Before we begin this article, let’s watch the video below.
The video shows Kim Jong Un being elected as the leader of his Workers’ Party with 100% approval. It’s legitimate voting according to Kim and his sycophants. But we know it’s not democratic. We know what happens to the North Koreans who defy Kim.
On the opposite spectrum is Switzerland, where voter turnout is less than 50%. The low turnout is because of the frequency and complexity of elections. They vote for popular initiatives – petitions filed by the public; for referendums for changing the constitution and laws; and for the election of representatives at different levels.
We also have countries Uruguay and Belgium with voter turnout of over 85% and that are highly democratic.
But then there are countries like Tunisia and Haiti, whose voter turnout in the last elections (2023 and 2015, respectively) sits at 11.4% and 17.8%. These countries have been classified as having poor democratic representation.
These examples paint a complex picture. Countries with both high and low voter turnout are authoritarian. Similarly, democratic countries also have both high and low voter turnouts.
In this article, we explore one aspect: how authoritarian regimes use elections for their legitimacy and why voting alone is not democracy.
In this post, we discuss…
“Performing” Democracy
Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the competition and cooperation of their
elected representatives.
A democracy, according to Robert Dahl, Philppe C. Schmitter, and Terry Lynn Karl, should have the following nine procedures:
- Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected officials.
- Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon.
- Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.
- Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government.
- Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined.
- Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law.
- Citizens have the right to form associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups.
- Popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutional powers without being subjected to overriding (albeit informal) opposition from unelected officials.
- The polity must be self-governing; it must be able to act independently of constraints imposed by some other overarching political system.
Most people, however, believe that democracy refers to having regular fair elections. This fallacy, known as “procedural fallacy” or “electoralism”, rests on the erroneous faith that the mere act of holding elections will channel political conflict into peaceful contestation and confer legitimacy upon the victors, regardless of the structural conditions under which those elections occur.
Contemporary autocrats have mastered the art of “performing” democracy. They do not abolish institutions; they hollow them out. They do not ban opposition; they render it impotent. They do not cancel elections; they engineer them. They have turned democracy into illusion.
Elections, therefore, do not always equate to democracy.
Competitive Authoritarianism and Rigged Voting
Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way introduced the concept of “Competitive Authoritarianism” to describe regimes that possess the formal architecture of democracy—legislatures, judiciaries, and multiple parties—but where the playing field is so heavily skewed it cannot be considered democratic.
The incumbent often has an advantage over others in competitive authoritarianism because of the following three generations of rigging.
First-Generation (Crude Rigging)
Prevalent during the Cold War and early transition periods, this kind of involves physical ballot stuffing, violent voter suppression, and the overt falsification of tally sheets. This method is high-visibility and high-risk.
The regime of Ferdinand Marcos (1965–1986) in the Philippines provides a quintessential example of Cold War proceduralism. After declaring martial law in 1972 to “save the republic” from communist insurgency, Marcos did not abolish the constitution; he replaced it with the 1973 Constitution, creating a parliamentary framework that concentrated power in his hands.
The 1978 elections for the Batasang Pambansa (Interim National Assembly) were a masterclass in performative democracy. Marcos allowed the opposition coalition, Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN), led by the imprisoned Benigno Aquino Jr., to run in Metro Manila. However, the regime denied LABAN access to media, banned public rallies, and engaged in massive vote-buying. On election day, the result was a clean sweep for Marcos’s Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) party (21-0 in Manila). The fraud was so blatant that it triggered a “Noise Barrage” protest, yet the U.S. State Department, prioritizing the security of Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base, accepted the “official” results as a step toward “normalization”.
Marcos repeated this in the 1981 presidential election, which he “won” with 88% of the vote against a token opponent, Alejo Santos, after the legitimate opposition boycotted. Vice President George H.W. Bush’s famous toast to Marcos—“We love your adherence to democratic principles and to the democratic processes”—encapsulated the era’s procedural fallacy: the existence of the process was sufficient for validation, regardless of the principle. It was only when the “Snap Election” of 1986 exposed the regime’s crumbling control and the military defected that the U.S. withdrew support, proving that validation was contingent on the autocrat’s ability to maintain stability, not democracy.
