a member of the Federal Parliament as a minister, with a six-month deadline to gain membership. While it can be used to bring technocratic expertise into government, it could also be exploited to appoint political allies who have failed to secure an electoral mandate. Non-elected party members have even made budgets and long-term policies undermining the concept of representative governance.
The risk is partially mitigated by Article 78(4), which explicitly bars a person who lost the election to the then House of Representatives from such an appointment, but the provision, overall, creates a potential loophole that could undermine the principle of a legislature-derived executive.
7. The Game of Appointments
The greatest leverage political parties have is the ability to influence appointments of the Judges, including the Chief Justice, the Attorney General, and the members of various constitutional commissions.
Inclusion of the Minister for Law and Justice, a jurist appointed by the Prime Minister, and a senior advocate or an advocate recommended by the highly politicised Nepal Bar Association in the Judicial Council (Article 153) allows firm control of political parties in the judiciary.
The Constitutional Council (Article 284), which recommends the Chief Justice and Chiefs and officials of Constitutional Bodies, consists of the Prime Minister as the Chairperson and key legislative leaders as members. Article 284(1) allows the Minister of Law and Justice to become the member of the Constitutional Council while making a recommendation for the appointment of the Chief Justice. This provision creates a formal channel for executive and legislative influence over appointments in the Election Commission, CIAA, NHRC, and so on.
The structure of these key institutions creates a potential avenue for politicising the judiciary and constitutional commissions, thereby entrenching the role of political parties in a process that is essential to judicial independence and to the impartial functioning of commissioners tasked with holding the executive, the legislature, and political parties accountable.
Conclusion: A System of Potential Party Hegemony
In the interactions managed in the Constitution, political parties emerge as critical fulcrums upon which governance pivots. They act as the primary conduits of political authority, mediating power across all three branches in all three levels through control over electoral lists (Article 84) and the enforcement of party discipline via anti-defection laws (Article 89(e)).
Ultimately, the stability and effectiveness of Nepal’s constitutional framework depend not on the separation of its state organs but on the faithful adherence by all political and institutional actors to the principles of checks and balances, the failure of which has led to the current constitutional crisis.
Constitution Study #14:Clash of the Constitutional Mandate and Popular Uprising
A Nation at a Constitutional Crossroads
In a move that has shaken Nepal’s political foundations, the Gen Z-led anti-corruption movement on September 8-9 swept the KP Sharma Oli government from power. In the ensuing political vacuum, President Ramchandra Paudel executed an unprecedented solution: the September 12 appointment of former chief justice Sushila Karki as interim Prime Minister. This decision, followed by the dissolution of the House of Representatives, was hailed by some as a necessary response to the popular will but has plunged the nation into its most profound constitutional crisis yet.
This is more than a mere political debate; it is a fundamental stress test of Nepal’s young constitution. The appointment has ignited a fierce legal battle, pitting the raw power of popular sovereignty against the established bulwarks of judicial precedent and the separation of powers. As ten petitions challenging the government’s legitimacy land at the Supreme Court, Nepal is forced to confront a question that will define its democratic future: Are the rules that govern the state absolute, or can they be rewritten by the force of a people’s movement?
In this post…
1. The Blueprint for Power: How Nepal’s Executive is Supposed to Work
The current crisis is unintelligible without a firm grasp of Nepal’s constitutional blueprint for executive power, specifically the procedures laid out in Part-7 of the Constitution. Article 74 establishes a “multi-party competitive federal democratic republican parliamentary form of governance.” This framework is not merely a suggestion; it is the binding charter for political legitimacy.
At its core, Article 76 provides a clear, step-by-step process for appointing a Prime Minister. The President is to appoint the leader of the parliamentary party that commands a majority in the House of Representatives. Recognizing the complexities of coalition politics, the article also provides a sequence of fallback options in clauses (2), (3), and (5) for scenarios where no single party holds a majority. This constitutional playbook is the only established path to forming a government, which the recent political rupture cast aside.
2. The Political Rupture: A Protest, a President, and an Unprecedented Appointment
The crisis unfolded with breathtaking speed. Following the ousting of the KP Sharma Oli government by a massive Gen Z-led anti-corruption movement on September 8-9, the nation’s political order was upended. On September 12, President Ramchandra Paudel, acting on the recommendation of movement representatives, appointed former chief justice Sushila Karki to lead an interim government. On Prime Minister Karki’s recommendation, the President then dissolved the House of Representatives and gave the new government a six-month mandate to conduct parliamentary elections, scheduled for March 5. This rapid sequence of events, occurring over just a few days, bypassed the established constitutional process and triggered an immediate judicial backlash in the form of ten petitions filed in the Supreme Court.
These petitions challenge two distinct but deeply intertwined actions: the formation of Karki’s government and her subsequent recommendation to dissolve the House. The challenge to Karki’s appointment is therefore foundational; if her premiership is deemed unconstitutional, then her recommendation to dissolve the House—the second major point of contention—is invalid from the start.
