Tag: Article 76

How Nepal Forms a Government: The 5-Step Constitutional Roadmap

On January 7, 2026

Constitution Study #17: A step-by-step description of the constitutional provisions (Article 76) for forming a government in Nepal

The period following a general election in Nepal is often chaotic. News cycles fill with talk of negotiations, power-sharing deals, and political “horse-trading”, leaving many citizens confused about what comes next. The uncertainty around which party or coalition wins or forms a government is a bigger battleground than the polls themselves.

Yet, amidst this perceived chaos, the Constitution of Nepal provides a surprisingly clear, step-by-step roadmap for forming a government. This framework, detailed in Article 76, is designed to navigate the complexities of a multi-party system. This article breaks down that complex constitutional process into five simple, understandable steps, framing it as a constitutional drama of escalating stakes.

Forming a government in Nepal:

Steps of government formation in Nepal according to Article 76.

Step 1: The Straightforward Path – A Clear Majority

The first and most straightforward method for forming a government is outlined in Article 76, Clause (1) of the Constitution. If a single political party wins a clear majority of seats in the House of Representatives, the President appoints the parliamentary leader of that party as the Prime Minister. This is the simplest and most stable path to forming a government.

This scenario represents the ideal for stable governance, as it provides a clear mandate and avoids the need for complex negotiations. However, in Nepal’s political landscape, a single-party majority has become a rarity. This is largely due to a political culture where parties are often feudalistic in nature and centred around their topmost leaders rather than cohesive ideologies, frequently resulting in fractured electoral mandates. The instability that challenges Nepal’s governance often stems from the fact that this first, ideal step is seldom achieved.

Step 2: When No One Wins Outright – The Art of the Coalition

When no single party secures a majority, the process moves to Article 76, Clause (2). Under this provision, the President appoints a member of the House of Representatives who can prove they have majority support through an alliance of two or more parties. This is the formation of a coalition government.

This is the most common path to power, reflecting a political culture where parties, often centred on individual leaders rather than ideology, engage in intense political broking. This necessity for compromise contributes directly to the “frequent changes in government” that challenge Nepal’s stability, as alliances are often transactional and built on fragile power-sharing agreements rather than durable policy consensus. Managing the competing demands of coalition partners often leads to policy gridlock and fragile alliances.

Election coalitions can break down, and new government coalitions can form, as evidenced in the aftermath of the 2022 elections. The then CPN Maoist (Centre) ran the elections along with Nepali Congress, but when the time for forming the government came, it broke the alliance and joined the other parties: CPN (UML), Rastriya Swatantra Party, Rastriya Prajatantra Party, People’s Socialist Party, Janamat Party, and Nagrik Unmukti Party, and three independents, with Pushpa Kamal Dahal heading the government.

Step 3: If Coalitions Crumble – The Largest Party’s Chance

If a coalition government cannot be formed within thirty days, the Constitution provides a third option under Article 76, Clause (3). The President will then appoint the parliamentary leader of the single largest party in the House of Representatives as Prime Minister. However, this appointment is conditional. As per Clause (4), this Prime Minister must win a “vote of confidence” from the House within thirty days to remain in power.

This provision acts as a critical safeguard to prevent complete political deadlock when coalition talks fail. It ensures that a government can be formed, even if it lacks an upfront majority. However, this type of minority government is inherently fragile. This precariousness forces the largest party to govern not by mandate, but by perpetual negotiation, often making it vulnerable to the shifting allegiances of smaller parties.

In 2023, after the CPN (UML) withdrew its support for Pushpa Kamal Dahal, the Nepali Congress had the opportunity to lead according to this provision. However, the Congress did not take a risk and joined with the CPN (UML). KP Sharma Oli was once again appointed Prime Minister according to Article 76(2).

Step 4: The Last Attempt – Any Member’s Claim

Where Step 3 empowers the leader of the single largest party, Step Four dramatically widens the field. If the minority Prime Minister from Step Three fails to win the vote of confidence, the process moves to a crucial and often contentious final attempt under Article 76, Clause (5). The President will then appoint any member of the House who can present grounds (e.g., letters of support from a sufficient number of members) demonstrating they are able to win a vote of confidence. This Prime Minister must also secure that vote of confidence within thirty days, as stipulated in Clause (6).