Second-Generation (Institutional Bias)
The second-generation rigging, prevalent in the 1990s and 2000s, includes gerrymandering, the packing of electoral commissions with partisans, and the misuse of state media.
The end of the Cold War fundamentally altered the incentives for autocrats. Overt dictatorships lost international funding and legitimacy. To survive, autocrats had to adopt the full architecture of democracy. This era gave birth to Competitive Authoritarianism, where the struggle was between Western conditionality (linkage and leverage) and the incumbent’s ability to manipulate the level playing field.
Alberto Fujimori’s regime in Peru (1990–2000) serves as a critical case study of how an elected leader can use democratic mandates to destroy democracy. Faced with a hostile Congress and the Shining Path insurgency, Fujimori executed an autogolpe (self-coup) in April 1992, dissolving the legislature and judiciary with military backing.
What followed was a sophisticated use of the procedural fallacy to regain international standing. Under intense pressure from the Organization of American States (OAS), Fujimori did not embrace permanent dictatorship. Instead, he:
- Convened a Democratic Constituent Congress (CCD) to draft a new constitution.
- Held a referendum to ratify it.
- Organized general elections in 1995.
Fujimori won the 1995 election in a landslide (64%) against Javier Pérez de Cuéllar. International observers validated the election as procedurally “acceptable”, effectively washing away the sin of the 1992 coup. This validation ignored the underlying reality: the National Intelligence Service (SIN), led by Vladimiro Montesinos, was systematically bribing judges, media owners, and opposition figures to ensure Fujimori’s dominance. The “clean” election of 1995 masked the “dirty” institutional capture, allowing the regime to survive until the Vladivideos scandal exposed the rot in 2000. This case highlighted the danger of international observers focusing on election-day mechanics while ignoring the inter-election destruction of checks and balances.
Third-Generation (Autocratic Legalism)
Prevalent post-2010, the third-generation rigging involves “lawfare” (disqualifying candidates on technicalities), the capture of the judiciary, digital surveillance, internet shutdowns, and the deployment of “zombie observers” to dilute criticism.
The trajectory of Bangladesh under Sheikh Hasina (2009–2024) offers a stark illustration of how the procedural fallacy can eventually lead to regime collapse. Hasina employed progressively more brazen techniques to secure power:
- 2014: The “Uncontested Election” (BNP boycott leading to 153 uncontested seats).
- 2018: The “Midnight Election” (allegations of ballot stuffing the night before).
- 2024: The “Dummy Candidate” Election. To avoid another uncontested poll, the Awami League ran “independent” candidates who were actually party members to create the illusion of competition.
The international reaction to the January 2024 election was polarized. The U.S. and UK declared the elections “not free or fair”. Conversely, India, China, and Russia validated the results, prioritizing strategic partnership. Hasina relied on this geopolitical shield and the veneer of the election to claim legitimacy. However, this “procedural” victory severed the regime’s connection to the populace. Lacking genuine consent, the regime crumbled in August 2024 in the face of student protests, proving that while elections can satisfy foreign allies, they cannot permanently contain domestic rage without substantive legitimacy.
The Controversy of International Legitimacy
The persistence of electoralism is sustained by specific international mechanisms that allow autocrats to shop for legitimacy.
The “Zombie Observer” Phenomenon
Autocrats have neutralized the threat of international election observation by cultivating their own monitoring groups. Regimes in Azerbaijan, Cambodia, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe, invite observers from the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), and various “GONGOs” (Government-Organized NGOs). These missions invariably issue reports declaring the elections “transparent, free, and democratic,” often contradicting the findings of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or EU. This creates an “epistemic fog,” allowing the autocrat to claim that criticism is merely Western bias and pointing to “international validation” from friendly blocs.