3. The Core of the Controversy: Can a Former Chief Justice Become Prime Minister?
The petitioners’ case against Sushila Karki’s premiership hinges on a direct, literal reading of a single constitutional clause designed to safeguard judicial independence. They argue that her appointment as Prime Minister is an unambiguous breach of Article 132 (2), which is intended to prevent the politicization of the judiciary. The article states:
“No person who has once held the office of Chief Justice or a Justice of the Supreme Court shall be eligible for appointment to any government office, except as otherwise provided for in this Constitution.”
However, a sophisticated counter-argument has emerged, positing that this clause does not apply to the prime ministership. Ram Lohani, Associate Professor, Tribhuvan University first argues that the Prime Minister’s post is not an office that the President “assigns” someone to work in. Whereas the President has discretion in other appointments, Article 76 obligates the President to appoint any person who meets the constitutional criteria, such as commanding a majority. The Prime Minister is therefore not “put to work” by the President but rather assumes an office by constitutional right.
This leads to the second, crucial distinction: the difference between a “government office” and a “political post“. Lohani argues that Article 132’s prohibition applies only to the former. He notes that other constitutional articles, such as 238(8) and 240(8), explicitly permit former members of constitutional commissions to hold “political posts” while barring them from other “government service.” This distinction, he argues, implies that political roles like Prime Minister fall outside the scope of the prohibition placed on former justices. This clash between a literal interpretation and a nuanced, structural one lies at the heart of the legal controversy.
4. A Dissolved House: Constitutional Move or a Breach of Precedent?
The second constitutional challenge targets the dissolution of the House of Representatives, an act petitioners claim is both unconstitutionaland a direct repudiation of the Supreme Court’s own landmark rulings. The argument carries significant weight, as:
“The court had reinstated the House of Representatives twice after it was dissolved by the then Oli-led government in 2020 and 2021. It had ruled that the constitution envisions a full five-year term for the lower house.”
Petitioners contend that in endorsing the dissolution, President Paudel violated his primary duty under Article 61: “to abide by and protect the Constitution.”
In response, supporters of the move, including some constitutional experts, frame the dissolution not as a legal breach but as a “political solution to a political problem.” They argue that the extraordinary circumstances, born from a popular uprising against a failing political class, demand a departure from rigid legalism. This perspective is articulated forcefully by senior advocate Dinesh Tripathi:
“In the changed context, decisions should be made accordingly by the court. This is the change brought about by a political movement.”
This viewpoint asks the court to prioritize the perceived spirit of political change over its own carefully constructed precedent, presenting a direct challenge to the court’s role as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional text.
Conclusion: Law, Spirit, and the Path Forward
Nepal now stands at a precipice, forced to reconcile the rigid text of its Constitution with the undeniable force of a popular movement demanding a political reset. The creation of an extra-parliamentary government and the dissolution of the House represent a profound departure from the constitutional order, justified by its architects as a necessary response to an existential crisis of governance.
The Supreme Court’s impending decision will be its most consequential to date. The verdict will not only determine the legality of Karki’s government but, more importantly, will define the very nature of Nepal’s constitutional democracy. At stake is a fundamental question:
Is this a singular, emergency-driven deviation from the rules, or does it set a precedent for a new, extra-constitutional pathway to power that could be abused in the future?
The court’s ruling will determine whether Nepal’s democratic institutions are resilient enough to withstand political storms or fragile enough to break under the weight of popular pressure.
By means of ever more effective methods of mind-manipulation, the democracies will change their nature; the quaint old forms—elections, parliaments, Supreme Courts and all the rest—will remain. The underlying substance will be a new kind of non-violent totalitarianism.
– Aldous Huxley (Brave New World Revisited, 1958)
Democracy in modern times is an illusion. It is a doublespeak for elites who ask for our votes while legitimising their control. We are living in a system that calls us free while we are imprisoned by emotions shaped by algorithms, propaganda, and continuous surveillance.
In this post…
Athenian Democracy
Most historians agree that democracy originated from Athens. The people in Athens, a Greek city-state, developed democracy to conduct public affairs. The concept was simple. The citizens gathered in the Agora for Assembly (Ekklesia) to vote on laws, declare war or peace, decide foreign policy, and oversee public spending. Participation was a civic duty, not a choice.
There were no elections in Athens, though. They believed that elections could be rigged by the wealthy, the eloquent, or the well-connected. Because elections could give rise to oligarchy, they used lottery to select their representatives. Although fateful, they thought the random choice was more democratic as everyone had equal opportunity. They had also invented the kleroterion, an allotment machine to prevent rigging of the lottery.
One of the biggest problems of the Athenian Democracy was that it included citizens only, which included men born in the city. Women, slaves, merchants, and foreigners were excluded from voting. Even the original democracy was not fully democratic.