This clause is the constitution’s most radical attempt to break parliamentary gridlock. By allowing any member to stake a claim, it theoretically bypasses the rigid, hierarchical party structures that often cause deadlock. It opens the door for consensus candidates to emerge from outside the established leadership, but has also become a focal point of constitutional debate, as it can trigger intense political maneuvering and legal challenges regarding what constitutes valid “grounds” for a claim.

Step 5: Dissolution and a New Election

If all previous attempts fail, including the Prime Minister appointed in Step 4 being unable to secure a vote of confidence, the process reaches its definitive conclusion under Article 76, Clause (7). In this event, the President, on the recommendation of the Prime Minister, will dissolve the House of Representatives and call for new general elections to be held within six months.

This is the constitution’s last resort: a political circuit breaker designed to prevent a complete system overload by returning power to its ultimate source—the people. This step embodies the principle of popular sovereignty enshrined in the constitution’s preamble, ensuring that when the elected representatives fail, the ultimate authority returns to the people. However, it comes at a significant cost, ushering in a period of political instability and the considerable expense of another national election.

Conclusion: A Framework for Stability or a Recipe for Intrigue?

The Constitution of Nepal lays out a detailed, multi-layered process for government formation. It is designed to exhaust every possible avenue for creating a functional government from the elected parliament before returning to the voters for a new mandate. This five-step cascade is a direct response to the nation’s complex political realities. This cycle of formation and dissolution at the federal level has cascading effects, often delaying the implementation of laws and policies crucial for empowering Nepal’s provincial and local governments and deepening its fragile federalism.

This leaves us with a critical question for the future of Nepal’s democracy: does this intricate, multi-stage process serve as a robust framework for stability in a fragmented polity, or does this complexity create perverse incentives for the political manoeuvring and constitutional brinkmanship it is designed to prevent?

An infographic about Nepal's current constitutional crisis

Nepal’s Constitutional Crisis: When a 27-Hour Protest Rewrites the Rules of Power

By Sandeept

On December 3, 2025

In Constitution Study, Blogging, Nepal, Nepali, Politics

Constitution Study #14: Clash of the Constitutional Mandate and Popular Uprising

A Nation at a Constitutional Crossroads

In a move that has shaken Nepal’s political foundations, the Gen Z-led anti-corruption movement on September 8-9 swept the KP Sharma Oli government from power. In the ensuing political vacuum, President Ramchandra Paudel executed an unprecedented solution: the September 12 appointment of former chief justice Sushila Karki as interim Prime Minister. This decision, followed by the dissolution of the House of Representatives, was hailed by some as a necessary response to the popular will but has plunged the nation into its most profound constitutional crisis yet.

This is more than a mere political debate; it is a fundamental stress test of Nepal’s young constitution. The appointment has ignited a fierce legal battle, pitting the raw power of popular sovereignty against the established bulwarks of judicial precedent and the separation of powers. As ten petitions challenging the government’s legitimacy land at the Supreme Court, Nepal is forced to confront a question that will define its democratic future: Are the rules that govern the state absolute, or can they be rewritten by the force of a people’s movement?

In this post…

1. The Blueprint for Power: How Nepal’s Executive is Supposed to Work

The current crisis is unintelligible without a firm grasp of Nepal’s constitutional blueprint for executive power, specifically the procedures laid out in Part-7 of the Constitution. Article 74 establishes a “multi-party competitive federal democratic republican parliamentary form of governance.” This framework is not merely a suggestion; it is the binding charter for political legitimacy.

At its core, Article 76 provides a clear, step-by-step process for appointing a Prime Minister. The President is to appoint the leader of the parliamentary party that commands a majority in the House of Representatives. Recognizing the complexities of coalition politics, the article also provides a sequence of fallback options in clauses (2), (3), and (5) for scenarios where no single party holds a majority. This constitutional playbook is the only established path to forming a government, which the recent political rupture cast aside.

