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Category: International Relations & Diplomacy

Smash & Grab: Annexation of Sikkim—A Review

How does a country merge with another? Does a referendum held within 72 hours have legal validity? How do foreigners play in domestic issues? Indian journalist and editor Sunanda K. Dutta-Ray, who was close to the Chogyal of Sikkim (Sukhim/Denzong), explores these issues in detail in Smash & Grab: Annexation of Sikkim.

Book Cover of Smash & Grab: Annexation of Sikkim by Sunanda K. Datta-Ray

A Brief History of Sikkim

Independent Existence and British Shadows

Sikkim had an independent existence even before the Treaty of Sugauli between Nepal and the British East India Company in 1815. In 1642, Phuntsog Namgyal had become the first Chogyal of Sikkim. The term Chogyal is derived from Tibetan, which means ‘the gyalpo (king) who defends the chho (Dharma). After the Treaty of Tumlong in 1861, Sikkim, which was a British protectorate, became a protectorate of India when India became independent.

Plights as the Protectorate of India

Ever since India became independent from the British, the feeling that a republic should not have a monarchical protectorate had developed in the Indian administration. Nehru did not consider it a big deal. But in 1951, China established complete control over Tibet. After the Tibetan uprising in 1959 and the war with China in 1962, India became suspicious. Due to the religious-cultural ties between Lhasa and Gangtok, fearing that China might also take over Sikkim, India came to the side of annexing Sikkim.

However, since it had a democratic image and had helped Bangladesh gain independence, it was not possible for India to launch a direct military attack. Similarly, India controlled the communications, foreign affairs, and resources necessary for the development of Sikkim. The British colonial period also continued to interfere internally through political officials and chief executives.

Shifting Demographics, Politics, and Indian Interests

After the British protection, Nepali-speaking traders entered Sikkim, which was created by the Bhutia-Lepchas, in large numbers. By the 1970s, the Bhutia-Lepchas were only 25 per cent, i.e., a minority in their own country. However, since the power was with them, the majority Nepali-speaking people were afraid that something would happen. There were Kazis of all castes, but their power was waning as the Chhogyals had limited authority. During the power struggle, they began to seek democratic rights.

Lendup Dorji was one such Kazi. He did not have a good relationship with the Chogyal Palden Thondup Namgyal, who was based in Kalingpong. The rift between them widened after the Chogyal married Hope Cook and the Kazi married Elisa Marie. The Chogyal, who was trying to make Sikkim independent, lost popularity due to the Indians and their propaganda. A dictatorial rakshyah became his public image. On the other hand, leaders like the Kazi, Nar Bahadur Khatiwada, and Ramchandra Paudyal, who were trying to establish democracy, became widely praised.

With the involvement of Indian political officials, diplomats, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the intelligence agency RAW, the Chogyal was constantly weakened, and after the 1973 movement, the Kazi was gradually made powerful. Ashok Raina’s ‘Inside RAW’ says that this movement was run by RAW. However, the real power lies with the Indian Chief Executive. B.S. Das starts working above Chogyal. After him, B.B. Lal becomes the Speaker of the Legislative Assembly and even assumes the powers of the Chief Justice.

The Referendum for Annexation of Sikkim

On April 14, 1975, he proposes the merger of Sikkim with India after the referendum. But Dutta-Ray makes a big question mark about the plebiscite being announced on the 10th, the voting on the 14th, and the results coming out overnight from remote places. Most people did not understand what the voting was for. Most of them thought it had been done to remove Chogyal as the head of the nation. Even journalists were not given proper access during the polls. Nar Bahadur Khatiwada later sent a memorandum to Morarji Desai, the Prime Minister after Indira Gandhi, saying that they were deceived. Former Prime Minister of Nepal Bishweshwor Prasad Koirala said that there was no referendum in Sikkim.

My Feelings on the book Smash & Grab: Annexation of Sikkim

Reading about how the simple-minded Chogyal and leaders of Sikkim were manipulated by clever Indians, I felt love for Sikkim and anger towards Indians. The Chogyal also seems to be at fault for not understanding the geopolitical pressures. Moreover, he could not reconcile with Lhendup Dorji on common national interests. Dorji, too, was so blinded by the prospect of gaining power over the Chogyal that he did not understand that he was only a pawn in the grand chessboard of geopolitics.

Datta-Ray weaves movie-like stories of characters, some of which are extremely moving, especially at the beginning. The ending, however, is abrupt. Since the book was first published in 1984, nine years after the annexation, the aftermath of the annexation could have been included, but it is not there. Moreover, the book has a high level of vocabulary, which slowed my reading.