Aristocracy: Rule by the wise philosopher king who is benevolent and not tyrannical,
Timocracy: Rule by honour-driven soldiers. Ancient Sparta is an example.
Oligarchy: Rule by the wealthy landowners who put money above all increasing the gap between the rich and the poor. A capitalist state gives rise to oligarchy.
Democracy: Rule by the many after revolution against the oligarchs. Democracy can descend into mob rule and then into tyranny.
Tyranny: Rule of the “protector” of the people who crushes his enemies and develops a system to protect himself. By the time people recognize the tyrant, they are already under his control.
Plato believed that not everyone was able to lead and had to eventually give in to the desire of the public. Pacifying the people the sole objective of a democratic ruler and this would eventually lead to anarchy and tyranny.
Representative Democracy and the American Discussion
The Athenian Democracy ensured everyone’s direct participation. However, applying it to a state with large population or geographic barriers is extremely difficult. There is also a possibility of mob rule, as Plato feared, where wrong decisions and actions can also be approved by the crowd. Democracy was not a favoured form of regime.
In most of the places, representatives of an estate, clan or group ruled over the people. These were often unelected. Even when elected, like in the Roman Republic, they used to come from elite families. The Magistratus, the Senate, and the Comitia heavily favoured the oligarchs. Similar arrangements were made in the parliaments of the mediaeval period.
The concept of elected representatives became more popular after the promulgation of the Constitution of the U.S.A. and the success of the French Revolution. They were inspired by the ideas of John Locke, Charles Montesquieu, and the debates of the American Founding Fathers regarding democracy and republic.
John Locke argued for representative institutions that safeguard people’s rights in Two Treatises of Government (1689). Similarly, in The Spirit of the Laws (1748), Montesquieu detailed the idea of separation of powers. James Madison, one of the Founding Fathers of the U.S.A., strongly preferred republic over democracy:
Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention… and have in general been as short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths. — Federalist No. 10 (1787)
Thomas Jefferson favoured broader democratic participation, argued for more trust in the “common man”, and pushed for expanding suffrage, but did not support direct democracy.
The idea of representative democracy was not uncontested, however. Rousseau, for instance, argued that true sovereignty rests with the people directly and that representation is a form of slavery:
“The moment a people gives itself representatives, it is no longer free.” — The Social Contract (1762)
The guthi is not only a land trust but also a self-governing social institution where decisions are taken collectively by lineage members. The leader is called thakali (not to be confused with the ethnic people, Thakalifrom Thak Khola area of Mustang, whose system is described in the next section).
Some of its features are:
Leadership rotation
Collective labour
Social accountability mechanisms
Participation by household, not just by individual “citizens”
Decisions often made through consensus, not simple majority rule
Certain guthi (especially diguthi) allow women significant authority
Guthis also call for collective action. Changes about to be brought by the Guthi bill were opposed in 2019.
A trading-network-based social order where economic cooperation required inclusive decision-making
Ritual and community functions coordinated by collective assemblies
The Panchayat System
King Mahendra introduced the Panchayat System in 1962. He believed partisan democracy did not suit Nepal and introduced a democratic system that valued local governance. A Panchayat at the local level included five representatives who looked after the basic needs and small judicial proceedings among the people. Although it was replaced by multi-party democracy in 1990, the system still influences the villages in Nepal and also shapes the modern local governance at the ward level.
Multi-Party Democracy with Constitutional Monarchy
In 1990, Nepal adopted a new constitution, and with it restored multi-party democracy with the constitutional monarch as the protector. Some communist groups who were unsatisfied, started an armed revolution against the government. Parties, especially Nepali Congress and CPN-UML, busy with their internal politics and unserious about the issue, let the movement grow. They also wanted to use excessive force using the Royal Nepal Army, whose deployment required the King’s permission.
After the Royal Massacre of King Birendra’s family in the Narayanhiti Palace premises, the Maoists declared monarchy was dead. King Gyanendra could not gain support from the people and he had to give up his throne paving way for democratic republican system.
Multi-Party Democratic Republic
Nepal adopted the republican system on the first meeting of the First Constituent Assembly in 2008. The Second Constituent Assembly gave Nepal its current constitution which adopts competitive multi-party democratic republic. However, competition is limited by fragile coalitions, shifting loyalties, and undemocratic practices within the parties.
Democracy in Modern Times
Oligarchic Elections and Tyrannical Tendencies
In modern times, “democracy” and “republic” are often used interchangeably. Whether it is the parliamentary democracy of India, the presidential republic of the USA or the democratic republic of Nepal, people’s participation is ensured through periodic elections. Constitutions, laws, and institutions prevent the tyranny of the majority. Institutions have become more inclusive as voting and candidacy rights prevent discrimination on any grounds.