2. The Political Rupture: A Protest, a President, and an Unprecedented Appointment

The crisis unfolded with breathtaking speed. Following the ousting of the KP Sharma Oli government by a massive Gen Z-led anti-corruption movement on September 8-9, the nation’s political order was upended. On September 12, President Ramchandra Paudel, acting on the recommendation of movement representatives, appointed former chief justice Sushila Karki to lead an interim government. On Prime Minister Karki’s recommendation, the President then dissolved the House of Representatives and gave the new government a six-month mandate to conduct parliamentary elections, scheduled for March 5. This rapid sequence of events, occurring over just a few days, bypassed the established constitutional process and triggered an immediate judicial backlash in the form of ten petitions filed in the Supreme Court.

These petitions challenge two distinct but deeply intertwined actions: the formation of Karki’s government and her subsequent recommendation to dissolve the House. The challenge to Karki’s appointment is therefore foundational; if her premiership is deemed unconstitutional, then her recommendation to dissolve the House—the second major point of contention—is invalid from the start.

3. The Core of the Controversy: Can a Former Chief Justice Become Prime Minister?

The petitioners’ case against Sushila Karki’s premiership hinges on a direct, literal reading of a single constitutional clause designed to safeguard judicial independence. They argue that her appointment as Prime Minister is an unambiguous breach of Article 132 (2), which is intended to prevent the politicization of the judiciary. The article states:

“No person who has once held the office of Chief Justice or a Justice of the Supreme Court shall be eligible for appointment to any government office, except as otherwise provided for in this Constitution.”

However, a sophisticated counter-argument has emerged, positing that this clause does not apply to the prime ministership. Ram Lohani, Associate Professor, Tribhuvan University first argues that the Prime Minister’s post is not an office that the President “assigns” someone to work in. Whereas the President has discretion in other appointments, Article 76 obligates the President to appoint any person who meets the constitutional criteria, such as commanding a majority. The Prime Minister is therefore not “put to work” by the President but rather assumes an office by constitutional right.

This leads to the second, crucial distinction: the difference between a “government office” and a “political post“. Lohani argues that Article 132’s prohibition applies only to the former. He notes that other constitutional articles, such as 238(8) and 240(8), explicitly permit former members of constitutional commissions to hold “political posts” while barring them from other “government service.” This distinction, he argues, implies that political roles like Prime Minister fall outside the scope of the prohibition placed on former justices. This clash between a literal interpretation and a nuanced, structural one lies at the heart of the legal controversy.

4. A Dissolved House: Constitutional Move or a Breach of Precedent?

The second constitutional challenge targets the dissolution of the House of Representatives, an act petitioners claim is both unconstitutional and a direct repudiation of the Supreme Court’s own landmark rulings. The argument carries significant weight, as:

“The court had reinstated the House of Representatives twice after it was dissolved by the then Oli-led government in 2020 and 2021. It had ruled that the constitution envisions a full five-year term for the lower house.”

Petitioners contend that in endorsing the dissolution, President Paudel violated his primary duty under Article 61: “to abide by and protect the Constitution.”

In response, supporters of the move, including some constitutional experts, frame the dissolution not as a legal breach but as a “political solution to a political problem.” They argue that the extraordinary circumstances, born from a popular uprising against a failing political class, demand a departure from rigid legalism. This perspective is articulated forcefully by senior advocate Dinesh Tripathi:

“In the changed context, decisions should be made accordingly by the court. This is the change brought about by a political movement.”

This viewpoint asks the court to prioritize the perceived spirit of political change over its own carefully constructed precedent, presenting a direct challenge to the court’s role as the ultimate arbiter of constitutional text.

Conclusion: Law, Spirit, and the Path Forward

Nepal now stands at a precipice, forced to reconcile the rigid text of its Constitution with the undeniable force of a popular movement demanding a political reset. The creation of an extra-parliamentary government and the dissolution of the House represent a profound departure from the constitutional order, justified by its architects as a necessary response to an existential crisis of governance.

The Supreme Court’s impending decision will be its most consequential to date. The verdict will not only determine the legality of Karki’s government but, more importantly, will define the very nature of Nepal’s constitutional democracy. At stake is a fundamental question:

Is this a singular, emergency-driven deviation from the rules, or does it set a precedent for a new, extra-constitutional pathway to power that could be abused in the future?

The court’s ruling will determine whether Nepal’s democratic institutions are resilient enough to withstand political storms or fragile enough to break under the weight of popular pressure.