One problem I have realised in reading the history of Sikkim is that there are several points of view. Smash & Grab: Annexation of Sikkim is biased towards Chogyal in the book. Angles from the “revolutionaries” in Sikkim, Indian bureaucrats, diplomats, and RAW agents portray different pictures. I will be back with those perspectives as soon as possible.

Extremism and Communal violence in Bangladesh; Extremism in Nepal

Dangers of Extremism: A Warning for Nepal from Bangladesh’s Communal Violence

The last eighteen months have witnessed a seismic shift in the political landscape of South Asia, as powerful, youth-led revolutions in Bangladesh (June-August, 2024) and Nepal (September, 2025) overthrew respective governments. Born from shared frustrations with corruption and economic despair, these movements represent a generational demand for a new social contract. However, the initial euphoria of political change can obscure profound dangers. This analysis argues that the the post-revolutionary collapse witnessed in Bangladesh, which allowed growth of extremism and communal violence, is a cautionary tale for Nepal. Because institutional fragility and digital manipulation are vital features of both movements, the lessons from Dhaka must be urgently heeded in Kathmandu.

1. A Tale of Two Revolutions: The Shared DNA of Discontent

To understand the divergent paths of Nepal and Bangladesh, it is strategically vital to first recognize the parallel triggers that led to their respective uprisings. Though ignited by different sparks, a government job quota in Bangladesh and a social media ban in Nepal, the underlying grievances were nearly identical. In both nations, a combustible mix of economic stagnation, systemic corruption, and deep-seated frustration with an aging, self-serving political class created fertile ground for mass mobilization. This shared DNA of discontent explains not just why the revolutions happened, but why Nepal must now study the tragic turn its neighbor’s revolution took.

1.1. Bangladesh’s “July Revolution” (2024)

The movement that would become Bangladesh’s “July Revolution” began with a seemingly specific grievance. In June 2024, the Supreme Court reinstated a 30% quota in government jobs for the descendants of freedom fighters, a move students saw as a direct threat to merit-based opportunity. This student-led protest rapidly grew into a nationwide mass uprising as it tapped into a deep well of public dissatisfaction with Sheikh Hasina’s authoritarian government, rampant corruption, and a prolonged economic downturn.

The government’s brutal response served only to escalate the conflict. A fact-finding report by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) later confirmed a “systematic and widespread use of unlawful force.” Crucially, this was not just the work of state security forces. The government deployed its own political cadres. The Chhatra League (the ruling Awami League’s student wing) acted in concert with police, attacking protestors with “blunt weapons, machetes and firearms.” This violent crackdown, which resulted in as many as 1,400 protest-related deaths and thousands of injuries, transformed a student movement into a revolution that brought the government down.

1.2. Nepal’s “Gen-Z Uprising” (2025)

In Nepal, the catalyst was the government’s fateful decision to ban 26 social media platforms. The official justification was a regulatory dispute; major platforms like Meta had failed to comply with national registration laws, while others like TikTok had. For a generation whose social, economic, and emotional lives are built on digital platforms, this was not a mere regulatory issue but a profound assault on their livelihood and freedom. The ban, however, was only the spark that lit a long-smoldering fire.

The deeper causes of Nepal’s “Gen-Z Uprising” mirrored those in Bangladesh. Youth unemployment had reached a critical level of over 20%, forcing over 2,000 young Nepalis to leave the country every day for job opportunitiies. The nation’s political system was dominated by a trio of aging leaders, K.P. Sharma Oli, Sher Bahadur Deuba, and Pushpa Kamal Dahal, engaged in a musical chair of corruption and stagnation. Public anger reached a boiling point with the viral “#NepoKids” trend, which contrasted the lavish lifestyles of the political elite’s children with the daily struggles of ordinary citizens. The speed at which the Oli government subsequently disintegrated was astonishing, exposing a hollowed-out state revealing that its authority was merely a facade.

While both revolutions were born from a shared wellspring of democratic hope, the immediate aftermaths revealed a terrifying divergence, with Bangladesh descending into a sectarian violence that Nepal must now studiously avoid.

2. The Aftermath in Bangladesh: When Political Upheaval Uncorks Communal Hatred

The power vacuum that immediately follows a successful revolution is a period of extreme vulnerability. State institutions are weak, the rule of law is tenuous, and the raw anger that fueled the uprising can be easily manipulated. In Bangladesh, this vulnerability was ruthlessly exploited by extremist elements who redirected legitimate political anger toward sectarian violence. The movement’s initial focus on democratic reform was hijacked, and the nation’s Hindu minority became the new target.