The problem, however, is that democracies have become mechanical. Elections are announced, political parties or individuals participate, people vote, and the representatives make laws or execute them according to the set principles. The actual voice of people is often lost, as they have little say in the nomination of political parties and candidates and the laws and policies the representatives endorse. This is because modern democracy is actually an oligarchy with popular legitimacy.
In an oligarchy, authority is in the hands of a select few, often distinguished by wealth, family ties, military power, or intellectual influence. Robert Michels’ “iron law of oligarchy” argues that even democratic organisations tend to concentrate power in a few hands due to organisational necessities.
The political parties and their leaders are often like oligarchs. They tend to concentrate power to themselves, depriving the general people from even the basic rights. The collective knowledge on denial of rights, political oppression, and ideological slavery is driving protests all over the world. Bangladesh’s July 2024 Uprising, Nepal’s September 2025 Protests, and uprisings in Indonesia, Philippines, and Madagascar.
There is also the danger of elected tyrants. Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, and Vladimir Putin suppressed opposition and undermined democracy even though they themselves contested elections. These leaders are villains to people who follow democratic ideals. But there is also a curious case of Lee Kwan Yew, the beloved Founding Father of Singapore. He and his PAP did bring up many reforms that upscaled industries in Singapore and improved people’s lives, but he also brutally suppressed the communists.
Mind Manipulation
The villainization of some and heroization of others is the result of interest-based mind manipulation or propaganda through the use of media. Although both Putin and Yew suppressed their rivals, Putin is a villain to the West because he does not accept the Western agenda and aggressively counters them. Yew, on the other hand, is a hero because he acted to safeguard the Western interests. The US intervention in other countries is an act of peace, whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine is imperialism. Change the news sources to Russia or Putin-supporting Russians, Putin is the hero, and the Western leaders are the villains. Truth in global politics is mediated by geopolitical interests, not universal moral standards.
Proliferation of social media has become a fuel for propaganda as explained by P.W. Singer and Emeron T. Brooking in their book, LikeWar. Politics is now a game of algorithm. If you “like”, “follow” or “subscribe” to a certain belief, you get bombarded with content that support it. Opposing political ideas become intolerable. You are fed sponsored political campaigns involving provocative statements from leaders and electoral candidates, endorsements from “influencers” who chase clout, and identity-based mobilization that hate on “others”. With unfiltered opinionated people catering to algorithm-filtered content on social media, populism is on the rise.
Populism and Celebrity Leadership
Representative Democracy inherently is a game of convincing people to elect candidates to an office. The game of throne is that of lies, and the one who can lie the most effectively is the winner. Successful is the one who either belongs to a political party with strong grassroots movements, promises to change the status quo through effective campaigning, or has made a name in the community in the past. No candidate can win elections in vacuum.
Political parties with strong grassroots movements are often the best in practicing democracy. Candidates from such parties are also the favourites. However, there is no denying that political parties and candidates are often used by the rich and the powerful to further the policies they want. The candidates also promise to provide basic infrastructures like roads and drinking water even if may be against the existing laws and policies or undermine sustainability.
Candidates working among the people for some time have a good understanding of the problems. If they already are members of political parties, they have the best chance. If they don’t belong to political parties, they may sweep the election as underdogs. However, they also must cater to people’s desire to solve the existing problems even if the solutions are illogical or problematic.
Effective campaigning, however, trumps everything else. You may belong to a political party or have good relations with the people, if you have no campaigning, you can’t win. Candidates use the rally of supporters, go to each household, meet each voter, and ask for a vote. All these have been eased by social media. And who has the best chance of succeeding in social media? Celebrities!
Ronald Reagan was an actor before he stepped into politics and became the President of the US. Donald Trump too came from entertainment industry. Nepal has also seen TV presenters and singers such as Rabi Lamichhane, Komal Oli, and Balen Shah have turned into leaders. Except Komal Oli, the existing fans of these celebrities have helped push forward their narratives, even when they are apolitical.
When leaders always cater to the emotions of the people, they eliminate opponents and gradually overreach to perpetuate their rule.
Continuation of Institutions
Democratic tyrannical leaders, unlike those like Ibrahim Traoré, need democratic institutions to legitimize their rule. Political scientists Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way describe modern states that maintain elections and courts but undermine real accountability as competitive authoritarian regimes. This is because power is most stable when people believe it is legitimate, and legitimacy is most easily maintained when people feel they are in control and believe they choose their leaders. A system seeking to control citizens without violence must therefore keep the appearance of democracy. They also need the facade for international legitimacy.
The continuation of institutions also comforts the general public. Most people stability and predictability over revolution and chaos. Keeping them provides emotional reassurance, even while policymakers, media, or interest groups subtly control outcomes behind the scenes. Moreover, the “democracy” needs to manufacture consent for self-legitimacy. The reign continues even though there the outcomes are predetermined by algorithmic control, agenda-setting, media manipulation, and financial influence. In fact, the participation itself generates consent.