However, the West has also repeatedly established and accepted authoritarian regimes as long as they support their interests. For example, the US and UK intelligence orchestrated the Operation Ajax to overthrow Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister, Mohammad Mossadegh, after he attempted to nationalize the British-controlled oil industry. In his place, they restored absolute power to the monarch, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. The Shah ruled autocratically with a brutal secret police force (SAVAK) but was heavily armed and supported by the West until he was overthrown in the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Similarly, the West supported the military rule of General Pervez Musharraf (1999–2008) for Pakistan was the frontline state in the “War on Terror”. With this support, General Musharraf conducted a referendum to consolidate his rule in 2002.
The Foreign Aid Trap
Research by Cheeseman and Desrosiers highlights how Western aid can inadvertently strengthen electoral autocracies. By continuing “everyday engagement” and funding “capacity building” for captured institutions (like judiciaries or electoral commissions), donors validate the structures of repression.
- The “Aid Curse”: In regimes like Rwanda and Uganda, high levels of aid reduce the government’s dependence on tax revenue, making them less accountable to their citizens.
- Bureaucratic Inertia: Donor agencies are incentivized to move money and demonstrate “technical” success (e.g., “we trained 500 judges”), often ignoring the political reality that those judges are not independent.
- Inconsistency: The discrepancy in how the West treats elections in strategic partners (Pakistan, Egypt) versus adversaries (Venezuela, Belarus) undermines the moral authority of democratic promotion.
Geopolitical Diversification
The rise of a multipolar world has been a boon for electoral autocrats. China and Russia offer a “no strings attached” alternative to Western validation. For regimes in Bangladesh, Cambodia, and Zimbabwe, the support of Beijing (via the Belt and Road Initiative) and Moscow provides an economic and diplomatic lifeline that renders Western conditionality ineffective. Autocrats can now “look East” for validation if the West demands too much democracy
Elections v/s Rule of Law
If elections are the engine of democracy, the Rule of Law is the chassis. Without a strong legal framework, the engine tears the vehicle apart. The World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index 2025 provides alarming evidence of a global “Rule of Law Recession” that is accelerating, undermining the very foundations of democratic governance.
The Global Rule of Law Recession
In 2025, the global rule of law continued to deteriorate, with 68% of countries, including Nepal, experiencing a decline in their scores. This represents a significant worsening from the previous year, where 57% of countries declined.
- Top Performers: The Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway, Finland, Sweden) and New Zealand continue to set the global standard. These nations demonstrate that high rule of law is inextricably linked to high levels of social trust, low corruption, and generally high voluntary voter turnout.
- Bottom Performers: Venezuela, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Haiti, and Nicaragua rank lowest. In these nations, the law has ceased to be a constraint on power and has become an instrument of state control.
The Collapse of Checks and Balances
The most concerning trend identified in the WJP 2025 report is the targeted erosion of constraints on government powers. The pillars that are meant to hold the executive branch accountable are crumbling.
- Legislative Weakness: Legislative checks on executive power declined in 61% of countries. Parliaments are increasingly bypassed by executive decrees or are dominated by super-majorities that act as rubber stamps for the leader’s will.
- Judicial Capture: The judiciary is the “last line of defense” against executive overreach, yet it is currently losing ground. Judicial independence declined in 61% of countries. When courts are captured, as seen in the 2024 judicial reforms in Mexico which introduced the popular election of judges, the capacity for legal redress vanishes.
Trust Deficit
When a citizen cannot resolve a land dispute fairly or enforce a business contract because the courts are corrupt or inefficient, their trust in the “system” evaporates. This breeds cynicism and paves the way for populist strongmen who promise “justice” through extra-legal means. The data shows a clear correlation: countries with low civil justice scores (e.g., Venezuela, Cambodia) also have the highest levels of democratic dysfunction.
Corruption v/s Democracy
Corruption is not merely a financial crime; it is a solvent that dissolves democracy. The 2024 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) report by Transparency International paints a grim picture of the relationship between graft and governance, revealing a world where anti-corruption efforts have stagnated.
Global Stagnation and Regional Trends
The global average CPI score remains stuck at 43/100, unchanged for over a decade. More than two-thirds of countries score below 50, indicating serious corruption problems.
- Eastern Europe and Central Asia: This region is trapped in a “vicious cycle” where weak democratic institutions allow corruption to flourish, and the proceeds of that corruption are used to further weaken institutions.