2.1. A Minority Under Siege

In the weeks following Sheikh Hasina’s ouster, a wave of violent attacks was unleashed against Bangladesh’s Hindu community. The motives were a toxic blend of political retribution, rising anti-India sentiment, and pre-existing local tensions over land and blasphemy allegations. Hindus were widely perceived as allies of the ousted Prime Minister, making them convenient scapegoats.

The experience of Chakravarty, a pharmacist, provides a harrowing account. He recalls hearing a mob chanting slogans before they attacked his shop. “I quickly put the shutter down,” he said, “I was trapped inside for about two and a half hours.” Later that night, Chakravarty returned home to find his house completely destroyed. The attack, however, was more than just physical destruction; it was the tearing of a social fabric. Chakravarty emphasized that such violence was “unprecedented” in his region. “People here work together – even celebrate together in religious festivals,” he noted. “This has never happened before.”

This was not an isolated incident. The sharp increase in religious radicalism was tragically exemplified by the lynching of Dipu Chandra Das this week. These targeted assaults underscore a grim reality: when state authority collapses, minority communities are often the first to suffer.

2.2. The Mutation of a Movement: From Political Protest to Mob Rule

The attacks on the Hindu community represented a dangerous perversion of the “July Revolution’s” original goals. An uprising that began as a pro-democracy movement devolved into targeted communal violence where, as a PGurus report noted, “mob rule and religious extremism are increasingly replacing the rule of law.”

This devolution from protest to persecution was systematic. The OHCHR report confirmed attacks on religious minorities, and data from Bangladesh’s National Security Intelligence (NSI) agency detailed 37 distinct violent attacks targeting these communities between August 5 and 15 alone. A movement born from a demand for accountability from an abusive state, which deployed its own party cadres as street muscle, devolved into a new form of mob rule.

The tragic events in Bangladesh serve as a stark and unequivocal warning for Nepal’s own precarious post-revolutionary path.

3. A Clarion Call for Nepal: Navigating the Post-Revolution Minefield

This analysis now turns to its core argument. While Nepal’s “Gen-Z Uprising” was not rooted in religious conflict, the country now exhibits many of the same vulnerabilities that allowed extremism to flourish in Bangladesh. The current political instability, the profound erosion of state authority with constant threats from the ousted Prime Minister, and the very digital tools that powered the revolution create a minefield of latent dangers. These vulnerabilities could be exploited by extremist elements, whether domestic or foreign, to inflame ethnic or religious divisions and derail the nation’s democratic aspirations.

3.1. Identifying Latent Dangers

Nepal’s primary risk factors form a triad of institutional weakness and digital volatility that demands immediate attention.

  • A Brittle Power Vacuum: The sudden collapse of the Oli government and the installation of a fragile interim administration under former Chief Justice Sushila Karki have created a period of profound political uncertainty. This leadership vacuum, while born of a popular mandate, leaves the nation without the established structures needed to enforce order and mediate conflict.
  • Erosion of State Institutions: The astonishingly rapid disintegration of the police and government apparatus during the protests revealed a critical lack of institutional resilience. The police effectively vanished from the streets, demonstrating that the state’s authority was a facade. This makes the country dangerously susceptible to organized mobs, as there is no credible force to maintain law and order.
  • The Disinformation Accelerant: A forensic analysis by the threat intelligence firm Cyabra revealed that a coordinated network of inauthentic social media profiles acted as a “violence accelerator.” This network, comprising up to 34% of the conversation on X (formerly Twitter), systematically amplified the most aggressive narratives. This is evidence of hybrid warfare tactics being deployed against a domestic population, where digital manipulation serves as a force multiplier for street-level violence.

3.2. Avoiding the Bangladesh Playbook

The most critical lesson from Bangladesh is how political grievances and geopolitical tensions were weaponized against a local minority population. Rising anti-India sentiment was skillfully channeled into attacks on Bangladeshi Hindus. Nepal is vulnerable to similar manipulations.

Given Nepal’s strategic position as a buffer state between India and China, it is already a theater of geopolitical competition. In Bangladesh, anti-India sentiment was the narrative used to target Hindus. In Nepal, with its complex ethnic and regional dynamics, this same digital playbook could be deployed with devastating speed to turn geopolitical tensions into targeted ethnic or regional violence.

Nepal’s new leadership faces a dual challenge: it must simultaneously focus on rebuilding state institutions while building immediate societal resilience against the threat of extremism.