War Politics
The Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) argues that democracies don’t go to war. The reality is different. Except communist dictatorships like North Korea and absolute monarchists like Saudi Arabia, almost every country claims to be democratic, hold elections, and support peace. Everyone is at war, though. From direct confrontations to proxy wars, the world is reeling with futile wars that only strengthen the elites.
Conclusion
The original Athenian Democracy included the voice of people, but it excluded women, slaves, and merchant. Compared to that, Nepal’s indigenous institutions are more democratic. Modern Democracy is different. It is representative and inclusive, but it is a rhetoric for mass control with manufactured consent. It is a system that depends on lies, propaganda, and emotional manipulation to legitimize itself. As Huxley says, the political institutions and structures remain “democratic. However, they are weak and corrupt and invoke fear and terror instead of respect and peace. Modern Democracy is an illusion that promotes hate over love, and divided identities over unity of humanity.
What’s the solution then? The solution, I think, is to give up the notion that each individual has power over the matters of the country. I don’t. Neither does the elected representative. Everyone in the society should be conscious enough to know that leadership is a heavy burden. From such a society emerge leaders who can balance practicalities with philosophy that best serves humanity. We need a grassroots movement that reinforces morality, truthfulness, and conscience. It will turn hatred into love and replace divisions with unity.
A more practical approach would be to improve civic education, strengthen institutions, and safeguard transparency mechanisms. Political parties should be made more democratic through internal debates and periodic elections of the leaders.
For Nepal, the path forward is not simply imitation of Western models but the creation of a contextual, home-grown, critical democracy that:
connects technological opportunity (digital participation) with local realities;
draws on Nepal’s traditional community governance like the guthi system, inclusive practices among multiple ethnicities and castes;
recognises that participation must include real agency, not just elections; and
safeguards against elite capture, algorithmic manipulation and institutional stagnation.
On October 8, an article on Nepal’s revolution appeared in The New York Times. (Click here if you don’t have access.) Written by Hannah Beech, the article is an ugly mix of journalism and storytelling that leaves huge plot holes in the characters described. (Also, I choose to comment on the report published in a foreign newspaper to show my fellow to be careful of the narratives they are trying to set.) Among the basic questions that journalism should answer, who, what, where, and when appear, but there are huge gaps in why and how. In this essay, I will point out and try to analyse where these questions are missing.
The article presents the story of Tanuja Pandey, Misan Rai, Mahesh Budhathoki, Sudan Gurung, Rakshya Bam and Dipendra Basnet as representatives of the protests. Presentation of these stories, however full of plot holes, inconsistencies, and mystery that journalism fails to cover.
Plot holes, Inconsistencies, and Mysteries
1. Generalization of Gen Z
In the fifth paragraph, Beech writes:
Across the world, Nepal’s youth have been celebrated as spearheads of a Gen Z revolution, the first to so rapidly turn online outrage at “nepo kids,” as privileged children of the elite are called, into an overthrow of the political system. The trajectory of Nepal’s Gen Z — economically frustrated, technologically expert, educationally overqualified — is part of a wellspring of youthful dissent that has flowed in recent years from Indonesia and Bangladesh to the Philippines and Sri Lanka.
Calling Nepal’s Gen Z technologically expert and educationally overqualified is a picture that applies only to the urbanites and the privileged. I too had made this mistake earlier. There are thousands of youths between 13 and 28 in rural areas who are struggling to get even a primary education. And there are more, even among the well-educated, who don’t know how to use a computer and for whom the internet is nothing but Facebook and TikTok.
2. How the new government formed
The article has two paragraphs on how the new government was formed. In the first paragraph, it says that “Gen Z keyboard warriors” supported Sushila Karki as the interim prime minister.
After the government collapsed last month, thousands of Gen Z keyboard warriors supported the appointment of Sushila Karki, a corruption-busting former chief justice, as leader of a caretaker administration, making her Nepal’s first female prime minister. Elections in this Himalayan nation, one of Asia’s poorest, are scheduled for March. The three big political parties, which for years traded power and alliances with an exuberant disregard for ideology, have been cowed for now.
A paragraph that appears later tells that the Chief of Army, General Ashok Raj Sigdel mentioned Sushila Karki’s name as the prime minister even before her name came up on Discord.
At army headquarters, General Sigdel had mentioned Ms. Karki’s name to members of the Gen Z movement before she became an online favorite. It was strange, they said, like he knew what was happening on Discord before it actually happened.
Journalism, however, ends here. There is no exploration of how General Sigdel put the name forward. Questions remain: Did he do it on his own? Was there other external influence?
If General Sigdel said the name himself, we are under a military control. If there was external influence, its even worse.
Moreover, the Discord poll was for selecting a representative to put forth unified demands of various Gen Z groups, not to choose a prime minister (even I had thought so before I looked back).