- Western Europe’s Slide: Even top-performing regions are backsliding. The UK (Rank 20) and other Western European nations have seen scores drop due to issues of “undue influence,” lobbying scandals, and the fraying of ethical standards in public office. This highlights that no democracy is immune to the corrosive effects of money in politics.
The Corruption-Turnout Nexus
The relationship between corruption and voter turnout is complex and context-dependent.
- The Mobilization Effect: In functioning democracies, high perceptions of corruption can increase turnout as angry citizens mobilize to punish incumbents through voting. This was evident in the 2024 elections in South Africa and Senegal, where frustration with entrenched corruption contributed to significant political shifts and the loss of majorities for ruling parties.
- The Apathy Effect: In contexts of systemic, endemic corruption, the effect is often the opposite. In Nigeria (CPI Score ~25), low turnout often reflects the widespread belief that the system is so rigged that voting changes nothing. When the electorate believes that all candidates are corrupt, the rational response is disengagement.
- The Populist Bridge: High corruption perceptions often predict the rise of populist leaders. When “mainstream” parties are viewed as corrupt elites, voters turn to “anti-system” candidates who often dismantle democratic checks under the guise of “draining the swamp.” This narrative has been potent in the US, Brazil, parts of Europe, and in Nepal.
Wealth v/s Democracy
Seymour Martin Lipset’s seminal 1959 modernization theory posited that economic development creates the social conditions—literacy, a robust middle class, and civil society—necessary for democracy. The data from 2024-2025 challenges the universality of this thesis, suggesting a more fractured relationship between wealth and liberty.
The Anomaly of Wealthy Autocracies
The existence of high-income autocracies contradicts the linear Lipset trajectory. Countries like Singapore, Qatar, and the UAE possess high GDP per capita but maintain restrictive political systems.
- The “Singapore Model”: Singapore ranks 3rd in the CPI (very clean) and has high governance effectiveness (Rank 9 in Governance Index), yet it restricts political pluralism. This represents the “technocratic authoritarian” ideal—a social contract where citizens trade political liberty for economic prosperity and administrative competence.
- The Rentier State: The Gulf States (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE) use oil rents to buy social peace, effectively severing the link between taxation and representation. The WJP Index shows these nations with relatively high rule of law scores regarding order and security, but abysmal ratings on fundamental rights. This demonstrates that wealth generated through resource extraction does not produce the same democratic pressures as wealth generated through industrialization or innovation.
Wealth Inequality: The Great Distorter
The distribution of wealth appears to be more predictive of democratic health than the aggregate wealth. High GDP per capita in the United States ($75,492 PPP) coexists with significant inequality and decline in democracy.
- Inequality and Voice: Research on civic engagement indicates that economic inequality skews political influence. In unequal societies, the wealthy have disproportionate access to policymakers through lobbying and campaign finance, while the poor are marginalized. This leads to policies that further entrench inequality, creating a cycle of exclusion.
- Poverty and Vulnerability: In lower-income democracies, poverty makes the electorate vulnerable to clientelism. Vote buying was recorded in at least 17 national elections in 2024, a direct consequence of economic vulnerability where a vote is sold for immediate subsistence needs rather than cast for long-term policy goals.
Conclusion
As we have seen from history, authoritarians have often arisen from elections and embraced them. Through clandestine operations and rigged international observers, they establish themselves as purveyors of democracy while dismantling democratic institutions. The global decline in rule of law and increasing corruption pose threat to the “rule of the people”.
Voting is necessary for democracy, but it should not be exclusive. As @NotsoLalit says in the embedded tweet, when grievances are reduced to elections, democracy becomes a formality and free pass for politicians to make promises without delivering anything. Also, a sustainable democracy is not limited to the tenure of elected representatives. It has to be a continuous process.
Ensuring meaningful participation of people at all levels is the key to strengthening democratic institutions. Moreover, without a restoration of the rule of law, the ballot box risks becoming nothing more than a coffin for liberty. The task ahead is not just to get out the vote, but to ensure that the vote still matters.