4. Conclusion: Securing a Fragile Peace

The youth revolutions in Nepal and Bangladesh were born from legitimate democratic aspirations. Yet, the tragic aftermath in Bangladesh reveals the grave danger that awaits when a power vacuum is filled not by democratic institution-building, but by extremism and mob violence. The specific mechanisms seen in Dhaka, where a government blurred the lines between state and party violence, and where geopolitical narratives were weaponized to incite sectarian hatred, now represent a clear and present danger for Kathmandu.

The analysis presented here distills into a final, powerful takeaway for Nepal’s new leaders and its vibrant civil society. The urgent priority must be to secure the fragile peace by fostering national unity, methodically rebuilding the rule of law, and aggressively combating the sophisticated digital manipulation that threatens to tear the social fabric apart. Nepal’s hard-won political revolution must not be allowed to curdle into sectarian conflict. The profound responsibility now falls to Nepal’s youth to learn from the tragic lessons of its neighbor and dedicate itself to building a truly inclusive, stable, and resilient democracy.

Globalization and Diplomacy: Navigating New Complexities

Diplomacy is the method of representation, communication, and negotiations between states as well as non-state actors. The diplomatic practices are formalised in the 1961 Vienna Convention. Diplomacy originates in the ancient civilisation itself and still shapes the politics and relationships between states. However, the prominence of non-state actors, globalisation, and evolving technology has challenged traditional diplomacy.

Historical Development of Diplomacy

Diplomacy is as old as civilisation itself. The oldest records of diplomatic activities are described in the Tablets of Ebla from 2500 BCE (present Syria). These tablets depict, in detail, the negotiations between ancient states, diplomatic exchanges, and peace negotiations. The Egyptian and Mesopotamian hieroglyphs also shed light on their diplomatic practices, where trade was crucial in maintaining peace.

Diplomacy was an art practised in ancient India from the Vedic times (18th century BCE). Kautilya (3rd century BCE) described diplomacy as an extension of warfare and emphasised that the Empire should act in its self-interest. Emperor Ashoka, on the other hand, used peaceful means based on Dharma.

The Ancient Greeks practised diplomacy through public negotiations and agreements, but this meant transparency, secrecy, and intelligence gathering were impossible to maintain.
Modern international relations and diplomacy have been influenced by the Roman Empire. The Empire applied secrecy, diplomatic exchanges, and intelligence gathering to maintain its longevity. The Roman Empire also introduced the concepts of jus gentium (law of the people) and jus naturale (natural laws), which became influential in international laws.

The most critical contribution to modern diplomacy, however, was made by the Peace of Westphalia (1648). It ended the Thirty Years’ War in Europe and gave birth to independent and sovereign nation-states. The concept of sovereign nation-states is still the most prominent in modern times. However, the status quo of state sovereignty is being challenged by the presence of many non-state actors, the rise of globalisation, and the prominence of digital technology.

Changes in Diplomacy in the Modern Times

The establishment of the United Nations in 1945 increased the dependency of states on each other, and prominence in communication has changed traditional diplomacy. It now not only includes traditional statecraft but also soft power to influence other states.
Soft power, which is a means to attract others without using coercion or payment (Joseph Nye, 1990), is increasingly influential in shaping modern-day negotiations between states. Whereas the use of force and military threats was thought of as a productive means for conflict resolution in the past, cultural exchanges, public interactions, and digital communications have become essential parts of maintaining peace.
The advent of technology has also changed the way the states communicate. In recent times, information exchange has become extremely rapid, and diplomats have to make quick decisions. This has added to the complexity of already tangled international relations. The rise of non-state actors, too, has complicated the diplomatic practices. They now influence state decisions, policy formulation, and actions towards achieving a common goal.

The changes in diplomacy have also added challenges. Rapid dissemination of information allows diplomats to have very little time to make decisions. This can affect the process of negotiation and conflict resolution. Non-state actors such as international organisations often bring ideas that work only with cooperation between states. Terrorist groups, on the other hand, can bring states together or divide them further. Refusing the demands of non-state actors can sometimes create conflicts among nations. Globalisation has also brought challenges as people migrate from one country to another, exchanging ideas and cultures. States are not isolated but dependent. This web of dependency is also a cause of conflict between them.

Conclusion

Diplomacy has evolved from its traditional form and adapted to the newer concepts of soft power, globalisation, and digital diplomacy. The increased interdependence of states, the prominent role of non-state actors, and the advent of digital communication have transformed diplomacy. They have provided opportunities for states to influence other states without using force or coercion. There are also several challenges, such as maintaining a balance between different actors, adapting to rapid development in technology, and exchanging people and ideas. However, diplomacy will shape itself to the needs of states and keep having an influential role in their relationships even in the future.

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