3. Unnecessary storytelling over journalism
The characters mentioned above appear dispersed throughout the article. The fact that they are flawed makes them human. However, the storytelling choice makes them unserious and cringey. Although I have been criticising the “Gen Z leaders”, I felt sympathetic towards them for being featured in a “story” of sensational journalism.
Insensitive Portrayal of Misan Rai
Misan Rai, a 18-year old protester had gone to the protest for the first time on Bhadra 23 (September 8). Her story, although truthful, makes her look insensitive and comical.
Tear gas exploded around her. Her friend’s mother ordered them to withdraw. The trio escaped down an alley, trailed by clouds of tear gas. The sounds of gunfire came soon after, but it was hard to tell the rev of a motorcycle from the volleys of bullets. Ms. Rai hadn’t eaten all day, apart from a couple of wafers gulped down before her exam. In the alley was a grapefruit tree, and she plucked the bittersweet fruit.
“I feel terrible I was eating when people were dying,” she said.
Inconsistency in Rakshya Bam’s Story
Rakshya Bam has been confidently telling that “saving the constitution” and going to elections in Falgun (March) is the best option and confidently puts it forward in her interviews with Rupesh Shrestha and Himalkhabar. The New York Times has shown a different side.
“We are all wondering, what to do if everything goes back to the same way, even after we lost our blood and fallen comrades?” said Rakshya Bam, 26, a protest organizer, who missed a bullet by a fateful flick of her head. “What if all this was a waste?”
The story of her missing a bullet appears later in the story again.
Ms. Bam, a protest organizer, felt a bullet rush past her head, the warmth imprinted even now in her mind, like a shadow that cannot be outrun.
Her interviews have never talked about the incident. She mentions making a human chain and witnessing a injured person, but she has never said about a bullet missing her. It’s an extremely significant event to miss. Also, eyewitness accounts have told that she and her team never went beyond the Everest Hotel. What’s the truth then?
Mysteries around Mahesh Budhathoki
The story of Mahesh Budhathoki is full of mysterious, sensational events. On September 8, he is said to have ridden among a fleet of motorcycles, whose riders wore black:
By late morning, men on motorcycles arrived, two or even three on each bike. Many wore black. Some waved the Nepali flag with its two red-and-white triangles. Some were Gen Z, but others were not. Ms. Pandey and some other organizers didn’t like the intrusion. They had released an earnest set of protest prohibitions, including no flags or party symbols. They didn’t want old politics to infiltrate a nonpartisan movement.
Mahesh Budhathoki, 22, rode among a fleet of motorcycles, the bikes revving with sharp salvos of noise. These bikes, as well as the entrance of other men — older, tougher, tattooed — changed the protest’s atmosphere, attendees said. The crowd got angrier, the slogans more extreme.
The protesters rushed the gates of Parliament. Men materialized with pickaxes. They attacked a fence. Ms. Rai watched the “goondas,” as she called them, “like bad guys in Bollywood” films. She wrapped her arms around a fence pillar to defend it from the destruction.
Again, storytelling tops journalism here. There is no objective investigation on those bikers and men with pickaxes. Only after a hint was left by Diwakar Sah in his video on October 11, the identity of those bikers became more well-known (See this TikTok video). Were they involved in violence? They have denied it on their Facebook page. There are other videos like this where the biker gang is aggressive, though. I think it’s a matter of deeper investigation.
Beech’s description of the events on September 9 gets even more mysterious with the mention of unfamiliar men handing Molotov’s cocktail.
In another part of town, Mr. [Mahesh] Budhathoki and his friends awaited instructions. Unfamiliar men handed them bottles filled with fuel, cloth stuffed in the top. The mob attacked a police station, anger swelling at the force blamed for killing the protesters the day before. From inside the station, a police officer grabbed a rifle and opened fire.
His death is shocking.
Mr. Budhathoki was a soccer fan who had been set to move to Romania for work before he joined the protest. His mother had been diagnosed with cancer, and the family needed money. A bullet hit him in the throat. He died slung over a scooter on the way to the hospital.
A more shocking event happens afterwards when his friends lose their mind and kill three policemen.
One of Mr. Budhathoki’s friends said he felt like the tendon girding his sanity had snapped. The crowd hurled the Molotov cocktails at the police station. They stalked the officers inside. One terrified policeman stripped off his uniform and tried to flee. The mob found his clothes and discarded pistol, then beat the man in his underpants until he stopped moving, two participants said. Video footage verified by The New York Times shows a crowd surrounding the motionless body. Another policeman ran into a neighboring building, climbing high. The crowd chased him and pushed him off a balcony, the friends said.
A traffic policeman, who happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time, did not escape the mob either. The police said three officers died near the police station.
“We were all killers,” said a 19-year-old protester named Habib.
He said he was proud of having avenged his friend’s death. In his hands, he held the casing of the bullet that he said killed Mr. Budhathoki. He found it on the ground, still hot. Days later, the shell smelled of smoke. He tightened his fist around it.
“We are Gen Z, but we’re just doing the dirty work of the old men,” he said.
Habib’s statements: “We were all killers” and “We’re just doing the dirty work of the old men” chilled me when I read them. When I went back at them, I realized that they are also overgeneralizations, for there were also people who were urging protesters to keep calm and avoid being like the old men.
Questions still remain: Who gave them Molotovs? Did the policemen who were killed by the mob shoot bullets? What will happen to Habib and the mob in the future?
The biggest irony is that Mahesh Budhathoki has been declared a martyr alongside the three policemen.*
Another inconsistent story of Sudan Gurung
Sudan Gurung, a volunteer of Hami Nepal has established a communication channel, Youth Against Corruption on Discord. This is where polls mentioned above occurred, and Sushila Karki was the clear winner. The following story is thus inconsistent with what is known to the public.
Mr. [Sudan] Gurung said that the people wanted to nominate him as prime minister. But he demurred, he said. He wanted Ms. Karki. Mr. Gurung waited for eight or nine hours in the palace for Mr. Paudel to approve her name. Mr. Gurung wore slippers and occasionally padded around barefoot.
“I didn’t care,” Mr. Gurung said. “We just toppled the government. It’s our palace now.”
When his story comes up again, he is said to have “floated vying for prime minister himself.”
Two days later, Mr. Gurung organized a late-night protest. His target: Ms. Karki, who had not consulted with him when she named three new cabinet members, he said. He demanded her resignation. He later floated vying for prime minister himself.
While I remember him and a group consisting of family of martyrs protesting the newly appointed prime minister, I don’t remember him talking about the post for himself. He did so with an Aljazeera interview though.
The Weirdest Story of Tanuja Pandey
Hannah Beech introduces Tanuja Pandey as “a Himalayan Greta Thunberg”.
Ms. [Tanuja] Pandey, a lawyer, had started off protesting as a high school student, like a Himalayan Greta Thunberg, campaigning to save Nepal’s environment. She was used to small, peaceful acts of dissent, usually with more police officers than protesters.
The problem with this description is that Greta has been controversial because of her privileged upbringing and advocacy of issues that are against Conservatives. Moreover, Nepal’s low contribution to carbon emission compared to the developed nations makes us victims. Was she involved in demanding climate justice with them? I doubt. Had she been doing so, she would have made news, at least in Nepal.
The story then pictures the protest from Tanuja’s eyes:
This march, though, felt different, she said. The online call by Ms. Pandey’s group of activists and lawyers urging fellow Gen Z-ers to rally against corruption and the social media ban had spread fast. Hami Nepal, a civic organization that helped with earthquake and flood relief, added its influential voice. Other youth groups popped up online calling for protesters to join, including one that had rebranded itself from a Hindu nationalist “God of Army” to a clique that supported Nepal’s deposed monarch to — on the day of the protest — Gen Z Nepal (similar to the moniker of the original protesters).
Hearing that students had been shot made Ms. Pandey feel ill. She couldn’t understand why so many older people had joined, kicking up trouble, revving their motorcycles, throwing stones. She was mystified by the lack of police until, suddenly, they were firing tear gas and then bullets.
However, Hannah leaves out the questions her journalism should have answered: Why was the number of police reduced? Did the pro-monarchs/pro-Hindus do anything wrong during the protest? Why did Hami Nepal become influential?
This paragraph again brings up conflicting scenario without explaining why and what happened next.
By the time the security forces had shot and killed 19 people and injured dozens more, Ms. Pandey had left the protest. Things had moved so quickly and gotten so violent that her group issued an online call urging everyone to leave. But forces that said they were associated with Mr. Gurung’s group, Hami Nepal, issued a counter order, urging people to return.
Tanuja is still shocked that the revolution has taken place:
“We wanted reform, not a revolution,” said Tanuja Pandey, 25, who helped first publicize the protest on her Gen Z group’s social media.
“I don’t know what happened, but the whole thing was hijacked,” she said.
If she claims she is a “leader” of the protests, she can’t just say “the whole thing was hijacked.” She is not a common person now. She should at least try to expose who hijacked the protest.
The NYT’s journalism also does not help. It does not explore the hijackers or if Tanuja’s statement was legitimate or not.
Moreover, the last scene of the article is out of place and cringeworthy:
A week after the protests began, Ms. Pandey celebrated her 25th birthday in Kathmandu. She was still keeping a low profile, fearing arrest or worse.
A hard rain obscured the gaggle of Gen Z protesters splashing across the paving stones to a small restaurant run by sympathizers. Lawyers and environmental activists, influencers and cultural preservationists, Ms. Pandey’s friends toasted with brass cups of milky rice wine. They feasted on deep-fried intestines stuffed with lard and dipped in fermented chile. They sang songs from the Beatles, Bob Dylan and Bollywood.
“To an accidental revolution,” they toasted.
Ms. Pandey looked serious.
“What happens now,” she asked. “Will Nepal change?”
Her friends turned quiet. They swallowed more wine. The rain beat down, fierce and warm.
Final Opinion
The New York Times article on Nepal’s revolution is rich in storytelling but poor in journalism. It does not answer even the basic of questions in many cases. Moreover, there are discrepancies in the description of events and characters.
I think the most devastating is generalization of Nepal’s Gen Zs as nonchalant and politically unaware. Misan Rai eating grapefruit amidst the protest and Tanuja Pandey gulping down wine on her birthday party despite an uncertain political future portray Nepalese Gen Z activists as carefree youths involved in something they can’t barely understand. Also, some of the scenes show how Nepalese youths crave for power and have a violent tendency.
The article, as a whole, fails to raise hope about the “revolution”. But that’s how I have felt since the evening of September 9. So, if it did not bring hope, can we still call it a revolution?
Constitution Study #13: A discussion of Article 30, the Right to Clean Environment, its implications and challenges in Nepal
We can’t live healthily without clean environment. The Constitution of Nepal recognises this necessity and guarantees the Right to Clean Environment as a fundamental right. However, as with the fundamental rights discussed in this Constitution Study series, attaining clean environment is an uphill task.
In this post, we discuss…
Right to Clean Environment in the Constitution
Article 30 of the Constitution states:
(1) Every citizen shall have the right to live in a clean and healthy environment.
(2) The victim shall have the right to obtain compensation, in accordance with law, for any damage caused by environmental pollution or degradation.
(3) This Article shall not be deemed to prevent the making of necessary legal provisions for a proper balance between environment and development in development works of the nation.
Difficulties in Implementation
Although the Constitution guarantees a clean environment for everyone, and the victims have the right to compensation for damage, environmental degradation is a huge problem, especially in the urban areas. Dusty congested roads, unmanageable traffic, and non-existent sewage management have been chronic problems, even in the capital city, Kathmandu.
Lack of proper urban planning and implementation of existing plans have made cities hazardous to live. Pollution-induced diseases are on the rise. For instance, 75 percent of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease cases, 46 percent of strokes, 44 percent of ischemic heart disease, 41 percent of lower respiratory infections, 38 percent of lung cancer, 30 percent of neonatal issues like low birth weight and preterm birth, and 20 percent of diabetes (Source: World Bank Report on Clean Air in Nepal).
Moreover, smog from forest and field fires disturbs the normal functioning of people all over Nepal. Since the smog originates not only in Nepal but also in India, transborder pollution has been a major environmental issue of late.
Also, an increase in natural disasters has led to the destruction of the habitable environment in many parts of Nepal.
Plans for better environment
1. SDGs
The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), adopted in 2015, integrate environmental sustainability as a central pillar of development. Several goals explicitly relate to achieving the right to clean environment:
SDG 6 (Clean Water and Sanitation): Ensure availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation for all, including reducing pollution, eliminating dumping, and minimising release of hazardous chemicals.
SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy): Promote renewable energy and energy efficiency, reducing environmental impacts of energy generation.
SDG 11 (Sustainable Cities and Communities): Reduce adverse environmental impacts of cities, including air quality and waste management.
SDG 12 (Responsible Consumption and Production): Ensure sustainable use of natural resources and reduce waste generation.
SDG 13 (Climate Action): Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts.
SDG 14 & 15 (Life Below Water & Life on Land): Reduce water and terrestrial pollution, halt biodiversity loss, and restore degraded ecosystems.
2. Sixteenth Plan
The Sixteenth Plan (2024/25–2028/29) focuses on different environmental issues, including:
Environmental Dimension
Key Actions in the 16th Plan
Climate Change & Mitigation
Implementation of emission-reduction strategies, renewable energy, and energy-efficient policies
Green Economy & Biodiversity
Minimizing development impacts; promoting clean infrastructure; natural resource conservation
Financing & Coordination
Accessing international climate finance; engaging stakeholders; multi-agency collaboration
SDGs & LDC Graduation Strategy
Embedding climate risk management within broader development and transition frameworks
3. Laws and Policies
Nepal has adopted laws and policies to meet SDGs as well as the right to clean environment. Some of them are:
Environment Protection Act 2019 and related regulations provide a legal framework for pollution control, EIA/IEE requirements, and environmental accountability.
Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs): Under the Paris Agreement, Nepal has committed to reaching net-zero emissions by 2045.
Nepal has established 20 protected areas (national parks, wildlife reserves, conservation areas) covering over 23% of its territory—well above the global target of 17%.
Conclusion
Despite having the Right to Clean Environment is a constitutional mandate, Nepal has not been able to implement it properly due to political constraints, lack of coordination between the three federal units, lack of awareness among people, and transboundary pollution. It is of utmost importance to align policies towards clean environment and sustainable development, improve coordination between the federal levels, and address transboundary pollution through diplomatic approaches.
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